PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY

Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries

SECOND EDITION

AREND LIJPHART

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for
Gisela
and for our grandchildren,
Connor,
Aidan,
Arel,
Caio,
Senta, and
Dorian,

in the hope that the twenty-first century—their century—will yet become more democratic, more peaceful, kinder, and gentler than the one our generation has bequeathed to them

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PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

I welcome the opportunity to publish an updated edition of *Patterns of Democracy,* originally published in 1999, because it gives me an opportunity to test whether my main findings and conclusions continue to be valid—especially my finding that the great variety of formal and informal rules and institutions that we find in democracies can be reduced to a clear two-dimensional pattern on the basis of the contrast between majoritarian and consensus forms of government, and my conclusion that consensus democracies (measured on the first of these dimensions) have a superior record with regard to effective policy-making and the quality of democracy compared with majoritarian democracies. The basic organization of the book has not changed, but the data on which its empirical analysis is based has changed in important ways.

First, my analysis continues to compare the same number of democracies—thirty-six—but three of the countries had to be removed because they are no longer free and democratic according to the criteria of Freedom House: Colombia, Venezuela, and Papua New Guinea. I replaced them with Argentina, Uruguay, and Korea, which returned to democracy in the 1980s.

Second, I extended the analysis from 1996 to 2010, which en-

tails a considerable increase in the time span during which the other thirty-three democracies are analyzed: a 74 percent increase for the newest democracies included in the first edition—India and Spain—smaller but still substantial increases for the countries that became democratic between the 1950s and the early 1970s, and even a significant 28 percent increase for the older democracies analyzed from the late 1940s on.

Third, I made no major changes in the definition and measurement of the ten basic variables that make up the majoritarian-consensus contrast, with two important exceptions. In hindsight, I concluded that the way I operationalized executive dominance in Chapter 7 of the original edition was too complicated and cumbersome; I therefore use a much simpler and more straightforward operationalization in the updated edition. In Chapter 13, I was forced to change the treatment of central bank independence because from the mid-1990s on the internationalization of central banking—in particular, the creation of the European Central Bank and changes in several national central bank charters demanded by the International Monetary Fund—changed the status of central banks from domestic institutions to organizations in the international system. A less important change is that I reduced my discussion of the issue dimensions of partisan conflict—which is not an institutional variable and is not one of the basic ten variables distinguishing majoritarian from consensus democracy—from about a third of Chapter 5 to a more appropriately short addendum to that chapter.

Fourth, the biggest changes are in Chapters 15 and 16 with regard to the variables by which I measure the performance of consensus versus majoritarian democracies. Some of these variables—like economic growth, the control of inflation and unemployment, women's representation, and political equality—are the same as in the original edition, but the data on them are for later periods and therefore almost completely new. A few others, like social expenditure and environmental performance, are also the same but measured by new and different indexes. And then there are

entirely new variables not used in the original edition at all. I also streamlined the presentation of the results of the regression analyses. Instead of showing the bivariate relationships between consensus democracy and the performance variables in the tables and discussing the influence of control variables, especially the impact of the level of economic development and population size, in the accompanying text, I now have tables showing multivariate regression analyses of the effects of consensus democracy with these two standard controls in place in all instances.

Generally the quality of all the new data is a great deal better than the quality of the data that I had at my disposal in the mid-1990s, and they are available for many more countries. In particular, I made grateful use of two entirely new and highly relevant datasets for the measurement of the quality of government and the quality of democracy, respectively: the Worldwide Governance Indicators and the data of the Democracy Index project of the Economist Intelligence Unit. Not only have excellent data become much more available in the past decade, but they have also become more easily accessible. In the preface to the first edition, I wrote that I might not have been able to write it without the invention of email. I can now add that this new edition might not have been possible, or would have been much more difficult to write, without all of the information that is available on the internet.

To briefly preview my conclusions in the updated edition, I find that my original conclusions are amply confirmed. In fact, the evidence with regard to the interrelationships of my ten majoritarian versus consensus characteristics and with regard to the superior performance of consensus democracy has become even clearer and stronger.

The preparation of a study of as many as thirty-six countries is impossible without the input of many comparative and country experts. I am deeply grateful to my friends and colleagues for the valuable advice and assistance I received from them. First of all,

I want to express my thanks again to everyone who helped me with the first edition of this book. Their input is still reflected in the contents of this second edition, too.

I was especially in need of assistance with regard to the three new countries in the updated edition, and I am grateful for the excellent advice on Korean politics from Taekyoon Kim, Kyoung-Ryung Seong, Jong-Sung You, and my Korean research assistant, Don S. Lee. For Argentina and Uruguay I had a huge team of aides and advisers, and I am deeply indebted to them all: David Altman, Octavio Amorim Neto, Marcelo Camerlo, Rossana Castiglioni, Sebastián Etchemendy, Mark P. Jones, Jorge Lanzaro, Andrés Malamud, M. Victoria Murillo, Sebastián M. Saiegh, and Andrew Schrank. For recent developments in several other countries I relied on the advice of Edward M. Dew, Fragano S. J. Ledgister, Ralph R. Premdas, and Rajendra Ramlogan (Barbados and the other Caribbean countries); Carl Devos and Luc Huyse (Belgium); Pradeep K. Chhibber and Ashutosh Varshney (India); Yuko Kasuya and Mikitaka Masuyama (Japan); Deborah Bräutigam, Jørgen Elklit, Shaheen Mozaffar, Linganaden Murday, and Nadarajen Sivaramen (Mauritius); Peter Aimer and Jack Vowles (New Zealand); Richard Gunther and Óscar Martínez-Tapia (Spain); Matthew Flinders, Michael Gallagher, and Thomas C. Lundberg (United Kingdom); and Gary C. Jacobson (United States).

I am equally grateful to all of the scholars who helped me in important subject areas: Krista Hoekstra, Hans Keman, Jelle Koedam, and Jaap Woldendorp (cabinet coalitions); Daniel M. Brinks, Isaac Herzog, Donald W. Jackson, and Mary L. Volcansek (judicial review); Christopher Crowe and Mauro F. Guillén (central banks); and Scott Desposato, Stephen J. K. Lee, Philip G. Roeder, and Sebastián M. Saiegh (statistical and computer issues). Other scholars whom I would like to thank without placing them in country or subject categories are Ernesto Alvarez, Jr., Julian Bernauer, Joseph H. Brooks, Royce Carroll, Josep M. Colomer, Zachary Elkins, John Gerring, Ronald F. Inglehart, Mona Lena Krook, Sanford A. Lakoff, Dieter Nohlen, Matt H. Qvortrup, Manfred G. Schmidt, Alan Siaroff, Fabia Soehngen, Rein Taagepera, Steven L. Taylor, and Adrian Vatter.

In April 2011, I gave seminars on the findings of this updated edition at the Juan March Institute in Madrid and at the Madrid campus of Suffolk University, and in November 2011 a similar seminar in the Department of Politics of the University of Antwerp. The comments and questions I received from the participants in these seminars were very helpful. I would also like to thank William Frucht, executive editor at Yale University Press, for the strong encouragement he gave me to write an updated edition, and Laura Jones Dooley, who expertly copyedited both the first and second editions. Above all, I owe special thanks to my two research assistants, Christopher J. Fariss and Don S. Lee. Chris was my main statistical adviser, and he prepared almost all of the figures in Chapters 6 to 14 as well as the factor analysis reported in Chapter 14. Don collected and organized most of the macroeconomic and violence data for Chapter 15. I am deeply grateful for their help, hard work, and friendship.

Preface to the First Edition

My book *Democracies,* published in 1984, was a comparative study of twenty-one democracies in the period 1945–80. Its most important findings were (1) that the main institutional rules and practices of modern democracies—such as the organization and operation of executives, legislatures, party systems, electoral systems, and the relationships between central and lower-level governments—can all be measured on scales from majoritarianism at one end to consensus on the other, (2) that these institutional characteristics form two distinct clusters, and (3) that, based on this dichotomous clustering, a two-dimensional "conceptual map" of democracy can be drawn on which each of the democracies can be located. My original plan for a second edition was to reinforce this theoretical framework and the empirical findings mainly by means of an update to the mid-1990s—an almost 50 percent increase in the total time span—with only a few additional corrections and adjustments.

When I began work on the revision, however, I realized that it offered me a great opportunity for much more drastic improvements. I decided to add not just the updated materials but also fifteen new countries, new operationalizations of the institutional

variables, two completely new institutional variables, an attempt to gauge the stability of the countries' positions on the conceptual map, and an analysis of the performance of the different types of democracy with regard to a large number of public policies. As a result, while *Patterns of Democracy* grew out of *Democracies,* it has become an entirely new book rather than a second edition.

For those readers who are familiar with *Democracies,* let me describe the principal changes in *Patterns of Democracy* in somewhat greater detail:

1. *Patterns of Democracy* covers thirty-six countries—fifteen more than the twenty-one countries of *Democracies.* This new set of thirty-six countries is not just numerically larger but considerably more diverse. The original twenty-one democracies were all industrialized nations and, with one exception (Japan), Western countries. The fifteen new countries include four European nations (Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Malta), but the other eleven—almost one-third of the total of thirty-six—are developing countries in Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, Asia, and the Pacific. This greater diversity provides a critical test of the two-dimensional pattern found in *Democracies.* A minor change from *Democracies* is that I dropped the French Fourth Republic (1946–58) because it lasted only twelve years—in contrast with the minimum of almost twenty years of democracy for all other cases; in this book, "France" means the Fifth Republic from 1958 on.
2. In *Democracies,* I analyzed the twenty-one countries from their first national elections in or soon after 1945 until the end of 1980. *Patterns of Democracy* extends this period until the middle of 1996. For the original countries (except France), the starting-point is still the second half of the 1940s; for the others, the analysis begins with their first elections upon the achievement of independence or the resumption of democracy—ranging from 1953 (Costa Rica) to 1977 (India, Papua New Guinea, and Spain.)

3. The two new institutions analyzed in *Patterns of Democracy* are interest groups and central banks (Chapters 9 and 13). Two other variables that were discussed prominently in *Democracies* and given chapters of their own—the issue dimensions of partisan conflict and referendums—are "demoted" in *Patterns of Democracy.* I now discuss them more briefly in Chapters 5 and 12, and I have dropped the issue dimensions as one of the five elements of the first cluster of characteristics because, unlike all the other variables, it is not an institutional characteristic. The first cluster still consists of five variables, however, because the interest group system is now added to it. The second cluster is expanded from three to five elements: I split the variable of constitutional rigidity versus flexibility into two separate variables—the difficulty of constitutional amendment and the strength of judicial review—and I added the variable of central bank independence.
4. I critically reviewed the operationalization of all of the institutional characteristics, and I found that almost all could be, and should be, improved. My overriding objective was to maximize the validity of my quantitative indicators—that is, to capture the "reality" of the political phenomena, which are often difficult to quantify, as closely as possible. One frequent problem was that I was faced with two alternative operationalizations that appeared to be equally justified. In such cases, I consistently chose to "split the difference" by combining or averaging the alternatives instead of more or less arbitrarily picking one instead of the other. In the end, only the operationalization of the party system variables—in terms of the effective number of parliamentary parties—survived almost (but not completely) intact from *Democracies.* All of the others were modified to a significant extent.
5. In *Democracies,* I placed my democracies on the conceptual map of democracy on the basis of their average institutional practices in the thirty to thirty-five years under consideration; I did not raise the question of how much change may have oc-

curred over time. Chapter 14 of *Patterns of Democracy* does look into this matter by dividing the approximately fifty years from 1945 to 1996 into separate periods of 1945–70 and 1971–96 and by showing how much—or how little—twenty-six of the democracies (those with a sufficient number of years in the first period) shifted their positions on the conceptual map from the first to the second period.

6. Perhaps the most important new subject covered in *Patterns of Democracy* is the "so what?" question: does the type of democracy make a difference for public policy and for the effectiveness of government? Chapter 15 investigates the relationship between the degree of consensus democracy and how successful governments are in their macroeconomic management (such as economic growth and the control of inflation and unemployment) and the control of violence. Chapter 16 looks at several indicators of the quality of democracy (such as women's representation, equality, and voter participation) and the records of the governments with regard to welfare policies, environmental protection, criminal justice, and economic aid to developing countries.
7. I began *Democracies* with sketches of British and New Zealand politics as illustrative examples of the Westminster model of democracy and similar brief accounts of Swiss and Belgian democracy as examples of the consensus model. *Patterns of Democracy* updates these four sketches and adds Barbados and the European Union as two further examples of the respective models.
8. *Democracies* presented the relationships between the different variables by means of tables with cross-tabulations. In *Patterns of Democracy,* I generally use scattergrams that show these relationships and the positions of each of the thirty-six democracies in a much clearer, more accurate, and visually more attractive fashion.
9. *Patterns of Democracy* adds an appendix with the values on all ten institutional variables and the two overall majoritarian-consensus dimensions for the entire period 1945–96 and for the shorter period 1971–96. The ready availability of these basic data as part of the book should facilitate replications that other scholars may want to perform as well as the use of these data for further research.

It would have been impossible for me to analyze the thirty-six countries covered in *Patterns of Democracy* without the help of a host of scholarly advisers—and almost impossible without the invention of email! I am extremely grateful for all of the facts and interpretations contributed by my advisers and for their unfailingly prompt responses to my numerous queries.

On the Latin American democracies, I received invaluable assistance from Octavio Amorim Neto, John M. Carey, Brian F. Crisp, Michael J. Coppedge, Jonathan Hartlyn, Gary Hoskin, Mark P. Jones, J. Ray Kennedy, Scott Mainwaring, and Matthew S. Shugart. Thomas C. Bruneau, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, and Richard Gunther helped me understand the Mediterranean democracies better. Ralph R. Premdas was a key consultant on the Caribbean democracies, together with Edward M. Dew, Neville R. Francis, Percy C. Hintzen, and Fragano S. J. Ledgister. Pradeep K. Chhibber and Ashutosh Varshney helped me solve a number of puzzles in the politics of India. With regard to some of the small and underanalyzed countries, I was particularly dependent on the willingness of area and country experts to provide facts and explanations: John D. Holm, Bryce Kunimoto, Shaheen Mozaffar, and Andrew S. Reynolds on Botswana; John C. Lane on Malta; Hansraj Mathur and Larry W. Bowman on Mauritius; and Ralph Premdas (again) as well as Ben Reilly and Ron May on Papua New Guinea.

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In October 1997, I gave an intensive two-week seminar, largely based on draft materials for *Patterns of Democracy,* at the Institute for Advance Studies in Vienna; I am grateful for the many helpful comments I received from Josef Melchior, Bernhard Kittel, and the graduate students who participated in the seminar sessions. In April and May 1998, I gave similar lectures and seminars at several universities in New Zealand: the University of Canterbury in Christchurch, the University of Auckland, Victoria University of Wellington, and the University of Waikato in Hamilton. Here, too, I benefited from many useful reactions, and I want to thank Peter Aimer, Jonathan Boston, John Henderson, Martin Holland, Keith Jackson, Raymond Miller, Nigel S. Roberts, and Jack Vowles in particular.

James N. Druckman expertly executed the factor analysis reported in Chapter 14. Ian Budge, Hans Keman, and Jaap Woldendorp provided me with their new data on cabinet formation before these were published. Several other scholars also generously shared their not yet published or only partly published data with me: data on the composition of federal chambers from Alfred Stepan and Wilfried Swenden's Federal Databank; data on the distance between governments and voters collected by John D. Huber and G. Bingham Powell, Jr.; and Christopher J. Anderson and Christine A. Guillory's data on satisfaction with democracy. Last, but certainly not least, I am very grateful for the work of my research assistants Nastaran Afari, Risa A. Brooks, Linda L. Christian, and Stephen M. Swindle.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

There are many ways in which, in principle, a democracy can be organized and run; in practice, too, modern democracies exhibit a variety of formal governmental institutions, like legislatures and courts, as well as political party and interest group systems. However, clear patterns and regularities appear when these institutions are examined from the perspective of how majoritarian or how consensual their rules and practices are. The majoritarianism-consensus contrast arises from the most basic and literal definition of democracy—government by the people or, in representative democracy, government by the representatives of the people—and from President Abraham Lincoln's famous further stipulation that democracy means government not only *by* but also *for* the people—that is, government in accordance with the people's prefererences.[1]

Defining democracy as "government by and for the people"

1. As Clifford D. May (1987) points out, credit for this definition should probably go to Daniel Webster instead of Lincoln. Webster gave an address in 1830—thirty-three years before Lincoln's Gettysburg address—in which he spoke of a "people's government, made for the people, made by the people, and answerable to the people."

raises a fundamental question: Who will do the governing and to whose interests should the government be responsive when the people are in disagreement and have divergent preferences? One answer to this dilemma is: the majority of the people. This is the essence of the majoritarian model of democracy. The majoritarian answer is simple and straightforward and has great appeal because government by the majority and in accordance with the majority's wishes obviously comes closer to the democratic ideal of "government by and for the people" than government by and responsive to a minority.

The alternative answer to the dilemma is: as many people as possible. This is the crux of the consensus model. It does not differ from the majoritarian model in accepting that majority rule is better than minority rule, but it accepts majority rule only as a *minimum* requirement: instead of being satisfied with narrow decision-making majorities, it seeks to maximize the size of these majorities. Its rules and institutions aim at broad participation in government and broad agreement on the policies that the government should pursue. The majoritarian model concentrates political power in the hands of a bare majority—and often even merely a plurality instead of a majority, as Chapter 2 will show—whereas the consensus model tries to share, disperse, and limit power in a variety of ways. A closely related difference is that the majoritarian model of democracy is exclusive, competitive, and adversarial, whereas the consensus model is characterized by inclusiveness, bargaining, and compromise; for this reason, consensus democracy could also be termed "negotiation democracy" (Kaiser 1997, 434).

Ten differences with regard to the most important democratic institutions and rules can be deduced from the majoritarian and consensus principles. Because the majoritarian characteristics are derived from the same principle and hence are logically connected, one could also expect them to occur together in the real world; the same applies to the consensus characteristics. All ten variables could therefore be expected to be closely related. Previous research has largely confirmed these expectations—with one major exception: the variables cluster in two clearly separate dimensions (Lijphart 1984, 211–22). The first dimension groups five characteristics of the arrangement of executive power, the party and electoral systems, and interest groups. For brevity's sake, I shall refer to this first dimension as the *executives-parties dimension*. Since most of the five differences on the second dimension are commonly associated with the contrast between federalism and unitary government—a matter to which I shall return shortly—I shall call this second dimension the *federal-unitary dimension*.

The ten differences are formulated below in terms of dichotomous contrasts between the majoritarian and consensus models, but they are all variables on which particular countries may be at either end of the continuum or anywhere in between. The majoritarian characteristic is listed first in each case. The five differences on the executives-parties dimension are as follows:

1. Concentration of executive power in single-party majority cabinets versus executive power-sharing in broad multiparty coalitions.
2. Executive-legislative relationships in which the executive is dominant versus executive-legislative balance of power.
3. Two-party versus multiparty systems.
4. Majoritarian and disproportional electoral systems versus proportional representation.
5. Pluralist interest group systems with free-for-all competition among groups versus coordinated and "corporatist" interest group systems aimed at compromise and concertation.

The five differences on the federal-unitary dimension are the following:

1. Unitary and centralized government versus federal and decentralized government.
2. Concentration of legislative power in a unicameral legislature versus division of legislative power between two equally strong but differently constituted houses.

3. Flexible constitutions that can be amended by simple majorities versus rigid constitutions that can be changed only by extraordinary majorities.
4. Systems in which legislatures have the final word on the constitutionality of their own legislation versus systems in which laws are subject to a judicial review of their constitutionality by supreme or constitutional courts.
5. Central banks that are dependent on the executive versus independent central banks.

One plausible explanation of this two-dimensional pattern is suggested by the classical theorists of federalism—Ivo D. Duchacek (1970), Daniel J. Elazar (1968), Carl J. Friedrich (1950, 189–221), and K. C. Wheare (1946)—as well as by many contemporary theorists (Colomer 2011, 85–100; Hueglin and Fenna 2006; Stepan 2001, 315–61; Watts 2008). These scholars maintain that federalism has primary and secondary meanings. Its primary definition is: a guaranteed division of power between the central government and regional governments. The secondary characteristics are strong bicameralism, a rigid constitution, and strong judicial review. Their argument is that the guarantee of a federal division of power can work well only if (1) both the guarantee and the exact lines of the division of power are clearly stated in the constitution and this guarantee cannot be changed unilaterally at either the central or regional level—hence the need for a rigid constitution, (2) there is a neutral arbiter who can resolve conflicts concerning the division of power between the two levels of government—hence the need for judicial review, and (3) there is a federal chamber in the national legislature in which the regions have strong representation—hence the need for strong bicameralism; moreover, (4) the main purpose of federalism is to promote and protect a decentralized system of government. These federalist characteristics can be found in the first four variables of the second dimension. As stated earlier, this dimension is therefore called the federal-unitary dimension.

The federalist explanation is not entirely satisfactory, however, for two reasons. One problem is that, although it can explain the clustering of the four variables in one dimension, it does not explain why this dimension should be so clearly distinct from the other dimension. Second, it cannot explain why the variable of central bank independence is part of the federal-unitary dimension. A more persuasive explanation of the two-dimensional pattern is the distinction between "collective agency" and "shared responsibility" on one hand and divided agencies and responsibilities on the other suggested by Robert E. Goodin (1996, 331).[2] These are both forms of diffusion of power, but the first dimension of consensus democracy with its multiparty face-to-face interactions *within* cabinets, legislatures, legislative committees, and concertation meetings between governments and interest groups has a close fit with the collective-responsibility form. In contrast, both the four federalist characteristics and the role of central banks fit the format of diffusion by means of institutional separation: division of power between separate federal and state institutions, two separate chambers in the legislature, and separate and independent high courts and central banks. Viewed from this perspective, the first dimension could also be labeled the joint-responsibility or joint-power dimension and the second the divided-responsibility or divided-power dimension. However, although these labels would be more accurate and theoretically more meaningful, my original labels—"executives-parties" and "federal-unitary"—have the great advantage that they are easier to remember, and I shall therefore keep using them throughout this book.

The distinction between two basic types of democracy, majoritarian and consensus, is by no means a novel invention in political science. In fact, I borrowed these two terms from Robert G. Dixon, Jr. (1968, 10). Hans Hattenhauer and Werner Kaltefleiter

2. A similar distinction, made by George Tsebelis (2002), is that between "institutional veto players," located in different institutions, and "partisan veto players" such as the parties within a government coalition.

(1986) also contrast the "majority principle" with consensus, and Jürg Steiner (1971) juxtaposes "the principles of majority and proportionality." G. Bingham Powell, Jr. (1982), distinguishes between majoritarian and broadly "representational" forms of democracy and, in later work, between two "democratic visions": majoritarian and proportional (Powell 2000). Similar contrasts have been drawn by Robert A. Dahl (1956)—"populistic" versus "Madisonian" democracy; William H. Riker (1982)—"populism" versus "liberalism"; Jane Mansbridge (1980)—"adversary" versus "unitary" democracy; and S. E. Finer (1975)—"adversary politics" versus centrist and coalitional politics.

Nevertheless, there is a surprisingly strong and persistent tendency in political science to equate democracy solely with majoritarian democracy and to fail to recognize consensus democracy as an alternative and equally legitimate type. A particularly clear example can be found in Stephanie Lawson's (1993, 192–93) argument that a strong political opposition is "the *sine qua non* of contemporary democracy" and that its prime purpose is "to become the government." This view is based on the majoritarian assumption that democracy entails a two-party system (or possibly two opposing blocs of parties) that alternate in government; it fails to take into account that governments in more consensual multiparty systems tend to be coalitions and that a change in government in these systems usually means only a partial change in the party composition of the government—instead of the opposition "becoming" the government (Lundell 2011).

The frequent use of the "turnover" test in order to determine whether a democracy has become stable and consolidated betrays the same majoritarian assumption. Samuel P. Huntington (1991, 266–67) even proposes a "two-turnover test," according to which "a democracy may be viewed as consolidated if the party or group that takes power in the initial election at the time of transition [to democracy] loses a subsequent election and turns over power to those election winners, and if those election winners then peacefully turn over power to the winners of a later

election." Of the twenty countries with the longest democratic history analyzed in this book, all of which are undoubtedly stable and consolidated democratic systems, no fewer than three—Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Switzerland—fail even the one-turnover test during the more than sixty years from the late 1940s to 2010, that is, they experienced many cabinet changes but never a complete turnover, and six—the same three countries plus Belgium, Finland, and Germany—fail the two-turnover test.

This book will show that pure or almost pure majoritarian democracies are actually quite rare—limited to the United Kingdom, New Zealand (until 1996), and the former British colonies in the Caribbean (but only with regard to the executives-parties dimension). Most democracies have significant or even predominantly consensual traits. Moreover, as this book shows, consensus democracy may be considered more democratic than majoritarian democracy in most respects.

The ten contrasting characteristics of the two models of democracy, briefly listed above, are described in a preliminary fashion and exemplified by means of sketches of relatively pure cases of majoritarian democracy—the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Barbados—and of relatively pure cases of consensus democracy—Switzerland, Belgium, and the European Union—in Chapters 2 and 3. The thirty-six empirical cases of democracy, including the five just mentioned (but not the European Union), that were selected for the comparative analysis are systematically introduced in Chapter 4. The ten institutional variables are then analyzed in greater depth in the nine chapters that comprise the bulk of this book (Chapters 5 to 13). Chapter 14 summarizes the results and places the thirty-six democracies on a two-dimensional "conceptual map" of democracy; it also analyzes shifts on the map over time and shows that most countries occupy stable positions on the map. Chapters 15 and 16 ask the "so what?" question: Does the type of democracy make a difference, especially with regard to effective policy-making and the quality of democracy? These chapters show that consensus democracies score significantly higher

on a wide array of indicators of democratic quality and that they also have better records with regard to governing effectiveness, although the differences in this respect are not as large. Chapter 17 concludes with a look at the policy implications of the book's findings for democratizing and newly democratic countries.

CHAPTER 2

THE WESTMINSTER MODEL OF DEMOCRACY

In this book I use the term *Westminster model* interchangeably with *majoritarian model* to refer to a general model of democracy. It may also be used more narrowly to denote the main characteristics of *British* parliamentary and governmental institutions (G. Wilson 1994; Mahler 1997)—the Parliament of the United Kingdom meets in the Palace of Westminster in London. The British version of the Westminster model is both the original and the best-known example of this model. It is also widely admired. Richard Rose (1974, 131) points out that, "with confidence born of continental isolation, Americans have come to assume that their institutions—the Presidency, Congress and the Supreme Court—are the prototype of what should be adopted elsewhere." But American political scientists, especially those in the field of comparative politics, have tended to hold the British system of government in at least equally high esteem (Kavanagh 1974).

One famous political scientist who fervently admired the Westminster model was President Woodrow Wilson. In his early writings he went so far as to urge the abolition of presidential government and the adoption of British-style parliamentary government