

# The Orange Revolution: ‘People’s Revolution’ or Revolutionary Coup?

David Lane

*The ‘Orange Revolution’ in Ukraine is widely considered to be an instance of the ‘coloured revolutions’ of 1989 engendered by democratic values and nascent civil societies in the process of nation building. The article examines the extent to which the ‘Orange Revolution’ could be considered a revolutionary event stimulated by civil society, or a different type of political activity (a putsch, coup d’état), legitimated by elite-sponsored ‘soft’ political power. Based on public opinion poll data and responses from focus groups, the author contends that what began as an orchestrated protest against election fraud developed into a novel type of political activity—a revolutionary coup d’état. It is contended that the movement was divisive rather than integrative and did not enjoy widespread popular support. The article considers why sponsored democracy promotion and western-inspired ‘soft power’ politics have failed.*

**Keywords:** Orange Revolution; nationality; Ukraine politics; post-communism and *coup d’état*; ‘soft’; political power; people’s power

## Introduction

The outcomes of the disintegration of communism have been relatively peaceful affairs for nearly all the post-communist countries of central Europe. Property has been largely de-statised; a market system for consumer goods, for labour and for property has been introduced. The apparatuses of communist power have been disbanded, and political parties compete for the popular vote: electoral systems of one type or another, claiming to be democratic, have been installed. However, not all countries have adopted the social and political characteristics of successful capitalist democracies. These include those which aspire to membership of the European Union (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Armenia) and a group of former republics of the USSR (Russia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan).<sup>1</sup> All these countries to a greater or lesser extent have had imperfect ‘transitions’ to capitalism and democracy. In many of the latter countries since 1998, ‘coloured’ revolutions have occurred—Serbia (2000), Belarus (2001 and 2006), Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004) and Kyrgyzstan (2005). These public protests have adopted a colour (orange for Ukraine, rose for Georgia) as a symbol to identify their supporters and to define the character of the movement. In 2005, similar events were initiated in Russia, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, though they were successfully suppressed.

These activities all had in common an attempted socio-political transformation intended to introduce ‘democracy from below’.<sup>2</sup> Although differing in content, they



shared common goals: replacing the incumbent political leadership, calls for free and fair elections and a free press. The literature on these phenomena, however, is often journalistic in approach, partisan in orientation and normative rather than objective in content. It does not measure the extent of, or reasons for, the public protests. Apart from the recognition of students as major actors, we have no detailed analysis of the composition of the leaders or followers of the protests; and their aims (ostensibly, the promotion of democracy, freedom and human rights) have not been put to any critical analysis. Indeed, it is unclear whether these outbursts are deserving of the label of 'revolution' in any reputable political science sense. This article takes just one case, that of the 'Orange Revolution' in Ukraine, as an instance of civil strife, and subjects it to some scrutiny.

## Ukraine and Transformation

Ukraine displays the formal features of a democracy and market society: transformation has secured relatively high levels of price liberalisation and small business privatisation, though little enterprise restructuring (EBRD 2006a). Politically, the country has a multi-party system with competitive elections which have secured a turnover of leadership in the elected parliament and presidential power (fulfilling one of the conditions for a stable democracy).<sup>3</sup> While democratic institutions are becoming 'consolidated', there remains extensive disenchantment with politics, consequent on the political and economic reforms.<sup>4</sup> The reform programme and the introduction of capitalism had very damaging effects on the well-being of the population. For example, in 1987, the USSR was 25th in the world ranking of states by human development; by the year 2000, Ukraine (one of the USSR's most advanced economies) had fallen to 80th. Even by 2005, Ukraine's gross domestic product (GDP) was only 59 per cent of the 1989 level.<sup>5</sup> The collapse in living standards led to public resentment against reform and the beneficiaries of privatisation. National opinion polls conducted in 2005, after the Orange Revolution, revealed widespread social and political disillusionment: only 23 per cent of the population believed that they had the 'ability to live under the new social conditions', 51 per cent felt that their health care was 'insufficient' and 44 per cent were absolutely or somewhat dissatisfied with life in general (Panina 2006, 60). These data provide an empirical backing to a condition of 'decremental relative deprivation' as defined by Ted Gurr (1970, ch. 1). In this case, people's expectations remain constant (or may even rise, in anticipation of gains to be made from the end of communism) but the capabilities to meet them decline: such conditions lead to civil strife. In the Ukrainian case, to use Gurr's terms, welfare (economic), political and interpersonal value opportunities declined, and constituted conditions predisposing people to political protest.

Ukraine, like the other 'partly reformed' countries of post-communism, presents a challenge to the international order and particularly to the hegemonic powers of the west in the form of the European Union and the United States. As a country strategically situated to the east of the Mediterranean and with borders to both the European Union and Russia (whose southern fleet is based in Crimea), it presents a desirable strategic asset or, if in alliance with Russia, a possible security threat. The size of the country (population 50 million) puts it below France but above the

highest populated accession state of the European Union (Poland, 39 million). Its incomplete transition to capitalism, noted above, not only entailed widespread poverty, but also ailing industrial and agricultural sectors needing modernisation on a massive scale. While the sentiments of the elites in most of the EU states (and even more so the US) were in favour of Ukrainian EU membership, they have balked at promising it, though NATO membership was (and is) a real possibility.

The contest for the presidency in 2004 presented two candidates: Viktor Yushchenko, favourably disposed towards both the EU and joining NATO, and the eastern-supported and Russian-leaning Viktor Yanukovich.<sup>6</sup> The United States and Russia came out clearly in favour of Yushchenko and Yanukovich, respectively.

There were then important international players seeking to influence Ukrainian politics. How far they did so is a contentious matter. Changes in the technology of global information and communication since the late 20th century have implications for politics and the ways that political power might be exerted. 'Soft power' through democracy promotion and 'people's power' has become a major social constituent of political change and one of the key components of American foreign policy, especially in the post-communist societies (Nye 2004). Soft power was clearly a potent instrument for use in Ukraine.

## The Orange Revolution

The declared victory of Yanukovich in November 2004 led to public demonstrations in Kiev and other areas of Ukraine, which have become known as the 'Orange Revolution'.<sup>7</sup> The mass protests sought to secure a change of election result through a novel type of mass mobilisation in the form of a mass public political gathering entertained with rock music, provided with free (tent) accommodation, food and even pocket money for participants. The demonstrations, managed by the Yushchenko team, were directed against the Electoral Commission and, legitimated by exit poll estimates, sought to overturn its ruling, though the events had a wider political significance in that they promised a major reorientation of Ukraine's internal and external policies.

It was widely held by commentators in the west that these events signalled the beginning of a new era of Ukrainian nationhood: 'The Orange Revolution marked a new stage of Ukrainian society development and identified the end of the previous political epoch on the hybrid Soviet-type system' (Stepanenko 2005, 614). The country should, and would, move toward its European home as well as, it was hoped, secure liberation from the corruption<sup>8</sup> and stagnation of the Kuchma regime. The sweep of revolution beginning in 1989 was now taking root in Ukraine.

[T]he [O]range revolution had set a major new landmark in the post-communist history of eastern Europe, a seismic shift Westward in the geopolitics of the region. Ukraine's revolution was just the latest in a series of victories for 'people power'—in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia in the late 1980s and, more recently, in Serbia and Georgia (Karatnycky 2005).

Power politics of the 'soft' variety has been conceptualised by Joseph S. Nye (2004) who considers that the objective of such power is to use the 'attraction' of the

dominant power to get what it wants, rather than through the use of military force. 'Attraction' can refer to political values (democracy, freedom, justice), cultural artefacts (pop music) and consumption articles (MacDonalds, mobile phones). Promotion of internal change through manipulation of the norms and values of citizens is a major strategy. Utilising multiple channels of communication to project the domestic achievements and international performance of the west is likely, claims Nye, to be to the benefit of the US and Europe. Coloured revolutions, which contest allegedly fraudulent elections in authoritarian states, through mass mobilisation, are forms of 'soft power' and are part of 'democracy promotion'.

Opponents, however, take a more critical view and consider power politics to be at the core of the struggle: in this case between Yanukovich and Yushchenko. Writers such as Nataliya Narochitskaya (2008) contend that the 'voice of the people' is an illegitimate use of modern media technology (television, radio and the press) to create public opinion to force political change. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs), with powerful sponsors, become political bodies working through networks and the media—rather than being rooted in civil society and acting on behalf of citizens. Sponsors,<sup>9</sup> directly or indirectly financed by outside governments, become involved in insurgent activity, defining democracy in terms of their own conceptions and magnifying election frauds to promote a *coup d'état* to their political advantage. What is portrayed in the media as 'people's power' is in reality an elite-manipulated demonstration.

To explain adequately the dynamics of the Orange Revolution one would need to study internal and international elite interests<sup>10</sup> which are beyond the scope of this article. Here we adopt a perspective of the Orange Revolution from 'the bottom', through study of public opinion and focus group discussions, which is considered in the light of the existing literature. I focus on the public conception of the Orange Revolution from the point of view of participants and citizens. Methodologically, I use qualitative data in a quantitative way. This provides a novel approach to the assessment of the legitimacy of the 'coloured' revolutions as well as giving qualitative indicators to the social background of the insurgents.

The coloured revolution phenomenon is a new type of political movement which needs to be fitted into a paradigm of political change. First, I conceptualise the Orange Revolution as a novel type of revolutionary activity: not a classical revolution or *coup d'état*, but a combination of both—a *revolutionary coup*. Second, I consider the extent of public support and opposition to the demonstrations. Third, I outline public perceptions and analyse the social background of supporters and opponents. Finally, I conclude that the Orange Revolution was a failure in democracy promotion and point to some of the conditions which are likely to promote or retard sponsored coloured revolutions.

## Types of Political Change

In analysing popular political protests and political change one may distinguish between a *putsch*, *coup d'état* and revolution. A *putsch* may be defined as a sudden illegitimate overthrow of a ruling elite by another competing elite (for example, the installation of a military regime in place of a political one). A *coup d'état* is an

illegitimate replacement or renewal of one governing set of personnel by another (e.g. the replacement of a ruling faction of a political party by another from that party or another party). These political processes are distinguished by relatively little public participation, either in the overthrow or in the defence of the incumbents, and they have by intention no significant social or economic effects.

A *revolution* is a more complex process. Charles Tilly defines a 'revolution' as:

a forcible transfer of power over a state in the course of which at least two distinct blocs of contenders make incompatible claims to control the state, and some significant portion of the population subject to the state's jurisdiction acquiesces in the claims of each bloc (Tilly 1993, 234).

This definition, like that of Jeff Goodwin (2001),<sup>11</sup> involves the seizure of state power. However, it ignores the type of social movement, the level of popular participation and the policy intentions of the insurgents. There are different kinds of 'revolution'.<sup>12</sup> In a minimal definition, there are two elements: changes in the structure of political authority (an elite renewal of the incumbents of state power) and high levels of mass participation. I define this as a *revolutionary coup d'état* as no major changes of regime type are intended by the new political incumbents (despite such demands by many of the supporters). Mass involvement takes place, but it is of an 'audience' participatory type. We may distinguish between such a coup and a social or political revolution. A maximalist definition of a *social or political revolution* requires major changes in the social and economic system consequent on the political transformation of the ruling elites by a new political class taking power.<sup>13</sup> Whereas in a *revolutionary coup d'état*, public participation is of a passive 'audience' type, in a political revolution the public, in the form of autonomous civil society associations, has a positive input to political activity requiring significant social change. Finally, the outcomes are crucial. If the intentions of the insurgents are not subsequently realised in structural transformation, a political revolution cannot be said to have occurred. In this way, we may distinguish a social/political revolution from a *coup d'état* consequent on public protest.

The definition of various types of political change in terms of organisation, level of public participation and intentions of insurgents/counter-elites are summarised in Figure 1. The coloured revolutions, I contend, fall into the *revolutionary coup d'état* category: they have high elite (or counter-elite) participation; high public (mass) participation but of an 'audience' type; they lead to elite renewal, but not to the reconstitution of the political class or wider social and economic changes in property relations.

## Perception of the Orange Revolution


Current western scholarship generally considers the events known as the 'Orange Revolution' to be an instance of 'people's power' (Wilson 2005; Aslund and McFall 2006; Kuzio 2007). The present article attempts to evaluate the orientations of the population through the study of public opinion polls<sup>14</sup> taken soon after the events. To give a qualitative dimension of the political process, reference is also made to the testimony of respondents at focus group meetings organised by the author in

**Figure 1: Types of Political Change: Putsch, *Coup d'état*, Revolutionary *Coup d'état*, Political/Social Revolution**

<i>Type of political change</i>	<i>Type of organisation</i>	<i>Level of public participation</i>	<i>Intentions of insurgents/counter-elites</i>	<i>Consequences, if successful</i>
<b>Putsch</b>	Counter-elite led	Low	Elite replacement	New elite
<b>Coup d'état</b>	Elite or counter-elite led	Low	Governing elite renewal	New personnel in ruling elite
<b>Revolutionary coup d'état</b>	Elite or counter-elite led	High: audience participation	Elites: renewal of governing elite; for mass participants, changes of leaders and priorities	New personnel in ruling elite
<b>Political/social revolution</b>	Counter-elite led	Very high: mass push from below	Fundamental replacement of political class and socio economic system	New political class, reconstituted institutions, including property relations

Ukraine.<sup>15</sup> Using cross-tabulations of the public opinion poll data, one is able to study the social characteristics of groups favourably disposed and opposed to the events. Focus group discussions also give a qualitative dimension to our understanding of participants' attitudes.

Bearing in mind that even the largest of public demonstrations can only include a relatively small portion of the population, participation in the protest actions subsequently known as the 'Orange Revolution' was on a large scale. Of the 1,800 people surveyed in 2005, 4.8 per cent reported that they had taken part in the protest actions in Kiev and another 12.8 per cent took part in other towns and localities (of these, of course, some may have participated in 'anti-Orange' demonstrations, or in meetings associated with Yushchenko's opponent, Yanukovich); 5.2 per cent actively aided the protesters (with food, money etc). Large as the participation was, the population was by no means fully in support of the demonstrations. As shown in Figure 2, over a quarter of people surveyed in 2005 did not support the events, and a further fifth were uncommitted. Moreover, following the actions, there has been a considerable decline in commitment: by 2006, nearly 40 per cent of the population claimed that they had not and did not support the leaders of the

**Figure 2: Support/Not Support the Orange Revolution 2005, 2006**

'Orange Revolution'. Already some six months after the events of November 2004, nearly 4 per cent of previous supporters were disillusioned, rising to 15 per cent in 2006.

Participants in the focus groups explained how they felt. Vladimir, a driver in Kiev said: 'Everyone thought that it was a revolution at that time. Everybody hoped that something will change. ... A kind of change happened; people believed ... that each person is worth something'. Oleksandr, a businessman respondent in one of the focus groups in Lvov declared:

I believe that revolution is when there is a result ... We have not started living better; on the contrary, we live in the same country, even a worse one than before ... Many people in western Ukraine at the beginning wanted to go to Kiev and make a revolution but in the middle of all this we had tours, a banal betrayal of people who went to [make a] revolution. In reality it was a well-staged technology [event] which ended in fiasco. And nothing changed in people's consciousness (2 October 2006).

What then had been their expectations and why had they become disenchanted? We have some useful indication of what motivated the participants when we consider the responses to the following question asked in the opinion polls: 'In your opinion, what were the main factors [motivating] the political activities of citizens during the "Orange Revolution" '. (No more than 3 responses, surveyed 2005 and not repeated in 2006).

Protest against the authorities and non-acceptance of one of the presidential candidates (presumably Yanukovich) came high in the priorities (41.9 per cent), followed by economic motives (30.4 per cent). These criteria do not envisage a revolutionary change. As Nadezhda, a middle-class grandmother working for a consumers' association in Kiev put it: 'The events were partly a revolution because people believed that they were overthrowing the old regime and installing a new

one which would protect their interests. I say partly because people put in a new person, hoped for improvements though no improvements were achieved' (October 2005).

Protest against 'injustice' was mentioned by 20 per cent of polled respondents. Geopolitical orientations (5.2 per cent) were even lower than 'the wish to participate in a spectacular event' (9.9 per cent). As there were a relatively low number of people (2.1 per cent) making alternative suggestions and 15.7 per cent did not respond, we may conclude that the major reasons were given in the survey.

There was no general consensus about the role of the Orange Revolution in nation building. Just over a third of the respondents (37 per cent) agreed that the ' "Orange Revolution" gave birth to a political nation in Ukraine'. One of these was Igor, a university lecturer in Kharkov, who said: 'There were some revolutionary elements ... it [was] undoubtedly a national revolution ... The Ukrainian people for the first time remembered a hymn of Ukraine and learned it at that time. ... In this sense this revolution was a bourgeois-democratic and national revolution but unfortunately unfinished' (April 2007). This view is reflected in the western literature: Andrew Wilson (2005, 210), for example, refers to 'Yushchenko's value-based campaign, which helped consolidate a new version of the "national idea" '.

However, 20 per cent of those polled did not know what a 'political nation' was, 15 per cent did not agree with the assertion and 29 per cent found the question 'difficult to answer'. These opinions reflect divisions in Ukrainian society. As Roman, a plant sciences researcher from Kharkov pointed out: 'I think a revolutionary situation existed but no revolution occurred in reality. There was a wish by people and people lost patience, it was necessary to change something. Everybody sensed that it was necessary to create changes but no changes occurred at the end'. The ambiguous nature of the 'revolution' is indicated here, as this participant clearly envisaged a social revolution, though the outcome did not even satisfy protesters supporting the election of Yushchenko.

The divisions between personal opinions are shown by the following three statements from members of one of the Kharkov focus groups. First is Dariya (a student of journalism):


The Orange Revolution was an event. Some think it was positive, some think it was negative but it was a great event for Ukraine and the world. And many students ... supported Yushchenko, voted for the Orange for different reasons. ... The most positive feature of the revolution is not that Yushchenko became president but because of that solidarity. Everybody supported each other. I was proud at that time that I was a Ukrainian. It's an incommunicable feeling to be proud of being Ukrainian.

Second is the point of view of Tatiana, a student at Kharkov Polytechnic:

I did not feel proud that I was a Ukrainian during the Orange Revolution. I think that the world got to know Ukraine from the worst side. And there was no solidarity. I was at Maidan [the scene of major demonstrations] at that time and I saw how some people cheered for the 'Orange' before 5 p.m. and after for the 'blue' [i.e. Yanukovich]. They stood where they got paid for.



**Figure 3: Public Evaluation of Type of Political Activity: Coup, Spontaneous or Protect Rights**



Third is Vitaliy (another Kharkov student):

This was a velvet revolution. There were people for the idea, but ... very many people just went there to earn money. Both sides did that. There were ideological people there and they got what they wanted and it's good for them (April 2007).

The political character of the events is a disputed one. Clearly, for a demonstration of this magnitude some form of organisation was required. Was it organised by the participants (an autonomous 'civil society' event) or manipulated from above—or a combination of both?<sup>16</sup> Taking a random sample of the population gives the possibility of determining the spread of opinions about the character of the November events and the social background of supporters and opponents. The respondents were given a number of alternative interpretations of the events—from a *coup d'état* supported by the west to a conscious struggle by citizens to protect their rights. The main results are shown in Figure 3 with the proportion of the respondents being in favour of each one: 45.2 per cent regarded the happenings as a 'bottom-up' activity (11.8 per cent plus 33.4 per cent), 36.4 per cent an elite-led coup (24 per cent plus 12.4 per cent) while 18.3 per cent were undecided. The image of the 'Orange Revolution' being a spontaneous 'people's event' is widely put in question.

### What Type of Event was the Orange Revolution?

As one of our focus group participants (Roman) put it: 'Ukraine is a very good political card to play. Nothing happens here without some external involvement. Internal and external politics include the interests of Russia and of the United States, and Europe who provided financial support'. However, this is not the full story. Many of those occupying the tents in the Maidan in the centre of Kiev were considered by a third of respondents to be part of a 'struggle of citizens to protect their rights'; and, as noted above, the largest group believed the coming out was a manifestation of protest against the authorities. As another Kharkov respondent, Yevgeny (a postgraduate student), put it:

I went to Maidan by myself with my own money, nobody paid me, and I was there for two days. I understand that any event if it is well organised is organised on someone's money, right? I do not exclude that money was given, maybe even by USA or from somewhere else. But it is in a way a legitimate process because Ukraine is indeed a geopolitical place which is very profitable both for the west and for Russia.

Elvira, a staunchly pro-Yushchenko activist from Lvov, articulated an image of the people against the authorities:

I went to the revolution from the first to the last day because the situation became critical. People came out to fight for their rights. We wanted a change in power. No matter what Yushchenko or Yanukovich would be, we knew that with Yanukovich the same power would remain ... People were not coming for money but for the idea. My generation wanted change so that our grandchildren would live better in a new system, so that people were not treated as cattle ... That forced people out to revolution.

Others, however, were more critical. Working-class members of the focus group in Kiev expressed contrary opinions. Vladimir (metal worker and Communist party member): 'A revolution normally is something like a shift of systems ... There [the Maidan] a herd of sheep was led ... Oligarchs developed a plan. In Western Ukraine there was high unemployment, they came over to Kiev because they did not have work. It was just a theatrical show'.

One reform activist referred to the events as analogous to the Russian February Revolution of 1917. Sergei (director of pharmaceutical company):

Maybe the revolution has not reached its goal, we can see this now. Maybe there will be an analogy with the February and October revolutions. We can see now that the change of social economic system has not happened. The same oligarchs ... remained in power. That's why I think that these contradictions will continue and the second stage of revolution might happen peacefully during the [coming] parliamentary elections, maybe without any shock. We might be in revolutionary mood for the next five years.

In these discussions, the emphasis was on revolutionary potential, which had been awakened by the Orange Revolution, even if it had been instigated from the top. Some were critical of the Yushchenko leadership; they did not see the happenings as a revolution and thought that they led nowhere.

No one was satisfied with the [government] executive at that time. This coincided with the ability of Yushchenko to have the finance and technical [media] means to create popular protest. ... These factors led to a replacement of the leadership but a continuation of the system. ... It was a swap over; it allowed them to get a second breath.

Disillusionment with the events was expressed by another as: 'It was a fraud. A lot was promised. Now the people are waiting for the promises to be kept'. As to the character of the Orange Revolution, Iryna, a student member of 'Pora' (a militant

pro-Orange youth organisation) contended that 'Revolution happened in people. If we look at the political scene, I think that it was a theatrical performance. It was a situation which was planned long ago and was carried out'. For another student, Mykola: 'It was excitement, an emotional splash greatly connected with personal motivations, cultural interests'. Similar views were expressed by the student members of a focus group in Lvov (2006), such as Oksana, an art student and secretary of 'Student Initiatives' group: 'In my view it was a revolution because people got united around a certain common idea. They were not fighting for Yushchenko but for changing something and not living as they used to live'. Vladimir (metal worker from Kiev) was sceptical:

I thought about it negatively. ... People wanted to grab power. Ideologically driven people were only in the minority at Maidan. The rest were only onlookers watching the show, romantics arrived from other places, local romantics. People came up to watch from boredom and curiosity. Many people only went there to bring food and blankets to their children who were in the tents. I know my neighbours, other people were paid for that. But others were not paid. It is not a revolution.

These quotations bring out the 'audience participation' aspect of many of those who took part in the events. They illustrate the points made earlier about the character of revolution: there was indeed recognition by some that the present regime was illegitimate and was incompatible with the need to 'live better in a new system'. As to the underlying conditions, the participation of the unemployed from West Ukraine is given a negative connotation by one participant. However, it brings out that limited economic opportunities gave rise to decremental relative social deprivation—an underlying cause of civil strife. The data show a high level of mass involvement, though of an 'audience participation' type.

## Supporters and Sceptics of the Orange Revolution

Traditional analysts of revolution, from Marx to Barrington Moore (1967) point to social cleavages, opposing interests determined by social background, at the root of popular protest. I analysed the social composition of those in the four groups defined in Figure 3. In cross-tabulating the data by occupation, no statistically significant differences were found between the occupational backgrounds of respondents (this may be due to small numbers when broken down into many categories). The largest group were those who thought the events represented 'a conscious struggle of citizens to assert their rights' (33.4 per cent of the respondents). Of these, there were some interesting differences in occupational background: 39.4 per cent of those defined as intellectuals were in this group; of entrepreneurs in small business, 42.9 per cent; of farmers (*fermery*) 60 per cent (though only five persons were in this category); of social significance is the fact that 40.3 per cent of students in the survey saw the November events as a struggle of citizens to assert their rights.

Twenty-four per cent of the sample surveyed regarded the events as based on 'support of the west'; 37.5 per cent of the top social group of executives, businessmen, politicians and state officials came into this category (though the total in this

group was only 24), for civil servants and those in the military the proportion was 29 per cent ( $n = 31$ ); of lower white-collar workers and small businessmen, 26.2 per cent were in this group; students were very much below the average with only 15.3 per cent in this category ( $n = 72$ ). A major conclusion here is the disproportionate participation of students with favourable dispositions to, and participation in, the events.

There were no significant differences between the views of men and women. Excepting young people in higher education, age also made only small, relatively insignificant differences: for example, 35.7 per cent of the under-30s regarded the events as a conscious struggle for defence of rights, compared to an average of 33.4 per cent of the population. Educational background also did not make any important difference: people of all educational backgrounds put a conscious struggle for civil rights first and a state coup supported by the west second. Those with higher education were slightly more in favour of a conscious struggle for rights than others. Also, the non-response was lower as educational level increased.

One might conclude that the Orange Revolution could not be described as a 'class' revolution in terms of its supporters and opponents. The data here would suggest that students and small businessmen saw the demonstrations in a positive emancipatory light and provided a social base to the activity.

A major social cleavage, however, is to be found on a regional basis. As shown in Table 1, those resident in the west and centre of Ukraine clearly saw the movement as a spontaneous expression of citizens seeking to assert their rights. These citizens also had a much more positive identification with the happenings: only 9 per cent of those undecided about its nature were from the west, compared to 34 per cent from the centre. The centre was more divided with a spread between all four interpretations. The demographic density of the protesters was in the west, where nearly 80 per cent of the respondents considered the events to be a spontaneous protest or a conscious struggle of citizens. Those who saw the movement as western inspired were clearly concentrated in the east: nearly half of those with this view came from here, whereas only 4 per cent in this group came from the west.

What is there about the inhabitants of these geographical areas that predisposed them to view the Orange Revolution in different ways? The language divide was closely linked to perceptions. The data were disaggregated by the language spoken at home (more than one language spoken is ignored) and the results are shown in Table 2. The major supporters of those who regarded the coup as orchestrated by western interests were Russian-speaking Ukrainians who accounted for 64 per cent of those in this group and for 44 per cent of those who thought it a coup supported by the political opposition. Ukrainian speakers only accounted for 13.3 per cent of the former group. Put another way, of the Russian speakers, 42 per cent saw the happenings as a western-sponsored enterprise; only 6 per cent considered it to be a spontaneous protest. For the Ukrainian speakers only 7.6 per cent regarded it as the former, whereas nearly half (48.7 per cent) considered the protest to be a 'conscious struggle of citizens to assert their rights'.

The identity of the western Ukrainians is historically much closer to western Europe than the Russians in the east who have a greater affinity with the previous Soviet

**Table 1: Public Opinion: 'Orange Revolution'—Coup or Civil Protest? (2005)**

Response by Region	<i>Coup d'état</i> , supported by the west	<i>Coup d'état</i> , supported by political opposition	Spontaneous public protest	Conscious struggle by citizens to protect rights	Difficult to say	Totals
West	5.5	7.1	17.8	60.4	9.2	100
Centre	4.2	10.3	27.4	32.8	9.1	18.2
	17.6	11.9	14.9	37.7	17.8	100
South	26	34.1	44.8	40	34.3	35.5
	22.8	15.4	8.1	29.5	24.2	100
East	23	30	16.5	21.3	31.9	24.2
	50.5	14.3	6	8.8	20.4	100
Total	46.7	25.6	11.3	5.8	24.6	22.2
	24	12.4	11.8	33.4	18.3	n = 1,704
	100	100	100	100	100	

Note: Results based on background of respondents to Ukrainian public opinion poll (March 2005, details in Note 14).

**Table 2: Nature of 'Orange Revolution' by Language Spoken at Home: Ukrainian and Russian (2005)**

Language spoken at home	<i>Coup d'état</i> with support of the west	<i>Coup d'état</i> supported by political opposition	Spontaneous public protest	Conscious Struggle of citizens to assert their rights		Total <i>n</i> = 1,794
				Difficult to say	Difficult to say	
Mostly Ukrainian	7.6	10	18.8	48.7	14.9	100
	13.3	33.6	66.5	61	34	41.9
Mostly Russian	42.3	15.0	6.3	16.0	20.4	100
	64.2	43.9	19.3	17.3	40.1	36.3
Total	24	12.4	11.8	33.4	18.3	100
	100	100	100	100	100	100

*Note:* Percentages do not sum to 100 as some categories are omitted from the table (e.g. mixed Ukrainian and Russian and other languages).

Union and Russia. The events of the Orange Revolution strengthened these identities. These data, which clearly indicate the polarised participation by the Ukrainian-speaking and Russian-speaking communities, lead one to cast considerable doubt on the widely held view that the events of 2004 were part of a national-democratic revolution. Under half of the population thought it to be an event inspired by public protest.

## Political Outcomes


Evaluation of political events needs to include not only the intentions and expectations but also the consequences, as indicated in the typology of political change, illustrated in Figure 1 above. The Orange Revolution is often legitimated in the victorious outcome for Yushchenko in the third round of the presidential election. Yushchenko's popular opinion poll evaluation in 2005 was 5.6, compared to the former president Kuchma's 2.7 when in office (based on average of respondents' answers on a 10-point scale).<sup>17</sup> In 2006, however, Yushchenko's ranking had plummeted to 3.8: the largest category of answers (23 per cent) came from those giving the very lowest rating of one out of ten. Popular opinion in Ukraine was higher for Putin in both 2005 and 2006 (6.0 and 6.3, respectively) than for Yushchenko—even after the conflict over the price of energy between the two countries. Yet more remarkable is the popularity of A. Lukashenko, the president of neighbouring Belarus, who had higher standing in Ukrainian public opinion in 2005 (5.8) and 2006 (6.3) than Yushchenko, even in 2005. Clearly, if one of the objectives of 'soft politics' was to place the 'west' as an object of positive identification in people's consciousness, it had failed. Russia and, surprisingly perhaps, Belarus were considered by a significant part of the population to be preferred alternatives.

While the outcome was successful in terms of a change in personnel (a coup), it did not meet the expectations of the population for more substantive positive changes. A process of disenchantment occurred and the 'Orange Revolution' began to receive a negative connotation. The position is summed up in Table 3 which compares perceptions in 2005 and 2006. The results in one year show a remarkable change: the proportion of respondents considering themselves to be in a winning position in 2005 had declined by 50 per cent.

**Table 3: Do You Find Yourself in a 'Winning' or 'Losing' Position as a Result of the 'Orange Revolution'?**

	Per cent of respondents	
	2005	2006
Losing position	11.7	34.7
Difficult to say	55.8	48.7
Winning position	32.1	16.4

**Figure 4: Attitudes to Joining EU, NATO, Russia/Belarus: 2004 to 2007**



Source: Panina (2006); data for 2007: Natsional'na (2007, 500).

The Orange Revolution was an attempt not only to change the alleged fraudulent electoral process but also to define the political 'other' as Russia, and the friendly 'our' as the west in general and the European Union in particular (epitomised in the Orange slogan of 'Back to Europe!'). Figure 4 shows attitudes towards the EU, NATO and Russia/Belarus in four years: 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007.

Attitudes to the EU are generally more positive than negative, though positions have become clearer cut between 2004 and 2006. The main change came in 2006, not 2005, and is probably linked to the conflict with Russia over energy supplies in



that year. Nevertheless, the proportion of people being 'more negative' towards the EU has more than doubled between 2004 and 2006; though a clear majority (61 per cent) are in favour of membership, this fell back to a low of 43 per cent in 2007. Except for 2006, joining with Russia and Belarus has been more popular than with the EU. The consequence of the dispute with Russia (which had curtailed energy supplies) in 2006 led to a near doubling of the numbers finding it 'difficult to answer' rather than moving into the opposition camp. If one considers the possible effects of the Orange Revolution events, however, one needs to compare attitudes in 2004 (before) and 2005 (after). Those favourable to joining the EU did not change very much at all between these two years; those with 'more negative' attitudes actually rose from 11.7 per cent to 19.9 per cent. Attitudes to NATO have hardened. Support for joining declined from 18.8 per cent in 2004 to only 12.7 per cent in 2006; the previously high number of undecided people has declined considerably as they have moved against NATO.

A qualitative dimension of political attitudes is given by respondents in the focus group in Lvov. From Stefaniya, a research worker, active in Rukh:

Ukraine has a long tradition of living in Europe and having connections with Europe. Another question is how profitable it is for us and when it happens whether the standards of life will rise. With Russia, as a good neighbour, we should develop relations too but not too closely.

From Yurij, an entrepreneur and member of 'Pora' (a Ukrainian nationalist group): 'Ukraine is a guarantor of security in Europe. It's beneficial for Europe to have a strong, independent Ukraine. People in the east are more manipulated than us, they are less conscious. Borders should be opened and elites should agree with eastern-Ukrainian elites'. And from Andrij, a teacher and supporter of national-patriotic forces (Svoboda):


There is a difference in orientation between the authorities or intellectual elites of western Ukraine and the east (such as Donetsk). If I have a choice only between two alternatives, then I am for European Union which at least offers certain life standards. I am for NATO now because I think this membership would at least take away a threat to Ukraine's territorial unity.

For Oleg, an entrepreneur and supporter of Our Ukraine:

On the one hand, everybody wants to be in Europe but everything here is done opposite to [that of] Europe. On the other hand, Europe is falling down spiritually and Russia is a more spiritual country, that is, it's more pleasant to be with spiritual Russia than with sick Europe. ... We understand that Ukraine plays a small role in global problems. I think Ukraine can be saved by dictatorship without joining any block.

The data cited and the discussion cast doubt on the efficacy of the Orange Revolution and democracy promotion significantly to influence the population towards a more pro-western stance. While attitudes to the EU have become more positive, a significant proportion of the population have a positive attitude to Russia and Belarus; hostility to NATO significantly increased.

Public attitudes to the political regime have become more unstable following the events of the Orange Revolution. The underlying tensions stemming from the

**Figure 5: Perception of Political Situation in Ukraine: 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007**

How would you evaluate the general situation in Ukraine? Select most appropriate answer.


Source: Panina (2006), Question b15; data for 2007: Natsional'na (2007, 474).

transformation process have, if anything, become exacerbated. Could another public protest lead to a social (or counter-) revolution? Clearly, this is a concern for many in the west who seek to 'tie in' Ukraine to the European Union. The conditions which promote public disturbances and revolutionary events (unlike election studies) are relatively under-researched and their outcomes are unanticipated (for instance, the fall of the USSR). Indications are that public dissatisfaction is still high. The public's mood remains 'tense' and has been on a steadily rising upward course since 1998. Data for 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007 are shown in Figure 5. The level of 'tension' has risen by 6.5 points and the estimate of 'quiet' has fallen from 21.3 in 2005 to 12.2 in 2006. In 2007, 'critical/explosive' rose to almost a third of respondents and 'safe' fell to less than 1 per cent of respondents. These data would indicate that the underlying tensions in Ukraine have increased considerably.

I have contended that 'decremental relative deprivation' was one of the main causes of the psychological predisposition to civil strife. This is a consequence of the social conditions prevailing following transformation. One measure is the perception of people's life chances compared to those of their parents. Data in Figure 6 show the considerable decline in positive perceptions of opportunities. While there has been a perceived improvement in economic conditions for 43 per cent of the respondents, 37 per cent felt that they were materially worse off than their parents at a similar age; there has been a perceived major deterioration compared to parents with respect to the stability of life (70.4 per cent of respondents believed their position worse), personal safety (59 per cent), social security (58.6 per cent) state of health (50.3 per cent), possibility of taking holidays (47 per cent) and position in society (30.6 per cent).

While levels of dissatisfaction are high, this does not necessarily give rise to civil strife. People's willingness to participate in political action is captured by the responses in Table 4. The propensity to participate in 'some kind of action' against the government undoubtedly increased between 2004 and 2005, but fell back again in 2006. The answers to question A in Table 4 show that even at the height of

**Figure 6: Comparison of Respondent's Life Chances with Parents at Same Age**



Aspect of Life Key: (1) Material conditions; (2) possibility to develop own potential; (3) possibility to have holidays; (4) state of health; (5) personal safety; (6) stability of life.

Question asked: When you compare your life with that of your parents when they were of your age now, which of the following have become better or worse or remained the same?

Source: Natsional'na (2007, 479). Based on 1,800 sample of population surveyed in 2007.

**Table 4: Willingness to Take Political Action**

A. If national government encroached on people's interests, would you take part in some kind of action?

	2004	2005	2006
No, would not	69	57	63.2
Difficult to say	24.7	33.4	28.6
Yes, I would	6.2	9.4	8.2

B. If your local government did the same, would you take some kind of action against it?

No, would not	54.9	46.2	50.3
Difficult to say	31.7	36.6	32.9
Yes	13.3	17.2	16.7

C. How likely, in your opinion, are mass protests in your region against a decrease in standard of living or for the protection of rights?

Unlikely	56.5	42.7	54.7
Don't know	21.2	22.1	19.3
Very likely	22.2	35.2	26.1

protest, less than 10 per cent of the respondents would be prepared to take action against the central government, though more would do so against local governments. As to participation in 'mass protests' (Table 4, question C), in the wake of the events in November 2004, more than a third thought that mass protests were likely—evidence that the population was now more politicised. By 2006, however, the euphoria of the Orange Revolution had worn off somewhat and the proportion fell to just over a quarter. But in the same year, 27.9 per cent of the respondents were willing to take part in 'legal meetings and demonstrations' (not shown in table). Those prepared to participate in direct action fell to below 10 per cent; 'unauthorised meetings and demonstrations' were supported by only 2.6 per cent and 'unlawful strikes' by only 1.8 per cent. Moreover, many believed that both legal and illegal means of protest were likely to be ineffective. Of those surveyed 31.2 per cent opined that 'none of the methods [legal and illegal] are sufficiently effective that I would resort to using them' (though this left quite a balance who would). Such evidence suggests that a relatively significant number of people would be willing to participate in further revolutionary events, and these might provide a core of insurgent activists.

### **Discussion: The Failure of Democracy Promotion?**

The testimony of participants in focus group discussions shows that demonstrators have mixed motives. These include political conviction, promoting democracy, excitement, participation in a spectacle, 'a show', even payment for being present. Such declarations may obscure underlying socioeconomic factors which predisposed people to political activity. There were real political and economic grievances underlying the protests, derived from the considerable dislocations and detrimental effects of the transformation process described at the beginning of this article. Moreover, one might criticise those who point solely to external forces deploying 'soft' politics to manipulate people to further their own interests. Such viewpoints ignore the deteriorating conditions, as indicated above, which predisposed people to action.

The significant decline in the economic, social and political capabilities available to the population, consequent on the transformation of state socialism, led to severe 'decremental relative deprivation' (Gurr 1970). There was a striking weakening in the levels of loyalty and trust in government and a critical fall in support for the regime. There was a noteworthy crisis of legitimacy. Two crucial factors are necessary to move from a situation of social and political discontent to revolutionary action. First, there must be an ideological rationalisation of radical change. The Orange Revolution provided a critique of the Kuchma regime: it defined as illegitimate the existing power structure and it presented an alternative—a closer move to the west and its values. Secondly, there must be a counter-elite with a mass following. The information technology available to Yushchenko enabled a mass to be assembled effectively. The coloured revolutions are Leninist in inspiration: they provide organisation and bring ideology to a receptive mass. However, I have demonstrated that there was not a nationwide mass mobilisation—either geographically or socially. Only students could be considered a socially mobilised group—particularly in Kiev and West Ukraine. Students were to Yushchenko what the working class was for Lenin. 'Soft' politics had an uneven effect.

Yushchenko, moreover, did not deliver a regime change. He sought to *avoid* a revolution.<sup>18</sup> The critical rhetoric was not translated into policy. As many of the respondents in the focus groups put it, there was a change of positions orchestrated by the Orange Revolution. The demonstrators were not part of an autonomous revolutionary movement; their activity was a form of audience participation. From the point of view of the counter-elite around Yushchenko, the demonstrations were a legitimating device in support of a *coup d'état*, which had considerable support from incumbent political elites (including the mayor of Kiev and sections of the security police), foreign support and diplomatic pressure. Financial resources were provided, not only by foreign supporters, but from the 'country's emerging upper middle class and new millionaires'.<sup>19</sup> Leadership was provided by elites well established in the Kuchma administration, including, of course, Viktor Yushchenko himself who had been head of the National Bank of Ukraine and had worked as prime minister under Kuchma. The phenomenon was a 'revolutionary' coup as defined above in Figure 1—revolutionary in the sense of the mobilisation of mass support and opposition to the incumbent powers, but a coup in that the objectives were replacements of personnel, rather than significant social and political systemic change.

Politicians in the west anticipated that the 'coloured' revolutions would bring Ukraine closer to the European Union. In Ukraine, Yushchenko's supporters hoped that the EU would become part of 'us', and that the 'other' would be defined as Russia. While there was fairly widespread opposition to the incumbent political powers, Yushchenko's active mass support was drawn from students and disproportionately from the 'ethnic Ukrainians' rather than the 'eastern Slavic' political cultures.<sup>20</sup> The events of the Orange Revolution did not initiate, and the consequences did not effect, integrating mechanisms creating solidarity—the formation of a 'civic Ukraine'—but led to greater division between East and West Ukraine.<sup>21</sup> The attractiveness of the Putin and Belarus Lukashenko regimes (usually ignored in the western literature) to many Ukrainians lies in the provision of a statist welfare nationalist regime which is (believed to be) anti-market and anti-western, quite the opposite of what was promised by the leaders of the Orange movement. The consequence is that Ukraine has become more polarised: in the East, the 'other' is defined as supporters of the Orange Revolution and West Ukraine. The associated 'us' has two different identities: Europe and West Ukraine, on the one hand, and East Ukraine and Russia, on the other.

Many writers contend that the Orange Revolution 'will positively influence the development of democratic movements ... in post-Soviet space' (Stepanenko 2005, 614). Karatnycky opines:

Ukraine had benefited from more than a decade of civil-society development, a good deal of it nurtured by donor support from the United States, European governments, the National Endowment for Democracy, and private philanthropists, such as George Soros. Although such sponsorship was nonpartisan, it reinforced democratic values and deepened the public's understanding of free and fair electoral procedures. Authentic democratic values were being reinforced by a new generation that had grown

up initially under glasnost, and later with a broad awareness of democratic practices around the world (Karatnycky 2005).<sup>22</sup>

Such views exaggerate the positive potential of civil society.

The data presented in this article contest the widely held view, as articulated by writers such as Anders Aslund and Michael McFaul,<sup>23</sup> that the Orange Revolution was an event stimulated by civil society. Such positions grossly understate the implications of sponsor-led organisations and the weakness of autonomous civil society associations. Certainly, they played a part in social mobilisation, but this was a top-down movement inspired by the leadership of non-governmental organisations (such as the youth group Pora), not a spontaneous upsurge of 'people's' power. Participation in 'civil society' associations in Ukraine is one of the lowest in Europe, with 84 per cent of the population having no membership of any association in 2005—less than in 1994 (Panina 2006, 23). USAID's 'NGO Sustainability Index 2003' commented that, in Ukraine, NGOs were only at the 'transition' stage and highly dependent on foreign sponsors. They often (not always, of course) intervened in the electoral process to procure success for their favoured candidates.<sup>24</sup>

The west, in the form of engagement in 'soft politics', has supported forces in opposition to many non-democratic governments which have triggered off 'coloured' revolutions. 'Democracy promotion' means, as Wilson approvingly points out, 'The West promoting its own values [and] ... help[ing] other countries [to] live up to these values' (Wilson 2005, 187). This involves influencing elections and backing those parties approved by the west's leaders. By the same logic, those in the host countries who lose as a consequence of western policy will oppose the imposition of alien values and seek their own champions outside (in this case, Russia), thereby creating conditions of instability. In Ukraine, the 'Orange Revolution' did not lead to a democratic revolution. The results of opinion polls and the testament of members of focus groups show that the outcome was not a step to democracy, but disappointment leading to disillusionment.

Why did this coloured revolution fail? The rhetoric of Yushchenko promised too much and he had neither the means nor the will to make substantial social changes. Sponsors sought and achieved a westward-orientated foreign policy and commitment to a more open market economy. 'Soft' politics in terms of the positive image of the west and particularly the US can succeed in a society with a population predisposed to change, which is relatively undivided and where there is no alternative ideological challenge. In the case of Ukraine, not all these conditions prevailed. The alternative of a statist economy in Belarus and a state-led society in Russia had a greater affinity with the Russian-speaking population which was exposed to alternative media. The aftermath of the Iraq War and involvement in the Balkans also makes questionable the assumption of Nye and others that 'the west' is any longer likely to win a 'soft politics' war. The use of media technology and the promotion of western values fail when the real intentions of counter-elites are exposed and the expectations of the mass of supporters are not met. Incumbent leaders can learn from their opponents' methods and use of media technology as well as their mistakes, thus limiting the potential for success of future 'coloured' revolutions.

## About the Author

**David Lane**, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 3RQ, UK. email: [DSL10@CAM.AC.UK](mailto:DSL10@CAM.AC.UK)

## Notes

Acknowledgement is made to the Leverhulme Trust which financed the research included in this article. The author wishes to thank the editors, Andreas Bieler and three anonymous referees for comments on an earlier draft.

1. For different groupings see Aslund (2007); Lane (2007); Stark and Bruszt (2001).
2. On the 1989 revolution see Kumar (2001). There is a growing, but relatively small, number of articles on 'coloured revolutions' and democracy promotion: Herd (2005); D'Anieri (2006); Grodsky (2007); Beissinger (2007). Among the better works on Ukraine's Orange Revolution is the special edition of *Communist Studies and Transition Politics* on the 'Democratic Revolution in Ukraine' (March 2007). On Russia, there is a growing literature on democracy promotion and, from the Russian side, the threat of subversion: V. Putin, [www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2007/04/26/1209\\_type70029](http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2007/04/26/1209_type70029); Sergey Kara-Murza, *Revolutsii na eksport*, Moscow, Algoritm, 2006.
3. The Bertelsmann political transformation index (considering levels of political participation, the rule of law, the stability of democratic institutions and levels of social and political integration) gives Ukraine a score of 7.1, just below the threshold (8) of a democratic regime (data for 2006, Berg-Schlosser et al. 2007, 269).
4. Only 12 per cent of people surveyed considered that their elected Member of Parliament could represent their interests and 30 per cent of the population in 2005 believed that 'Ukraine needs a multi-party system' (36 per cent thought not) (Panina 2006, 25).
5. The USSR included many economically backward republics of central Asia, making Russia much higher than 25th. The GDR at this time was ranked 20th. See Human Development Report for 2000 (UNDP 1990). For economic conditions see Transition Report (EBRD 2006b, 32).
6. Even prior to 2004, the Ukraine's leaders (including Yanukovich) aspired to membership of the European Union. It was generally recognised in the west that Yushchenko was more likely to accede to EU conditionality than Yanukovich.
7. Estimates of from 500,000 to a million people, many dressed in orange, assembled in the Maidan square in the centre of Kiev to protest at the official victory of Yanukovich. For overviews of the Orange Revolution see Wilson (2005); Aslund and McFall (2006); Kuzio (2007).
8. On the relevance of corruption, see Way (2005, 191–205).
9. Active in Ukraine, for example, were: Soros' Renaissance Foundation, USAID, Freedom House, the Carnegie Foundation, the National Endowment for Democracy, the German Marshall Fund.
10. Wilson (2005) provides a sympathetic account of the background of, as well as details on, the events themselves and their international implications.
11. Goodwin defines a revolution as any and all instances in which a state or government is overthrown by a popular movement in an extra-constitutional or violent manner (Goodwin 2001).
12. Tanter and Midlarsky (1967, 265), for example, define four different types of 'revolution': mass revolution, revolutionary coup, reform coup and palace revolution.
13. Scopol (1979) is the best-known articulator of this position. She emphasises the transformation of a society's state and class structures (p. 4).
14. The Public Opinion Polls are organised on a yearly basis (bi-yearly from 2006) by the Institute of Sociology at the National Academy of Science of Ukraine and consist of a sample of 1,800 people aged over 18 living in Ukraine. In this research I utilise the results of polls conducted in 2005 and 2006. Source: Panina (2006). Data for some of the tables are available only in the edition for 2005. Cross-tabulations in the tables are not shown in the published data and have been calculated separately for this article. Data for 2007 were published only in Ukrainian in *Natsional'na* (2007).
15. The focus groups have been initiated by the author and organised by the Institute of Sociology of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and Kharkov National University. Five focus groups composed of eight people each were held in Kiev in October 2005 and another six in Lvov in October 2006; four more took place in Kharkov in April 2007. The focus groups were composed of political activists drawn from students and the manual and non-manual working classes. The idea was to bring together political activists at the grass roots of politics, divided in their attitudes to the transformation

- of Ukrainian society: in each city groups were organised on the basis of two middle class and two working class; each class group then was selected on the basis of being in favour of, or opposed to, the movement to market reforms; in addition one politically mixed student group was organised (this was used as a pilot group). I do not claim that these opinions can be truly representative of the total population, but they provide a qualitative dimension to our understanding of politics.
16. There has been a great deal of journalistic discussion of this point, notably by Jonathan Steele of the *Guardian* (26 November 2004) and Mark Almond (*Guardian* 7 December 2004) coming out on the side of manipulation. Western interests, particularly American ones, put literally hundreds of millions of dollars into democracy promotion in one form or another. See the details in Wilson (2005, 183–188), who concludes that promoting western values is ‘nothing to apologise for’ (p. 187). There can be no doubt that other ‘coloured’ revolutions followed a similar path, with western advice, finance and information technology in support of local counter-elites challenging incumbent political leaders. Outcomes, however, differed.
  17. ‘How would you evaluate L. Kuchma’s actions as president?’ 1 as lowest grade and 10 the maximum.
  18. ‘Avoid’ is the word correctly used by Paul D’Anieri (2006).
  19. Elite interests (‘leaders of the Orange coalition’) are described by Karatnycky (2006), 41.
  20. This point is well taken by Taras Kuzio (2005).
  21. The presence of literally thousands of westerners ‘monitoring’ the election on the third round of voting further associated Yushchenko with the west. Numbers are difficult to estimate: the Canadian government sent 500 (mission led by former PM John Turner), another 550 were partially sponsored by the Ukrainian Canadian Congress, the US sent approximately 400 (partially sponsored by the American Congressional Committee) and Poland 300. In addition there were many others, including ‘official’ observer missions from the OSCE, Council of Europe and UN. My thanks to Mychailo Wynnyckyj of KMBS for these data.
  22. The idea of 1989 being a ‘people’s revolution’ has been popularised by journalists such as Garton Ash (1990).
  23. ‘Ukraine possessed the most mature civil society of any post-Soviet state’ ... and non-governmental organisations ‘spearheaded the protest movement against the regime’ (Aslund and McFall 2006, intro., 5–6).
  24. In 2004, for example, the American National Endowment for Democracy alone made available 15 million dollars for support of the democratic process (National Endowment for Democracy Report, cited in Lane 2006, 17). On the basis of data in the European Social Survey, Lane calculated that Ukraine, in terms of civil society participation in human rights activity, came below Romania, Latvia, Croatia, Czech Republic and Slovenia (*ibid.*, 12). The index of participation in such associations in Ukraine was nine times less than the median score in the old member states of the EU—a clear ‘civil society’ deficit.

## Bibliography

- Ash, T. G. (1990) *We, the People: The Revolutions of ‘89* (Harmondsworth: Penguin).
- Aslund, A. (2007) *How Capitalism was Built: The Transformation of Central and Eastern Europe, Russia and Central Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Aslund, A. and McFall, M. (eds) (2006) *Revolution in Orange. The Origins of Ukraine’s Democratic Breakthrough* (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment).
- Beissinger, M.R. (2007) ‘Structure and example in modular political phenomena: The diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions’, *Perspectives on Politics*, 5:2, 259–276.
- Berg-Schlosser, D. (2007) ‘The quality of post-communist democracy’, in S. White, J. Batt and P.G. Lewis (eds), *Developments in Central and East European Politics* (Basingstoke: Palgrave), 264–275.
- D’Anieri, P. (2006) ‘Explaining the success and failure of post-communist revolutions’, *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 39:3, 331–350.
- EBRD (2006a) *Transition Indicators 2006*. Available online at: <http://www/ebrd/com/country/econo/stats> (accessed 4 December 2007).
- EBRD (2006b) *Transition Report 2006* (London: EBRD).
- Goodwin, J. (2001) *No Other Way Out. States and Revolutionary Movements 1945–1991* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Grodsky, B. (2007) ‘Looking at Solidarnosc in Central Asia: The role of human rights organizations in political change’, *Slavic Review*, 66:3, 442–462.



- Gurr, T. R. (1970) *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press).
- Herd, G. P. (2005) 'Colourful revolutions and the CIS: "Manufactured" versus "managed" democracy', *Problems of Post-communism*, 52:2, 3–17.
- Karatnycky, A. (2005) 'Ukraine's Orange Revolution', *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2005. Available online at: <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/2005> (accessed 10 August 2007).
- Karatnycky, A. (2006) 'The fall and rise of Ukraine's political opposition: From Kuchmagate to the Orange Revolution', in A. Aslund and M. McFall (eds), *Revolution in Orange. The Origins of Ukraine's Democratic Breakthrough* (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment), 29–44.
- Kumar, K. (2001) *1989: Revolutionary Ideas and Ideals*, Minneapolis (University of Minnesota Press).
- Kuzio, T. (2005) 'Regime type and politics in Ukraine under Kuchma', *Communist and Post-communist Studies*, 38:2, 167–190.
- Kuzio, T. (ed.) (2007) 'Democratic revolution in Ukraine: From Kuchmagate to Orange Revolution', *Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, 23:1 (Special edition).
- Lane, D. (2006) 'Civil society formation and accountability in the new post-socialist EU member states', in H. Pleines (ed.), *Participation in New Modes of Governance. The Case of the New EU Member States* (No. 74) (Bremen: Forschungsstelle Osteuropa), 7–21.
- Lane, D. (2007) 'Introduction: Outcomes of transformation', in D. Lane (ed.), *The Transformation of State Socialism: System Change, Capitalism or Something Else?* (Basingstoke: Palgrave), 1–32.
- Moore, B. (1967) *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (London: Allen Lane).
- Narochitskaya, N. (ed.) (2008) *Oranzhevyi Seti: ot Belgrada do Bishkeka* (St Petersburg: Alety).
- Natsional'na (2007) *Natsional'na Akademiya Nauk Ukraini, Institut Sotsiologii, Ukrain's'ke suspil'stvo 1992–2007* (Kiev: Akademiya Nauk Ukraini).
- Nye, J. (2004) *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs).
- Panina, N. (2006) *Ukraynsk'e suspil'stvo: sotsiologichni monitoring 1992–2006* (Kiyv: Institute sotsiologii NAN Ukraini).
- Scocpol, T. (1979) *States and Social Revolutions* (New York: Cambridge University Press).
- Stark, D. and Bruszt, L. (2001) 'One way or multiple paths: For a comparative sociology of East European Capitalism', *American Journal of Sociology*, 106:4, 1129–1137.
- Stepanenko, V. (2005) 'How Ukrainians view their Orange Revolution: Public opinion and the national peculiarities of citizenry political activities', *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization*, 13:4, 595–618.
- Tanter, R. and Midlarsky, M. (1967) 'A theory of revolution', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 11:3, 264–280.
- Tilly, C. (1993) *European Revolutions 1492–1992* (Oxford: Blackwell).
- UNDP (1990) *Human Development Report 1990* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- Way, L. A. (2005) 'Rapacious individualism and political competition in Ukraine, 1992–2004', *Communist and Post-communist Studies*, 38:2, 191–205.
- Wilson, A. (2005) *Ukraine's Orange Revolution* (New Haven CT and London: Yale University Press).