

# **Party Politics in the Western Balkans**

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## 2 Legacy of communist and socialist parties in the Western Balkans

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As Ishiyama and Bozóki note, the development of communist successor parties<sup>1</sup> in post-communist politics has had an important effect upon the development of democracy (Bozóki and Ishiyama 2002: 393). In some countries the communist party was outlawed; in many cases it was transformed into a party of a socialist or social democratic character; elsewhere, the communist party began to take part in the democratic process, which led to varying results; in some cases, the party transformed itself into a classic socialist or social democratic party; while in other cases it retained a communist ideology. As the literature reveals, the type of the regime, the modus of transition, the manner of financing political parties, the organisation of the parties, as well as the whole political context, all matter. Ishiyama suggests that the patrimonial communist regime (as in Serbia) produced communist successor parties which had to distinguish themselves from the previous communist system and hence turned towards nationalism, while in a national-consensus regime (Slovenia, Croatia), the successor parties developed policies that divorced the party from the past, and led to the emergence of a social democratic identity (Ishiyama 1998: 81–2). Nevertheless, the application of the above-mentioned theory reveals the exceptionality of the Western Balkan countries. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the ethnic structure and the different goals of the three ethnicities had a great impact on the formation of political parties, which were mainly based on ethnic grounds, and left little space to the parties with a social democratic orientation. A special case is Macedonia – when the issue of independence was resolved, the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia left the nationalist discourse to the re-established VMRO-DPMNE; the transformed party moved significantly to the centre of the political spectrum, and regained its position in the party system. The case of Montenegro is specific as well – the main question was *to be or not to be with Serbia* and the successor Democratic Party of the Socialists of Montenegro (after an internal split) has managed to stay in power up to the present day (2008). Albania is an outstanding example of a country where nationalism was left out, and the socio-democratic orientation was a case of later transformation.

With the exception of Albania, the countries of the Western Balkans adopted a uniform approach towards their communist parties. Albania followed the pattern of Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria and Moldova<sup>2</sup> and outlawed the

communist party as early as 1992. Nevertheless, a couple of parties claiming a communist legacy remain active underground, though they have no political impact. The other countries of the region opted for toleration of the extreme left political parties, and occasionally the latter take part in local politics.

New parties which identify with communism emerged on all the party scenes. In Croatia it was the Communist Party of Croatia (*Komunistička partija Hrvatske*, KPH), which was set up at the end of 2005. Nevertheless, the state authorities prevented the party from becoming registered and so the party is functioning underground.<sup>3</sup> Another Croatian party which could be classified as extreme left is the Croatian Socialist Labour Party (*Socijalistička radnička partija Hrvatske*, SRPH) which was founded in 1997.<sup>4</sup> In BiH there is the Workers' Communist Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina (*Radničko-komunistička partija Bosne i Hercegovine*, RKP BiH) formed in June 2000.<sup>5</sup> In Serbia, the most 'successful' revival party happened to be the League of Communists – Movement for Yugoslavia (*Savez komunista- Pokret za Jugoslaviju*) which was founded in 1990s out of the Yugoslav National Army (*Jugoslovenska narodna armija*, JNA) part of the Yugoslav League of Communists. It later became the core of Yugoslav Left Party (*Jugoslovenska levica*, JUL), which governed together with SPS after 1993 (and formally after 1996). A New Serbian communist party was founded in March 1992 – the Party of Labour (*Partija rada*, PR), which since then has striven 'to overthrow the capitalist social system and replace it with the socialist social system'.<sup>6</sup> The party that claims to be the only ideological and legal successor of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia is the Union of Yugoslavian Communists in Serbia – Communists of Subotica (*Savez komunista Jugoslavije u Srbiji – Komunisti Subotice*).<sup>7</sup> Another party which relates its legacy to the previous communist league fighting for Marxism–Leninism is the New Communist Party of Yugoslavia. In Montenegro, the New League of Communists of Montenegro was founded in 1993 and renamed itself the League of Communists of Yugoslavia – Communists of Montenegro.<sup>8</sup> In the case of Kosovo, a radical Marxist group, the National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo (*Lëvizja Kombëtare për Çlirimin e Kosovës*, LKÇK) was among the first in the 1990s which advocated either independence for Kosovo or the creation of a Greater Albania.<sup>9</sup> In Macedonia, the League of Communists of Macedonia (*Sojuz na komunistite na Makedonija*), founded in 1992, represented the extreme left. In Albania, a group of firm Stalinists announced the foundation of the new party, the Communist Party of Albania (*Partia Kommuniste ë Shqipërisë*, PKSh), whose official date of founding was put at 8 November 1991 – the fiftieth anniversary of the Albanian Party of Labour.<sup>10</sup>

The communist parties in the Western Balkans have retained their internationalism or in many cases Yugoslavism, and so actively cooperate on the regional as well as international levels. One example is the Balkan Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties of the Balkans,<sup>11</sup> with the anti-imperialist struggle being one of its main goals. The less radical parties joined the Socialist International.

This text will look only at the successor parties as conceptualised by Ishiyama, and not the newly born communist parties. Some parties claim to be

the only legal successor parties (due to personnel or adherence to ideology), but as they are only partially related to the former ruling parties' resources and personnel, they will only be mentioned in passing. Many scholars claim that the historical legacies and points of departure are important factors explaining transition, while others prefer the type of transition or other criteria (cf. Merkel 1999; Dawisha and Parrot 1997; Linz and Stepan 1996; Beyme 1996; Ishiyama 2002, etc.). This text deals with the factors mentioned by most scholars as influencing the transformation path of the regimes as well as that of the communist parties: the legacy of the previous regime, the type of transition, the electoral performance of the parties, the financing of political parties, their internal organisation and programmatic orientation, external relations abroad, lustration laws, relations to ethnicity and the church, and electoral laws. The chapter concentrates on the legacy of the communist/socialist parties; it gives an overview of the transformation of the communist parties and their position in the current political system.

### **Successor parties: new European left or communists?**<sup>12</sup>

The transition from the communist regimes, as well as the transformation of the communist parties in the Balkans, followed different patterns. Kitschelt has classified the Croatian regime as a national consensus communism, where national competition and interest articulation were permitted and accompanied by a certain degree of bureaucratic professionalisation (Kitschelt 1995). Nevertheless, this categorisation can be questioned, as the League of Communists of Croatia (*Savez komunista Hrvatske*, SKH) was one of the conservative parties where no changes in the terms of democracy were expected due to the fact that most liberals were purged out of the party after the Croatian spring in the beginning of 1970s, when the leadership of the party was dominated by Serbs (disproportionately to the Serbian population in Croatia), who were not willing to take a pro-reform approach. As Pickering and Baskin note '...the waxing and waning of the liberal tradition in Croatian socialism turned more on questions of nationality, autonomy and federalism than on questions of genuine political pluralism and the autonomy of the individual in social life' (Pickering and Baskin 2008: 524). Nevertheless, when the transition eventually happened it came from above, when the reformed communists started to oppose the central Yugoslavian regime and introduced the necessary measures to implement political pluralism.

Even though the party eventually regained the liberal and reformist spirit (with Ivica Račan's victory as President at the 11th Congress of the League of Communists of Croatia in 1989, and in the context of the implosion of other East European regimes and following the example of Slovenia), the party failed to attract voters in the 1990 elections. In 1990 the party added to its name the Party of Democratic Change, and four years later it merged with the Social Democrats of Croatia to create the Social Democratic Party of Croatia (*Socijaldemokratska partija Hrvatske*, SDP).<sup>13</sup> The party remained in opposition till the end of the Franjo Tuđman regime, after which it somehow transformed and recovered, and

then came to power in 2000–2003. The 2003 as well as 2007 elections were again victorious for the Croatian Democratic Union (*Hrvatska demokratska zajednica*, HDZ).<sup>14</sup>

When assessing the performance of the SDP, one has to bear in mind that the Tuđman regime monopolised all national policy, and led Croatia in a not fully democratic manner. Politics was nationalised – the HDZ was presented as the winner of the *Homeland war* and the party which helped Croatia to become an independent, sovereign state. Parties which stood against the HDZ were presented not as the political opposition but rather as national traitors who failed to acknowledge the merits of HDZ in the struggle for national self-determination. The elections were by no means considered free and fair – only in 2000 was the OSCE able to declare that the elections to the parliament had made progress towards meeting the country's commitments to democratic governance, while three years later it stated that the elections were conducted generally in line with OSCE commitments and international standards for democratic elections (OSCE 2000: 2 and OSCE 2004a: 1). The same non-democratic pressures were applied to the checks and balances in the Croatian political system, judicial system, and media. Another characteristic of the non-democratic regime was the non-transparent manner of financing political parties. The main problems seem to have been the non-existence of any kind of disclosure obligation for regular campaign funds of the political parties, and non-transparent and limitless donations from the business sector (Petak 2003). The new law on the financing of political parties intended to improve the corrupted environment was only passed in 2006, with the whole process being supervised by the Venice Commission (European Commission for Democracy through Law).

Since the beginning of the transition, the SDP was led by Ivica Račan (1990–2007), a reformed communist who managed to transform the party into a social democratic one. The structural conditions, the great outflow of members of the League of Communists of Croatia,<sup>15</sup> and the position of the SDP in the opposition helped the party to transform itself from the clientelistic type to a programmatic party.<sup>16</sup> The programme of the SDP is that of a modern social democratic party, where no legacies of the communist past are visible. The party distinguishes itself from the HDZ, stressing its civic orientation (e.g. it claims to be willing to revoke the right of the Croatian diaspora to vote in Croatian elections).

The party is now not only part of the Socialist International, but (together with the Macedonian SDSM as the only Western Balkan representatives) an associate member of the Party of European Socialists (PES) as well. As all proposals for a lustration law were removed from the agenda of the parliament, there is no lustration law in Croatia in force which could have an impact on the performance of the SDP. At the very beginning of the transition, the Croatian League of Communists realised that its stance towards the church was harming its popular support, which was reflected in the founding statute of the SDP (1990) which states that religious belief is a private affair and therefore has no impact on party membership. The SDP then extended this provision in its

programme: the SDP recognises the freedom and equality of all religions and all religious communities and free expression of religious belief (cited from Markešić 2007: 50 in Milardović *et al.* 2007). The party switched from a completely atheist stance to neither atheist nor theist, and is now capable of welcoming all citizens of a pluralist society.

The winner-take-all electoral law of 1990 helped the HDZ to achieve absolute victory in the initial phase of Croatian transition. Even though the mixed electoral system was used for elections to the lower chamber of the Croatian parliament in 1992, the atmosphere of war and the fact that the HDZ was presented as a movement embodying the whole nation again aided the HDZ victory. The elections of 1995, which confirmed the trend of transforming the electoral system towards a more proportional one (nevertheless disadvantaging the smaller parties), were held in a post-war atmosphere in which the HDZ presented itself as the winner of the war, helping it to a repeat victory. The next elections (2000 and 2003) were held under a fully proportional system with a 5 per cent threshold on the level of the electoral districts. The prevalence of the majoritarian system up to 2000, the non-democratic practices during elections and the extraordinary post-war atmosphere favouring populism, all helped the ruling HDZ hold on to power, while hindering access of the other parties to the political contest.

The death of Franjo Tuđman opened the way for transforming the regime and for the victory of the SDP. The SDP government introduced many changes which moved Croatia more towards the ideals of democracy. Nevertheless, the government comprised of six parties broke down into factions, and was not able to reach important decisions. The indecisiveness of the government, along with other issues (such as turning war indictees over to the ICTY) discredited the party in the eyes of the public, and led to a comeback by the HDZ.

Bosnia and Herzegovina could probably be classified under Kitschelt terminology as patrimonial communism, as one could observe very little inter-elite competition. The transition was the result of events in Slovenia and Croatia. Nevertheless, instead of political pluralism, an ethnic pluralism emerged in BiH (Pejanović in Hafner and Pejanović 2006: 50), and the transition was hindered by the war. The political outcomes after 1995 have been highly influenced by the post-war environment and the fact that BiH is in effect a protectorate under UN, OSCE, NATO and EU auspices. The post-communist parties in BiH did not get much attention, and were in the shadow of ethnic parties in existence at the outbreak of the war (SDA, SDS, HDZ), or which were later founded again with a nationalist appeal (SNSD). The Law of Financing Political Parties was passed in 2000, but the controlling mechanisms incorporated are still followed in practice only with difficulty.

The successor parties in Bosnia Herzegovina have not been as triumphant as elsewhere. The Social Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina – Social-Democrats (*Socijaldemokratska partija BiH – Socijaldemokrati*) gains more votes only at the Federation of BiH level, while on the level of the parliament of BiH and the parliament of RS it has been represented by only four or fewer members

of parliament.<sup>17</sup> The party has failed to win strong support among Croats and Serbs, and is mostly voted for by Bosniaks. Nevertheless, the party has never achieved more seats in the parliament of FBiH than the Bosniak SDA, unlike the Serbian Independent Social Democrats (SNSD)<sup>18</sup> which overwhelmingly won in the 2006 elections over the Serbian Democratic Party.<sup>19</sup> To conclude the overall picture of BiH, it should be added that there is neither a Croatian nor a Serbian political party that could be linked somehow to the former Communist League of BiH; the former communists are dispersed among all the parties. In terms of personnel and party infrastructure, the only relevant post-communist party in BiH to be identified is SDP BiH.

The SDP BiH is a member party of Socialist International and an observer party in PES; it tries to present itself as a multi-ethnic, supranational, and modern social democratic party, recalling the SDP BiH which was founded back in 1909. It promotes social security, social justice, equality (regardless of sex, religion, national or social status), solidarity and accountability, freedom, and equal opportunity for all (SDP BiH 2002). Nevertheless, intra-party democracy is quite weak, as it is with other parties in the region.

No proposal for a lustration law has ever been adopted in BiH. Since 1990 the electoral law has stipulated (on the state as well as entity level) the list proportional system<sup>20</sup> so that pluralism would be ensured. Nevertheless, the systems used resulted in a fragmented political spectrum where the parliaments are composed of more than seven political parties.

Kitschelt categorised the regime in Serbia in the pre-transformation period as patrimonial communism, relying heavily on hierarchical chains of personal dependence between leaders and followers, and with low levels of inter-elite competition, popular interest articulation, and rational bureaucratic professionalisation. The transition, imposed from above, was a transmutation (communism changing to nationalism) rather than what we understand as a transition (transformation to a democratic regime).

In 1990, the League of Communists of Serbia (LCS) was reborn as the Socialist Party of Serbia; technically the party represented a merger of LCS and the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Serbia. Between 1989 and 1991, membership in LCS/SPS declined by half, but one-third of the 430,000 members in 1990 were new, indicating a real transition, and probably picking up portions of the nationalist electorate. (Goati not dated, cited in Miller 1997: 155). As the party presented itself as the only legitimate representative of the national interest, it succeeded in remaining in power, leading the country until the October revolution in 2000. It must be pointed out, however, that the party dominated politics due to the facts that the regime was not fully democratic, and that elections were not reasonably free and fair. It is highly disputable whether this party could be categorised as socialist, as its policies in the 1990s were mainly based on nationalism, so one might classify the party as extreme-right as well.<sup>21</sup> Furthermore, the party is not really keen on nationalisation of property, or the instalment of socialism in Serbia, and instead supports private property, keeping state control over strategic branches of industry.

The financing of political parties in Serbia did not meet even minimum democratic standards. The legislation was underdeveloped and not enforced. As experts from the Centre for Free Elections and Democracy (CeSID) mention, the parties conformed to the situation, and wealthy people got involved in politics, so determining the very nature of multi-partism and particularly the opposition parties (CeSID not dated). A new Law on Financing Political Parties was passed in 2003; it increased the funds allocated to the parties, and intended to comprehensively regulate the financing of the parties, which was seen as vital for the further development of democracy. Until 2003 the parties were receiving only small amounts of money, and were forced to rely on other sources. Experts from Transparency International state that before the collapse of the Milošević regime there was a wide system of arbitrary utilisation of state resources as the SPS spent state budget funds as if they were their own, which was the reason why Serbia at that time could be called 'a party state' (Goati *et al.* 2004: 13).

The SPS does not give much power to its leader; his main task was to coordinate the work of the party organs and develop set programme goals. Nevertheless, the 1992 statutes enlarged his authority so that the party president also coordinated the relationship between the party organs and the President of Serbia and other state functionaries, provided they were SPS members. The 2000 statutes again enlarged his authority by making the president head of the main committee, and entitled to propose party functionaries; the 2003 status cut back the power of the president for the first time: the right to propose party functionaries returned to the main committee, and the president was no longer *ex officio* head of the main office (Ristić 2008: 347). Radojević emphasises that the extended leadership character of SPS during the 1990s was not based on SPS statutes but on the authority of the chairman of the party (Radojević 2006: 91 in Lutovac 2006). The personalisation of the party is quite visible considering that from 2001 until his death in 2006, the former leader Slobodan Milošević led the party remotely from the Hague. As Orlović mentions, party leaders in Serbia can lose elections but not their party positions (Orlović 2006: 103 in Lutovac 2006). The party is neither a member of Socialist International nor has any affiliation to the PES. As regards the SI, the party stressed it would like to join, nevertheless the conditions were set as follows – to support the integration of Serbia into the EU, and the renouncement of ultra-nationalist policies. The entry of SPS into SI is hindered not only by internal factions within the party, but by protests from SDP BiH as well.

Along with Albania, Serbia is the only country in the Western Balkans where lustration laws have been passed. However, the law was passed only in 2003, with the main criterion concerning human rights violations; the departure point for the lustration laws was set for the day the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in Yugoslavia came into effect (23 March 1976), unlike in other CEE countries where the starting point was usually the time of the communist takeover, explicitly stipulating the prior holding of state or party position (Hatschikjan *et al.* 2005: 24).

The Serbian Orthodox Church played an important role during the 1990s,



providing support for Serbian involvement in the wars, although it was not an unconditional supporter of Milošević and his regime (Bardos 1992, cited in Miller 1997: 173). In 1999 the leaders of the Serbian Orthodox Church condemned Yugoslav President Slobodan Milošević as ‘the root of all evil’.<sup>22</sup> Nevertheless, ever since the Hague Tribunal was founded, the Synod and the Assembly of the Serbian Orthodox Church have categorically insisted that the tribunal was illegitimate and unfair, and that it places on trial the entire Serbian people and subjects them to a sort of collective guilt (RFE/RL South Slavic, How strong are the Catholic Church in Croatia and the Orthodox Church in Serbia? 31 January 2002, Volume 4, Number 4).

Serbia has carried out four reforms of the electoral system since 1990: the first two corresponded with trends in other post-communist countries in moving from the majority system to a proportional one. In the last reform, however, relatively small electoral units were replaced with a single electoral unit encompassing the whole state, which worsened the position of the small parties (Šedo 2007: 69). In regard to fairness, Goati often cites the violation of the principle of equality of parties in official media, the review of voting material, the rearranging of data by municipal electoral commissions, omissions in the electoral register, substantial electoral manipulation, and great numbers of cases of names of deceased persons in some electoral registers etc (Goati 2001: 108–11, 122–3, 138–9).

In neighbouring Montenegro, the communist regime strongly resembled its Serbian counterpart, with a low level of inter-elite competition, and personal dependence between leaders and followers; it was classified as patrimonial communism under the Kitschelt terminology. The Communist League of Montenegro was renamed in 1991 as the Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro (*Demokratska partija socijalista Crne Gore*, DPS) and has been leading the country continually since then. In 1998, the present leader Milo Đukanović took over the party, while former chairman Momir Bulatović formed a new Socialist People’s Party of Montenegro (*Socijalistička narodna partija Crne Gore*, SNP)<sup>23</sup> advocating closer ties with Serbia and against the secession supported by Đukanović; this was the major opposition party in Montenegro until the first parliamentary elections in the independent state in 2006. As in the case of Serbia, the successor DPS remained in power and only slowly adapted to the new situation by opening political competition to the other parties. The party retains a chameleonic nature, and is very flexible in adapting to new settings. Until 1997 it was very much under the Serbian yoke, while since then the policy has been to distinguish Montenegrin politics from Serbian ones, and slowly endorsing political and economic reforms. Unlike the SPS, the goal of the DPS is not only integration into the European Union but into NATO as well (DPS 2007).

The Election Monitoring Centre (CEMI) points out that control of financing political parties in Montenegro did not begin until 2006.<sup>24</sup> Even though the 1997 law already saw some provisions about public access to information on the political parties, the law did not specify a mechanism and procedures for the

fulfilment of these provisions. A new law introduced in 2004 implies that financial reports will be public, and therefore available to all who show interest, to check the accuracy of these statements. This significantly improved the level of availability of information on the gathering and expenditure of party political funding, not only for election campaigns but regular financing as well (CEMI 2005). The lack of controlling mechanisms allowed too much space for linking up between the political parties and the business sector. New rich elites emerged, closely tied to the ruling party and organised crime (Vreme 14.12.1994 in Bieber 2003a: 25).

The party has been led since 1998 by Milo Đukanović, who served four terms as Prime Minister from 1991–1998, and then again from 2003–2006, in the meantime serving as president of the republic (1998–2002). No other leader in post-communist Europe has dominated the political life of his country for such a long time. He has been dogged by charges of nepotism and shady links to tycoons. Critics point out that Đukanović has never had a consistent ideology beyond merely staying in power. But he has weathered some tumultuous times, and brought his country through two perilous decades without violence (RFE/RL, Pejić: *The Smartest Man in the Balkans*, 17 October 2008). The party is a full member of the Socialist International, and has no affiliation with the PES. Taking the transition into account, it is quite natural that no lustration law has been passed in Montenegro, and no draft lustration bill has been proposed in the Montenegrin parliament.

The party's relationship to the church is quite peculiar, bearing in mind that the Montenegrin Orthodox Church has yet to be recognised as an official church by the communion of Orthodox churches; it is blocked by Serbia, which claims the church's property in Montenegro. Milo Đukanović, pursuing the Montenegrin national identity, was quite careful in supporting the existence of the Montenegrin Orthodox Church, and it was only in 2000 that the state authorities allowed for the recognition of the Montenegrin Orthodox Church. Regarding the stance of the party towards the church, communist atheism was abandoned, and the current DPS party programme calls for ethnic and religious equality (DPS 2007).

The PR party-list system has been in force with minor changes in Montenegro since 1990. In 1992 the 20 very small electoral units were replaced with one large one, which even with a 4 per cent threshold has opened more space for the minor parties. Further changes in the electoral system were rather questionable, and it cannot be said with certainty which parties they favoured (Šedo 2007: 72). Regarding fairness, there were no serious allegations of manipulation of the vote; nevertheless the elections in 1992 cannot be deemed free and fair since the DPS had supremacy over the opposition in the economic and media spheres. The subsequent parliamentary elections in 1998 saw a systematic effort by the state administration to provide all the conditions for fair elections, and they were pronounced 'fair and honest' (Goati 2001: 151; 169–70).

The Macedonian communist political elites were the ones which promoted the preservation of the status quo in Yugoslavia, i.e. a decentralised and communist Yugoslavia. From the mid-1980s on, however, the pro-reform communist

elites began to prevail, thus changing the course of Macedonian politics and setting it on the path to political and economic liberalism (Daskalovski 1999: 26). In the Kitschelt terminology the regime until 1985 would probably fall under patrimonial communism, then slowly evolving into one of national consensus. The transformation was started by the communist elite themselves, and seemed inevitable in the course of development in other CEE countries. The League of Communists of Macedonia (LCM) transformed itself into the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (*Socijaldemokratski sojuz na Makedonija*, SDSM), which then became the main party of government from 1992–1998 and 2002–2006; it currently (2008) holds the position of the second largest party on the political party scene in Macedonia.<sup>25</sup>

The current president of Macedonia, Branko Crvenkovski (2004–present), was the leader of the SDSM in the period 1992–2004. Since then three chairmen have served, with Zoran Zaev leading the party since 2008.<sup>26</sup> As the party was in power during the decisive years of the transformation, it had a decisive role in the economic transformation, and has turned from a socio-democratic orientation towards neo-liberalism. Nevertheless, the party scene in Macedonia is closely tied with ethnicity, and disputed steps taken during the process of implementing the Ohrid Framework Agreement (together with corruption scandals and dissatisfaction of the people with the economic situation) led to the defeat of the party in the 2006 elections. The financing of political parties in Macedonia is regulated by a law passed in 2004 by the Macedonian parliament; this introduced more regulatory measures and opened the way for more transparency in the financing of political parties in the country. As lustration laws were not introduced in Macedonia, the reform leaders from the 1980s managed to stay in power throughout the transition. The relaxed stance of the social democrats towards the Macedonian Orthodox Church played a certain role as well. The electoral system followed a similar pattern as in other countries in the region, moving from the prevalence of majoritarian components to a more proportional one. SDSM is a full member of the Socialist International and an associate member of the PES.

The League of Communists of Kosovo ceased to exist in 1990 and there has been no relevant successor party in Kosovo; the only parties which received attention from the ethnic Albanians in the aftermath of 1999 were those striving for the independence of Kosovo. Many of the parties in Kosovo were formed mainly by communists purged from the LCK during the 1980s, and its former prominent politicians are dispersed among all parties; nevertheless, these latter can not be classified as classical successor parties because they did not inherit the preponderance of the former ruling parties' resources and personnel as conceptualised by Ishiyama.<sup>27</sup>

Along with the Romanian regime, the Albanian communist regime was one of the toughest in Europe, and would be classified under the Kitschelt terminology as a patrimonial system. Even though some *liberalisation* policies were launched after the death of Enver Hoxha in 1985,<sup>28</sup> the transition started somewhat later, and mainly because of the domino effect. It came from below with

student protests. The communists, however, pursuing only cosmetic changes, did not want to give up absolute power, arguing that Albania was not ready for democracy. The first elections in 1991 favoured the APL (in terms of party internal structure, nationwide network, resources, and the electoral system); the next elections in 1992 were more democratic, though by no means completely *free and fair*.

The turning point for the Albanian Party of Labour was its tenth congress, which took place on 10 June 1991.<sup>29</sup> The party rejected Marxism–Leninism and its former goal of forming a communist society, and changed its name to the Socialist Party of Albania. The party distanced itself from the APL and tried to present itself as a different party. Some parts of the programme remained in the socialist format (e.g. preservation of farm cooperatives), while some propagated capitalist mechanisms (e.g. privatisation). Neither radical nationalism nor strong ties with any church are advocated for Albania by the Socialist Party.<sup>30</sup>

This party was the leading party of government from 1997–2005, but it lost the most recent elections in 2005 due to internal splits and disagreements. From 1991 the Socialist Party was led by Fatos Nano, a charismatic leader who kept most power in his own hands, allowing no intra-party democracy.<sup>31</sup> Although from time to time some internal opposition against him emerged, he succeeded in suppressing it.<sup>32</sup> Thus Nano was able to hold power until a new person emerged on the party scene – a young, controversial, modern artist and former mayor of Tirana, Edi Rama, who was elected party chairman in 2005, whereupon Nano left to set up a new party. The Socialist Party is a full member of the Socialist International and has no affiliation with the PES.

Albania has no contribution limits from the business sector to the political parties, but a partial ban on foreign donations. Even though public disclosure was introduced, the parties are reluctant to reveal their financing sources and keep the identities of their donors secret. The Socialist Party had great advantage in comparison with other newly established parties in inheriting great resources as well as a well-established network. Although the Democratic Party tried to get rid of its rival by every means, the Socialist Party remained a relevant actor of Albanian politics.

As the leader of the Albanian transition until 1997, Sali Berisha was a fierce opponent of the Socialist Party, and a comprehensive lustration law was passed. In 1993, a law was passed affecting the licensing of private lawyers, and in 1995 further legislation was enacted on state officials. The lustration law was supposed to terminate at the end of the transition, and the law expired on its own terms in 2001 except for one article (Hatschikjan *et al.* 2005: 23).

Albania is one of those countries which has a most unstable electoral system, as each and every election was held according to new rules. The first modifications moved Albania towards a more proportional system. As some majoritarian components of the electoral system were strengthened in the last electoral reform, the Socialist Party will remain along with the Democratic Party as one of the two strongest, forming a bipolar structure and it might even become a two-party system in the next elections.<sup>33</sup>

## **Communist parties: from pariah to legitimate forces?**

All of the communist political parties in the Western Balkans successfully transformed and metamorphosed into socialist or socio-democratic groupings, except the Communist League of Kosovo which ceased to exist in 1990.

The successor parties in the Western Balkans could be grouped according to their development into three categories:

- Parties which lost the initial elections, restructured, and after one or two electoral terms returned to (coalition) governments (Croatia, Albania, BiH);
- Parties which reformed, accepted a socio-democratic orientation, and retained power (Macedonia<sup>34</sup>);
- Parties which adopted nationalist policies and so remained in power (Serbia, Montenegro).

In the Croatian case, the Social Democratic Party came to power after the death of Franjo Tuđman in 2000 and stayed in power until the 2003 elections, while the Albanian Socialist Party won the elections in 1997 after the collapse of the pyramid schemes, and retained power till 2005. The Macedonian Social Democratic Union of Macedonia remained in government until 1998, and returned to government in 2002. The Socialist Party of Serbia kept its position till the October revolution in 2000, while the Montenegrin Democratic Party of Socialists has been in government without pause up to the present (2008). The Social Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina–Social Democrats is being represented on all levels of the BiH administration, but lacking a nationalist approach it does not appeal much to the voters.

All of the analysed parties except SPS are members of the Socialist International, while only the Croatian SDP and the Macedonian SDSM are associate PES members, and the SDP BiH is an observer party of the PES. One could try to classify the parties according to ideology; in that case we would come to this categorisation.

- Parties with a socialist ideology (Albania approximately until the mid 1990s);
- Socio-democratic parties (Macedonia, Albania, Croatia, BiH);
- Nationalist socio-democratic parties (Serbia, Montenegro).

Most of the parties retained their charismatic or clientelist character, and only in the Croatian case and possibly to some extent in the Macedonian case could one observe a move towards a more programmatic spirit. Nevertheless, all categorisation has to be taken with caution, as the categories remain fluid, and all of the party systems are still developing.

In most cases the communist parties transformed successfully into parties of a (national) social democratic nature. But what about the communist ideas – were they completely abandoned? New communist parties re-emerged in all of the

Table 2.1 Communist successor parties in the Western Balkans

	<i>Previous regime</i>	<i>Transition</i>	<i>Retained power during transition/ got back to power later</i>	<i>Charismatic/clientelist/ programmatic</i>	<i>Socialist/Social Democratic/Nationalist Socio-Democratic</i>	<i>SI/PES</i>	<i>Lustration</i>
SDP	National consensus	Above	No/back later	Charismatic/programmatic	SD	SI/PES associate	-
SDP BiH	Patrimonial	Above	No/partially	Clientelist	SD	SI/PES observer	-
SPS	Patrimonial	Above	Yes/-	Charismatic	NSD	-/-	L
DPS	Patrimonial	Above	Yes/-	Charismatic/clientelist	NSD	SI/-	-
SDSM	Patrimonial/National Consensus	Above	Yes/-	Clientelist/programmatic	SD	SI/PES associate	-
PSSh	Patrimonial	Pressure from below, collapse	Yes/back later	Charismatic/clientelist	SD	SI/-	L

tracked countries. But whether operating legally or from underground, it seems that communist ideology does not appeal any more to the voters and communist parties everywhere remain on the margin of the political spectrum.

## Notes

- 1 Ishiyama defined the successor parties as ‘those parties which were the primary successors to the former governing party in the communist regime and inherited the preponderance of the former ruling parties’ resources and personnel’ (Ishiyama 1998: 62).
- 2 The Communist Party of Moldova was legalised again in 1993.
- 3 Quite interestingly the party does not reject democracy, and states that democracy is the basis for original Marxism. Even though the party has anti-capitalist and anti-liberal stances, it advocates Croatian integration into the EU, with a referendum as a precondition (KPH 2005).
- 4 The party uses the classical communist newspeak (imperialism, exploitation of masses etc.). Regarding the EU, the party would like to see Croatia within the EU, but as an equal member not only *as the ground for cheap labour and a place for investments with non-competitive slaves* (SRPH 2002: 51). The party remains on the margin of the political spectrum ([www.srp.hr/](http://www.srp.hr/)).
- 5 In its programme the party rejects Stalinism, and praises to a certain extent the Yugoslavian model of socialism. One of the main aims of the party is the re-establishment of socialist federal Yugoslavia as a decentralised state. The party does not accept parliamentary democracy as ‘it is based on partiocracy – the rule of power parties and their leaders’ ([www.rkp-bih.org/](http://www.rkp-bih.org/)).
- 6 Interestingly, the party has stood against Serbian nationalism, and has been striving for peaceful relations among the Yugoslavian nations. For this reason it denounced Serbian policy in Kosovo, and supported the ethnic Albanians during the 1990s ([www.partijarada.org/](http://www.partijarada.org/)).
- 7 The party achieves minor successes on the local level, participating in municipal governments.
- 8 The party takes part in elections but has no representation at the higher level of Montenegrin administration.
- 9 The party has been taking part in elections since 1999, trying to gain support but with no significant results. The party opposed the presence of the international community in Kosovo and is one of the most radical left political organisations ([www.lkck.net](http://www.lkck.net)). The US Department of Treasury has issued an Executive Order blocking property of persons ‘who threaten international stabilization efforts in the Western Balkans’ in which LKÇK is listed (United States Department of Treasury. [www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/actions/20010627a.shtml](http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/actions/20010627a.shtml)).
- 10 The leader of the party Hysni Mylloshi strove to establish a party of the Stalinist type. After the ban on all parties based on Enverism and Stalinism, the PKSH started to operate underground, and split into factions under the leadership of Hysni Mylloshi, Razi Brahim and Krastaq Mosk. The last-named established the independent Renewed Party of Labour in 1996 under the leadership of Sami Meta. The victory of the Socialists in 1997 meant the legalisation of the communist parties, and so from the PKSH factions there emerged three parties which became legal in August 1998: the Communist Party of Albania (PKSH), the Renewed Communist Party of Albania (PKSHR), and the New Albanian Party of Labour (PRPSH). The programme of these three parties does not differ much – they all admire the era of Enver Hoxha and the role of the Albanian party of Labour in the previous regime. The PKSH was the only communist party to gain one seat in the parliament. In 1998, the United Communist Party of Albania emerged criticising Hysni Mylloshi, the party leader with the highest support of the communist movement abroad.

- 11 It unites among others the Labour Party of Albania, the Reformed Communist Party of Macedonia, the Labour Party and the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in Serbia. ([www.balkanconference.net/english/index.html](http://www.balkanconference.net/english/index.html)).
- 12 For conceptualisation of the term 'left' see March and Mudde 2005; Fiala *et al.* 2007; Schirdewan 2004.
- 13 For the political party quotas in SDP see Leaković 2004.
- 14 Pickering and Baskin suggest that the HDZ might be included in the group of successor parties, as it was composed of communists purged from the party in the early 1970s despite the fact that the HDZ's message was ardently anti-communist. The same would go for the Independent Democratic Serbian Party (*Samostalna demokratska Srpska stranka*, SDSS) which was founded only in 1997, again by the ex-communists (Pickering and Baskin 2008: 528).
- 15 Between the end of 1989 to June 1990, membership in SKH-SDP fell from 298,000 to 46,000 and during 1990 roughly 70,000 members of SKH-SDP joined the HDZ (Goati 1991 cited in Cohen 1997: 115).
- 16 *Charismatic* parties revolve neither around collective action nor collective choice problems. Only the party leader's charisma holds the party together. *Clientelistic* parties revolve only around the collective action problem. They organise and exchange electoral support (votes and money) for policy favours, but do not present ideological platforms. *Programmatic* parties address both problems. They both organise electorally and present an ideological platform (Kitschelt 2000).
- 17 For exact numbers see [www.republikasrpska.net/skupstina](http://www.republikasrpska.net/skupstina).
- 18 The SNSD is not a classical successor party, and was created only in 1996. It has transformed since then, and now could also be classified as an extreme right-wing nationalist and secessionist party.
- 19 The SDS was very popular within the Serbian community in the 1990s.
- 20 For complex indexing and results of electoral laws used in BiH on all levels, see Šedo 2007.
- 21 For the position of the SPS on the 'left-right' scale see Branković in Bozóki and Ishiyama 2002: 214–15.
- 22 'If the only way to create a greater Serbia is by crime, then I do not accept that, and let Serbia disappear. Milošević has done a lot of evil to everyone, but he has done the most evil to the Serbian people', said Artemiye, the Bishop of Kosovo. (*RFE/RL Watch List*: 1 July 1999, Volume 1, Number 24).
- 23 Momir Bulatović was ousted from the party and formed a new People's Socialist Party of Montenegro (*Narodna socijalistička stranka Crne Gore*, NSS CG) in 2001.
- 24 The Law on financing political parties was adopted in 1993, followed by the anti-corruption law. A new law was approved in 1997. The last two changes occurred in 2004 with the approval of a new law, and a year later with its revision.
- 25 To some extent the League of Communists of Macedonia – Freedom Movement could be classified as one of the successor parties, as it was founded by a minor group from the former LCM. The same applies to the Socialist Party of Macedonia, which claims to be the successor of the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Macedonia, a minor party which used to ally with SDSM, but which is now in coalition with VMRO-DPMNE. From the ethnic Albanian parties the Party of Democratic Prosperity (*Partija demokratskog prosperitet* – PDP, *Partia e Prosperiteti Demokratik* – PPD) might be included as a successor party in Macedonia, as its founding fathers were former members of the League of Communists of Macedonia, with a different view on the treatment of the ethnic Albanian minority in Macedonia.
- 26 Interestingly in Balkan terms, the party was led by a woman (Radmila Šekerinska) in 2006–2008.
- 27 Among others we could cite prominent members of the League of Communists of Kosovo: Azem Vllasi and Kaqusha Jashari (both members of the central committee of LCK in the 1980s) joined the Social Democratic Party of Kosovo (PSDK) and the



- Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) respectively; Mahmut Bakalli (leader of the League of Communists of Kosovo till 1981) was one of the founding fathers of the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK); while a founding father of the League for Democratic Kosovo (LDK), Ibrahim Rugova, was a member of the League of Communists of Kosovo. It should also be noted that the origins of the PDK and the UÇK (Kosovo Liberation Army, KLA) were with Marxist groups which were in opposition to Titoist Yugoslavia and which had closer ties to Hoxha's Albania.
- 28 Liberalisation should be understood in the terms and conditions of Albania in the late 1980s, and not compared to the liberalism in other CEE countries.
- 29 From 1986 till the tenth congress of the APL the membership fell from 147,000 (1986) to 100,000 (1990) (Hoppe 1993: 12, in Zëri I popullit, 19.12.1991, p. 1).
- 30 Albanians claim that the only religion of the Albanians is the Albanian nation. Despite this, Albanian leaders from Albania have never expressed their desire for the creation of a Greater Albania.
- 31 Nano was imprisoned in mid-1993 on charges of misappropriation of foreign assistance; his father served as a close Hoxha adviser and director of state television. Nano used to work at the Institute of Marxism–Leninism alongside Nexhmije Hoxha. He rejected political pluralism and the free-market economy, emphasising that Albania had to develop its own political and economic model, within the existing social system (Biberaj 1999: 281 in Drita 1990).
- 32 See e.g. Schmidt 2000b: 32–50.
- 33 Another party which is not a classical successor party but stems from the original APL, or rather its reformist wing, is the Social Democratic Party of Albania (*Partia Socialdemokrate e Shqipërisë*, PSDSh), whose chairman Skendër Gjinushi, became the minister of education (1987–1991), famous for negotiations with the opposition. In the economy the party pursues a social market format (PSDSh undated). Since 2005 the party holds seven seats in the parliament.
- 34 Macedonia is a tricky case, as in the initial phase of the transition the party gained due to the drive towards independence.

### **3 Nationalist parties and the party systems of the Western Balkans**

*Věra Stojarová*

The aim of this chapter is to depict the chief issues and problems surrounding research of nationalism in the Western Balkans. The analysis of each country includes more than one party whenever applicable. The author has decided to look at the party documents (party programmes, manifestoes and other texts), and to assess actual party policy. In addition, the author circulated a questionnaire adapted from a book by Cas Mudde (Mudde 2007). The outcome, however, was less than satisfactory: 26 party questionnaires were sent out but only five were filled in and returned.<sup>1</sup> The parties will be treated as one unit and only when relevant will significant factions be mentioned. The text will focus only on the political parties; political movements, paramilitary formations and other groupings will only receive passing comment.

The author had to face a couple of questions with regard to the unfinished state-building process in the region. How should nationalism be defined, and how too nation and state building? Is nationalism the promotion of an independent Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), or that of an independent Republika Srpska? Does it consist in a state of its own for the Croatian entity? Is the Croatian entity a first step towards the creation of a Greater Croatia? Does nationalism mean striving to create a Greater Serbia? The last question should certainly be answered in the affirmative. But what about the others? The key to these questions is the delineation of the border between nationalism and ethno-regionalism, keeping in mind that the classification will only have validity temporarily, since the political backdrop will change over time. Cas Mudde claims that ‘regionalism is best limited to groups that call for more autonomy of a region within a larger state structure’ while interpreting ‘nationalism in a holistic way including both civic and ethnic elements’ (Mudde 2007: 29, 17). For the purposes of this study, we understand nationalism in terms of internal homogenisation (by assimilation, genocide, expulsion, separatism) as well as external exclusivity (bringing all members of the nation into the territory of the state by means of territorial expansion or, e.g. population transfer). In other words, those parties will be considered nationalist that strive for their own state. The text will also deal with those parties that strive for their own entity within already defined borders (e.g. the Croatian entity in BiH or Albanians in Macedonia). In the case of Montenegro, the analysis will concentrate on the period after independence was achieved (2006).

## Nationalism in Croatia

### *Croatian nationalism*

The post-war setting and inter-ethnic relations within society are far from being *normalised* even though 13 long years have passed since the end of the war in Croatia. The political and party landscape seems to be stable for the moment; the party system is bipolar with two main actors – Croatian Democratic Union (*Hrvatska demokratska zajednica*, HDZ) and the Social Democratic Party (*Socijaldemokratska partija Hrvatske*, SDP), in addition to some other minor parties. There seems to be a consensus about the future orientation of Croatia throughout the entire political spectrum and relevant parties support rapid integration into the EU. The leading post-war party, HDZ,<sup>2</sup> has transformed itself and moved towards the centre on the right–left axis, and seems to be becoming a standard conservative party. Even though the HDZ strives to take on the appearance of a pro-European, pro-democratic party, it retains some relics of its nationalist past.<sup>3</sup> Looking at other nationalist subjects of the political spectrum in Croatia, the fragmentation becomes clear at first glance. The most visible nationalist actors on the party scene are the Croatian Party of the Right (*Hrvatska stranka prava*, HSP)<sup>4</sup> and the Croatian Bloc (*Hrvatski blok*, HB)<sup>5</sup>; other nationalist parties remain without political representation in parliament: the Croatian Pure Party of the Right (*Hrvatska čista stranka prava*, HČSP),<sup>6</sup> Croatian Right-wing Movement (*Hrvatski pravaši- Hrvatski pravaški pokret*, HP-HPP),<sup>7</sup> Croatian Party of the Right 1861 (*Hrvatska stranka prava-1861*, HSP-1861),<sup>8</sup> Croatian True Revival (*Hrvatski istinski preporod*, HIP),<sup>9</sup> Croatian Right-wing Brotherhood (*Hrvatsko pravaško bratstvo*, HPB).<sup>10</sup> We might possibly include some factions of the Croatian Peasant Party (*Hrvatska seljačka stranka*, HSS).<sup>11</sup> Regionalist features are apparent with the Istrian Democratic Assembly (*Istarski demokratski sabor*), which focuses on the acquisition of a cultural and economic identity for Istria, as well as for equal status for Italians and Croats living on the Peninsula (IDS 2007).

In looking at the Croatian electorate, we must also keep in mind the unfinished transition, as well as a couple of other specific features. When the Croatian political scientist, Ivan Šiber, analysed electoral behaviour since 1989, he concluded that it is not yet possible to bind the social structure with a political orientation, due to the process of transition, the institutionalisation of a new sovereign and independent state, and the war.<sup>12</sup> Family roots played a role in the elections – families with partisan ancestors gave their votes mostly to parties of the left, while families with *Ustasha* and *Domobrana* ancestors voted for parties of the right. As Šiber concludes, voters for parties of the right (HDZ, HSP and HKDU) are religious and conservative, with authoritarian tendencies, and voters of the Croatian Party of the Right are mainly young, between the ages of 18 and 28. The older a voter is, the less he or she tends to vote for the HSP (Šiber 2007: 152–84). The Croatian right-wing electorate with its strong state-conservatism is more active in the elections than those of the left and other voters. This

state-conservatism, which is typical for the most active voters, encompasses support for the Croats in BiH, protection of the dignity of the Patriotic War, a strengthening of military power and state security, spiritual renewal and support for demographic growth (Čular 2005: 31). Dissatisfaction with democracy is constantly growing among HSP voters, while HDZ voters began to be dissatisfied with the state of democracy after the 2003 elections (Čular 2005: 151–3).

The Croatian extreme right political scene demonstrates specific features such as a Greater Croatia, Tuđmanism, the dignity of the patriotic war, a negative stance towards the ICTY, Serbianism, and the EU and NATO, and a positive stance towards the Croatian Independent State from the Second World War, (*Nezavisna Država Hrvatska*, NDH). Issues specific to the Croatian political scene which continue to be repeated in party documents are Croatian ethnic space and the protection of Croats abroad. The most radical parties such as the Croatian Party of the Right, Croatian Pure Party of the Right, Croatian Bloc and the Croatian Right-wing Movement would like to see the unification of Croatian ethnic space and the creation of a so-called Greater Croatia, while other parties promote equal rights for Croats in BiH with Serbs and Bosniaks, and therefore their right to their own entity – a Croatian republic in BiH. Another controversial issue on the Croatian political scene is relations towards Franjo Tuđman. The parties of the right admire him since he succeeded in gaining independence for Croatia and won the Patriotic War; other parties denounce him for his authoritarian tendencies and lack of respect towards the Serbian minority. The only party on the right which stands in opposition to Tuđmanism is the HSP-1861. Whereas the so-called Patriotic War has become another controversial issue for society, for the nationalist parties their stance is clear: one must protect the dignity of the war and stand against the ICTY. Most of them demonstrate strong anti-Serbian feelings. The stance of the parties towards the EU is becoming less negative, and such parties tend to promote the EU, subject to a referendum and with the right to withdraw, and a guarantee that Croatian national values will be protected. The position of the parties towards NATO is more negative; parties either promote a referendum on NATO or demand military neutrality for the country. The only parties demonstrating positive feelings towards NDH and the *Ustashes* used to be the HSP and HČSP. The HSP has been abandoning its revisionism recently and it is not an issue for the party any more.

It is evident that the former repository of nationalism and xenophobia in Croatia, HDZ, has moved to the centre, while the other nationalist parties remain fragmented. The only party which has successfully kept its representation in parliament is the Croatian Party of the Right. Even this party, however, is abandoning its *Ustasha* rhetoric, nationalism and xenophobia, and is now trying to find issues more attractive to the Croatian voters, such as ecology. The party in parliament which was furthest to the right was the Croatian Bloc. Nevertheless, this party has not gained a single seat in later elections and has thus joined the fragmented spectrum of far-right parties which are not represented in the Croatian assembly.

As can be seen, with the consolidation of the party system, Croatian parties tend to abandon strong nationalism and xenophobia and move closer to the

centre. The parties which stick to these old stances remain irrelevant and neither succeed in gaining seats in parliament nor in achieving stronger membership. Currently, we may conclude that Croatian nationalism is fading away from the party system. This could nevertheless change with accession into the EU, with the opening of borders, and with having new issues arise which the political centre does not wish to deal with.

### ***Serbian nationalism in Croatia – Republika Srpska Krajina 1991–1995***

The most important party in RSK was the Serbian Democratic Party (*Srpska demokratska stranka*, SDS). The SDS was set up in Knin as a party uniting ethnic Serbs in Croatia under the leadership of Jovan Rašković<sup>13</sup> and later on under the president of the Knin municipality Milan Babić. With its propaganda, it was inciting the Serbs living in Croatia with populist rhetoric about ‘the restoration of Ustasha, genocide over the Serbs, Croatia-Albanian agreement about the breaking of SFRY’, so to remind them of the German bombardment of Belgrade in 1941, the ‘Ustasha concentration camps’ and the ‘hundreds of holes filled with the killed Serbs’ (Barić 2005: 113, 125). Even though the SDS tried to present itself as the main united force against Croatia, the party was in factions. Already in 1991, one of the regional party leaders Milan Djukić left and organised the Serbian National Party (*Srpska nacionalna stranka*, SNS).<sup>14</sup> After Rašković left, the main rivalry took place between Milan Babić and Milan Martić. Babić was against Slobodan Milošević and his interfering into Krajina matters, while Martić sided with Belgrade and was obedient to Milošević’s decisions. The personal enmity between these two was transposed even onto the RSK governmental level and Babić was replaced as president of RSK with the more loyal Goran Hadžić. The main aim of SDS was

the creation of RSK as modern state, internationally recognized and equal with all other states which emerged after the dissolution of SFRY. At the end, RSK should be part of united Serbian state, which should be constituted on the ethnic and historical Serbian lands.

(Programme SDS cited from Barić 2005: 229)

After the end of the war in Croatia, the SDS ceased to exist. Some of its supporters, together with the Independent Serb Party (*Samostalna Srpska stranka*, SSS) set up a new party in 1997 – Independent Democratic Serb Party (*Samostalna Srpska demokratska stranka*, SSDS).<sup>15</sup>

Besides the SDS, which occupied the main place in the RSK party system, other parties have to be mentioned as well. Based upon the Serbian Radical Party (*Srpska radikalna stranka*, SRS) pattern of Vojislav Šešelj, the SRS RSK was founded in Vukovar in 1992 under the leadership of Rade Leskovac. However, the SRS RSK did not evade internal rivalry either. Leskovac tried to get rid of the link to the mother party in Belgrade and make the party independent, but he

was soon replaced by the more loyal Branko Vojnica. The party was in tow to Vojislav Šešelj and the SRS for its whole existence (Barić 2005: 230–3). After the signing of the Erdut agreement and the re-incorporation of Eastern Slavonia into Croatian territory, the party was in 1998 re-constituted as the Party of Danube Serbs (*Partija podunavskih Srba*, PPS) while the leadership remained the same.<sup>16</sup>

## Nationalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina

It is fairly difficult to assess the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina since the main parties present at the outbreak of war are still in power; they are all based on ethnic identity and nationalism. The Party of Democratic Action (*Stranka demokratske akcije*, SDA) is a Bosniak party which has been striving for a single, united Bosnia and Herzegovina. Even though the party claims to be open to other nationalities as well (e.g. the electoral slogan ‘we are the party even for beer drinkers’), its electorate is chiefly composed of Bosniaks. The party defines itself as a party of the political centre, and of the creation of a Bosnian identity which would be at a higher level than, but complementary to, the Serbian, Croatian and Bosniak identities (SDA 2005). The Croatian Democratic Union BiH (*Hrvatska demokratska zajednica BiH*, HDZ BiH) strives to change the Dayton Peace Agreement and to adopt a new constitution for BiH, since it does not agree with a country based on two entities when it is in reality composed of three ethnicities. The party advocates BiH integration into the EU and NATO; it further wishes to have special relations with Croatia and would like to see dual citizenship for inhabitants of these two countries. The party declares that it is open for anyone regardless of ethnicity (HDZ BiH 2007). Last but not least, the Serbian Democratic Party (*Srpska demokratska stranka BiH*, SDS BiH) defines itself as a Serbian national party and belongs with the most nationalist parties. The party has been obstructing the peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina and has continually dreamt about linking Republika Srpska (RS) with Serbia; the recent programme talks about special relations and about the right of RS to self-determination, as soon as the Dayton Peace Agreement passes out of effect. (*Politička platforma Srpske demokratske stranke. Prijedlog*. SDS 2007). In addition to these three parties, there are other parties based on strong nationalism. These are mainly factions of the endemic or paternal parties from Croatia or Serbia. As the state-building process in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not yet finished, most of the political parties include nationalistic features – mainly on the part of the Serbians and Croatians as the Bosniak political scene<sup>17</sup> strives (due to the current conditions and state) rather for regionalisation and multi-ethnic Bosnia and promotes neither internal homogenisation nor external exclusivity.

As for the Croatian political scene<sup>18</sup> in BiH, besides the above mentioned Croatian Democratic Union, there are several minor political parties which fulfil our criteria of nationalistic.<sup>19</sup> Almost all of them seek a different configuration of Bosnia and Herzegovina and have different proposals for redrawing the constitution.<sup>20</sup>

Almost all ethnic Serbian political parties in BiH<sup>21</sup> display nationalist features. The main role has been played by the above-mentioned Serbian Democratic Party, together with what is currently the largest player on the Serbian political scene in BiH – the Party of Independent Social Democrats (*Stranka nezavisnih socijaldemokrata*, SNSD), led by the former Prime Minister of Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik. The party programme touts BiH ‘as one state built on international agreements’ and essentially speaks of BiH as a federation with RS as one entity. However, the current leader has many times mentioned the possibility of a referendum on independence for Republika Srpska (SNSD undated). The ethnic Serbian political space remains fragmented<sup>22</sup> and only the strongest players are able to compete on the federal level or in the Federation of BiH, while the smaller parties continue to acquire only one or two seats in the Assembly of RS. Most of the ethnic Serbian parties in BiH seek the constitution to be redrawn to form a confederation of sovereign states with RS having special ties with Serbia.

As the state-building process is not yet complete in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the situation is quite difficult to assess. The political scene continues to be divided along ethnic lines, with most parties lobbying for their own ethnicity, while the chief subject of controversy is the Dayton Peace Agreement and the continued involvement of the international community in Bosnian state affairs. Most of the parties wish to rewrite the agreement which ended the Bosnian war. But each ethnicity has a different vision. The Bosniak parties wish to abolish the entities and create a centralised BiH. The Croats wish to create a third entity within BiH and thereby have one federal state composed of three entities. The Serbs wish to have stronger centralisation on the entity level and the right to leave the federation. Some of the Serbian political parties talk openly about an independent Republika Srpska tied to Serbia, while Croatian political parties seek the creation of their own entity within BiH. But would that be just the first step towards the creation of an independent Croatian Republic (Herzeg-Bosna) tied to Croatia?

## **Nationalism in Serbia**

### ***Serbian nationalism***

The rough division of the Serbian party system could be nationalist vs. modernist. The first radical and populist group<sup>23</sup> would encompass SRS,<sup>24</sup> SPS,<sup>25</sup> SPO,<sup>26</sup> NS<sup>27</sup> and DSS<sup>28</sup> while the second, pro-Western group would comprise DS,<sup>29</sup> G17+,<sup>30</sup> LDP,<sup>31</sup> LSV<sup>32</sup> and SDU.<sup>33</sup> For simplification we will call the first group radical and the second one modest. If we wanted to be more precise we would have to go more deeply into this issue. The most nationalistic and populist party, the SRS, is propagating the creation of a Greater Serbia, that is, the annexation of Republika Srpska and Republika Srpska Krajina into a new national state. The SPS uses populist means as well, however it does not want to revise the Dayton Peace Agreement or existing borders. All parties in Serbia see the future of Kosovo within Serbian borders. Radical groups demand the return of Serbian nationals and the Serbian army into Kosovo while the modest groups demand

dialogue leading to consensus which could mean the autonomy of the Serbs in an autonomous province in Kosovo and special protection of the property of the Serbian Orthodox Church.

The SRS is usually lumped in together with the Socialist Party of Serbia to create the third pole of the Serbian party system, sharing such themes as ‘criminal usurpation of the country’, ‘anarchy’, the return of ‘national-patriotic politics’ and a ‘system of law, work and responsibility’ (Komšić 2006: 175). The voters of this red–black pole, in contrast with DS voters, identify themselves much more with the nation, do not like Americans, tend towards authority, are traditional, patriarchal, passive, and anti-Western; in addition, they are against privatisation, giving rights to minorities and membership of Serbia in the EU (Mihailović in Lutovac 2006: 158). The SRS and SPS are most radical when talking about cooperation with the ICTY. Neither of these two parties talks about national reconciliation but rather about genocide committed on the Serbian nation. The SPO and NS do not want to deal with the past in order not to repeat the mistakes of the previous regime. The DSS has a kind of middle position while the modest group talks about the need to cooperate with the ICTY and to acknowledge the crimes committed by the Serbs.

In foreign policy, all parties except the SRS talk about integration into EU while DS, G17+, LDP, LDV and SDU support NATO accession as well. Most of the parties talk about supporting the Serbian diaspora in the neighbouring countries, while DSS refers to special relations with Republika Srpska. Most modern parties support regional cooperation.

Besides the party scene, there are other nationalist groups – e.g. the Guard of Tzar Lazar (*Garda Cara Lazara*) or the National Machine (*Nacionalni stroj*). These ideological platforms serve as a meeting point for those nationalist groups (presumably having ties with skinheads from Blood and Honour Serbia) recruiting volunteers for the defence of Kosovo.

### ***Regional nationalism – Vojvodina, Sandžak and Preševo valley – nationalism of Hungarians, Bošnjaks and Albanians***

Hungarian parties in Vojvodina focus on political and cultural autonomy for the ethnic Hungarians living there, while regional parties focus on decentralisation issues. So far, there are a couple of ethnic Hungarian political parties though none of them demand separatism. The Sandžak presents the same picture – the Bosniak parties focus on decentralisation but do not present a security threat in a form of separatism. This can not be said about the Preševo valley region – sometimes described by the ethnic Albanians as Eastern Kosovo (*Kosova Lindorë*). There is a strong tendency in the three municipalities of Preševo, Medvedja and Bujanovac for either gaining more attention from the central government of Belgrade or for accession to Kosovo. Hungarian, Bosniak and Albanian political parties are exclusively elected by their own ethnic community, although the Vojvodina political parties are more multicultural focusing on Vojvodina issues rather than ethnic Hungarian issues, which is in sharp contrast with the situation



in Preševo Valley where the Serbian and Albanian communities vote for their respective ethnic parties.<sup>34</sup>

### Nationalism in Kosovo

Each and every ethnic Albanian political party in Kosovo promotes independence, and therefore the whole spectrum could be labelled as nationalist. In the same sense, part of the ethnic Serbian political spectrum promotes the creation of a Greater Serbia or at least the idea that Kosovo is part of Serbia.<sup>35</sup> Parties promoting a Greater Albania are marginalised. The Kosovo National Front (*Balli Kombëtar Kosovë*, BKK) has succeeded the original Kosovo Front, which was set up in 1939 by the patriotic writer Mid'hat Abdyl Frashëri. The BKK is 'a continuation of all movements which are fighting for unification of Albanian nation'. In the section entitled The National Question, the BKK states that it 'has a deeply national character and proposes to unite all Albanian ethnic places under one state'. The party declares that it protects the rights and liberties of all Albanians in the world, wherever they live or work. The BKK emphasises that the priority is the national question, and that it will cooperate with those states and political forces which respect the sovereignty and independence of Kosovo as a first step in solving the Albanian national question. It also seeks full integration into Europe. The programme states that the BKK respects the rights of national minorities as enshrined in international agreements; however it would not fulfil requests by national minorities if those requests went against the Albanian national interest. The programme ends with the motto *Albania for the Albanians* (BKK 2001).

In addition to the party scene, there are paramilitary formations striving for the creation of a Greater Albania or independent Kosovo.<sup>36</sup>

### Nationalism in Montenegro

Since Montenegro ceded from the Federation of Serbia and Montenegro only in 2006, it is once again quite difficult to determine which parties are nationalist. There is not only state building, but also nation building going on – the Montenegrin nation was recognised only after the Second World War, while the Montenegrin language seems to have existed only since 2007, when the new Constitution of the Republic of Montenegro was passed. In 2003, 43 per cent of people claimed to have Montenegrin identity, while 32 per cent of inhabitants claimed to feel Serbian (*Popis stanovništva, domaćinstava i stanova u 2003*, 2004). These figures remain fluid as the processes of nation and state building have not yet consolidated. Therefore, if we look at the political scene in Montenegro before 2006, we must take into account that half of the political scene had irredentist tendencies, demonstrating nationalism accompanied with xenophobia and that we would therefore have to analyse most of the entities on the political scene. However, as independence was declared, the only nationalist entities depicted are those of a sub-regional character (Albanian formations

claiming a Greater Albania) or the sister parties of Serbian radical entities, seeking the creation of a Greater Serbia (SRS or SNS<sup>37</sup>). At one stage, the nationalist right-wing parties met in Montenegro with nationalist left parties, as the Serbian Radical Party formed a coalition before the elections of 2002 with the People's Socialist Party of Montenegro and YUL (the Yugoslavian Left, led by Mirjana Marković – the wife of Slobodan Milošević). The same happened four years later, when the People's Socialist Party of Montenegro<sup>38</sup> allied with the Serbian Radical Party, the Party of Democratic Unity, the Socialist Party of Yugoslavia, the Serbian National Council and Academic Alternative, in order to create the platform Serbian List, which subsequently received 12 seats in the 81-seat parliament.

To conclude, state building and nation building in Montenegro looks as if it is reaching its end; however, identification with either Montenegrin or Serbian identity remains fluid. Nationalism is still present and corresponds to the regional Albanian problem, as well as the identity problem in Montenegro. There is nothing like a relevant ethnic Montenegrin nationalist party in the country. The only parties which could be depicted as nationalist are the ethnic Serb parties, since their aim is a Greater Serbia. The Serbian People's Party as well as the SRS are typical examples of nationalist parties; they remain relevant actors in parliament while having almost no significant coalition potential but with the perspective of significant blackmail potential in the future.

### **Nationalism in Macedonia**

If we look at Macedonia's political scene, most nationalist formations are on the ethnic Albanian side. There is one ethnic Macedonian political party which used to be depicted as nationalist in the beginning of the 1990s – the VMRO-DPMNE.<sup>39</sup> However, with the finalisation of independence and the setting up of an independent Macedonian state, the party moved more to the centre of the political spectrum and gave birth to the marginal faction VMRO-NP.<sup>40</sup> If we look at the party system of the last decade, we most likely conclude that all ethnic Albanian formations could be classified as nationalist.<sup>41</sup> However, because the relevant political parties have been part of the political process since the Ohrid Peace Agreement and therefore do not wish to redraw the borders, and their chief aim is full implementation of that Agreement, we will not here focus on the entire ethnic Albanian political scene. As already stated above, the formations which strive for the creation of either a Greater Albania or a Greater Kosovo operate sub-regionally. In addition to the political scene, one could focus on paramilitary formations which operate across the entire ethnic Albanian territory or only in Western Macedonia, e.g. the Army of the Republic of Ilirida or the Macedonian National Liberation Army (*Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kombatarë*, UÇK).<sup>42</sup>

To sum up, most ethnic Albanian political parties seek full implementation of the Ohrid Framework Peace Agreement and do not wish to redraw the borders. However, it is quite unpredictable what kind of reaction the proclamation of

Kosovo independence (and the reactions in south-eastern Serbia and in Republika Srpska) will have on the ethnic Albanian political scene. Demands for federalisation of the country or for the creation of a greater Kosovo have already appeared and cannot be ruled out, which could mean a strengthening of nationalism in both ethnicities. The current situation could be the calm before the storm; as the Albanian question remains unresolved and ethnic Albanians make up almost 25 per cent of the population, there is still space for the nationalist subjects.

### Nationalism in Albania

The bipolar Albanian political scene is dominated by the Democratic Party (PDSH) and Socialist Party (PSSH) with some other minor parties on the right as well as on the left of the political scene. Political parties which would fight for unification of ethnic Albanian lands are marginalised. Ethnic Albanian formations operate in Kosovo, south-eastern Serbia, Albania and western Macedonia; they communicate together and presumably with the political wing of AKSh – the National Liberation Front of Albanians (*Komitetit Kombëtar për Clirimin dhe Mbrojtjen e Tokave Shqiptare*, KKCMTSH), which is based in Tirana. It merged with the Party of National Unity (*Parti Unitet Kombëtar*, PUK<sup>43</sup>) in 2002, in order to create the Albanian Front of National Unification (*Fronti Për Bashkim Kombëtar Shqiptar*, FBKSH).<sup>44</sup> There are a couple of political parties in the political spectrum which in some respects demonstrate nationalist features – the National Front (*Balli Kombëtar*, BK), Legality Movement Party (*Partia Lëvizja e Legalitetit*, PLL) or Albanian National Unity Party (*Partia Bashkesia Kombetare Shqiptare*, PBKSh). The only one which has ever surpassed the threshold to enter the Albanian Assembly is BK.<sup>45</sup>

To conclude, the Kosovo question is not very appealing to voters in Albania and they are not interested in electing a party which would like to redraw the borders and, in so doing, create a Greater Albania. Even though the political system is far from being consolidated, the party system, with its bipolar configuration, seems to be quite well established. At the moment, the nationalist parties do not attract enough voters to be elected to parliament and they remain negligible. The only threat comes from the fact that Albania, together with Kosovo, is the centre of pan-Albanian political and military formations, and some Albanians who are being sought in Kosovo or Macedonia are enjoying asylum in Albania.

### Conclusion

The Croatian nationalist scene is highly fragmented and there are more than ten parties located on the far right of the political spectrum. From among those which have ever gained representation in the Croatian Assembly, the most radical seems to be the Croatian Bloc. The Croatian Democratic Union has transformed itself into a classical conservative party, while the Croatian Party of the Right is also staking out issues other than nationalist hatred. Other parties in the political spectrum seem to have abandoned nationalist issues.

The Bosnian political scene is tricky – the Bosniaks achieved their aim (an independent Bosnia and Herzegovina within the former borders), so we would hardly expect to find any ethnic Bosniak striving for redrawing the borders, for example. The same cannot be said about the Croatian and Serbian political scene. Croats would like to see a different configuration of BiH and strive for their own entity within the state, which would have the right to be more closely attached to Croatia. Serbs seek more powers on the entity level and the right to be closely attached to Serbia; some parties champion referenda concerning the incorporation of RS into Serbia. To sum it up, the main focus of the parties is to achieve their national goals. Most of the ethnic Serb and Croat parties could, then, be labelled as strongly nationalist. Nevertheless, neither the political nor the party system is consolidated yet; what we say today does not necessarily have to be applicable and valid tomorrow.

In Serbia, the Serbian Radical Party together with the Socialist Party of Serbia, New Serbia, and the Democratic Party of Serbia, all demonstrate nationalist features. The strong position of nationalist SRS is caused by a frustration of the voters from the dreary economic situation as a result of wars and economic blockades. Serbian citizens have the feeling that Serbia is in disgrace in the West, which is always siding with Serbia's enemies. The strength of the SRS is demonstrated when the SRS stands for elections even in Croatia, BiH and Montenegro.

Nationalist parties in Montenegro are logically represented by ethnic Serb parties. If we had analysed the party system a decade ago, it would have been the opposite – Montenegrin parties striving for independence. Kosovo is a very similar case – one will have to wait until consolidation in order to assess the overall party system. Up until now, most political parties have promoted Kosovo independence and one cannot clearly distinguish the political right, left or any party family. In Macedonia, probably the most nationalist parties are VMRO-NP and PDSH. Nevertheless, most of the parties demonstrate some level of nationalism. The only party in the region which promotes the creation of a Greater Albania and has surpassed the parliamentary threshold is the National Front in Albania. However, the idea of all Albanians within one state is not very attractive for Albanian voters and the party remains on the margins of the political spectrum.

As we have seen, research in the Western Balkans is complicated due to the incomplete process of state and nation building, and it is very difficult to apply any theory to an unconsolidated political (party) system. Most of the parties we have analysed have an ideological core made up of nationalism as it still prevails due to the late process of state building.

Linz and Stepan concluded as far back as 1996, that 'one of the most dangerous ideas for democracy can be summed up in the maxim that every state should strive to become a nation-state and every nation should become a state' (Linz & Stepan 1996: 29–30). This paradigm is very visible in the Balkans, where the nation and state-building process was slowed down and it only comes to an end in the beginning of the twenty-first century, whereas other European nations had succeeded in forming their own states more than 100 years earlier. Nationalism in the Western Balkans demonstrates the same features: a striving for mono-

ethnic countries in expanded borders, accompanied with xenophobia towards other local ethnic groups.

## Notes

- 1 This chapter draws from Stojarová (forthcoming). The author would like to give special thanks to Cas Mudde for his consent to use the questionnaire translated into local languages from his latest book, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*.
- 2 The Croatian Democratic Union was set up in 1989 and became the major party in Croatia during the 1990s – it ruled from 1990 till 2000 and has been in power again since 2003. In the 1990s, the party or rather government policies were heavily influenced by the wars in Croatia and in BiH, and therefore heightened nationalism was the dominant philosophy. For the HDZ policies during the 1990s see e.g. Irvine 1996.

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HDZ was an endeavour of the Croatian national and democratic movement in the last decade of the last century, led by the salvation idea of reconciliation of the Croatian national being, introduced and divided during the political and military storms of the 20th Century, the idea of the unity of inland and extraterrestrial Croats, that Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina are an indivisible part of the united Croatian national being.

The current standpoint of the party is protection of the Croatian minority in BiH and promotion of their rights to become a third entity; the party promotes the right to vote and to stand for office for Croats living abroad (HDZ 2002).

- 4 The Croatian Party of the Right (founded in 1990) belonged originally to the extreme far right. Its former vice-chairman and current leader, Anto Đapić, was one of those who organised the Croatian Defence Forces (*Hrvatske obrambene snage*, HOS), one of the first defence forces organised by Croats at the onset of the Croatian war. Party members used to present themselves in black shirts, openly wearing *Ustasha* symbols and recalling the leader of the Independent Croatian State, Ante Pavelić. Recently, however, the party has started a process of reform and now presents itself as a modern (sometimes even pro-European) conservative right-wing party, similar to the CSU in Germany. Instead of controversial issues such as the ICTY and the Patriotic War, the party has started to deal with legal state issues, protection of the environment, pollution of the Adriatic and the use of genetically modified food (Pleše 2003). As regards the party programme, the HSP presents itself as a party promoting ethnic nationalism (early party policies could be labelled external exclusive – seeking the inclusion of all members of the Croatian ethnic community within a single Croatian State). Even though some party representatives presented themselves as pro-European, the party programme contained anti-European components, advocating referenda as a precondition for joining any other (supra-) state structure, and paraphrasing the *Father of the Homeland*, Ante Starčević: *Not Hague, not Bruxelles, not Dayton, but free independent Croatia!* ([www.hsp.hr/content/view/6/6/lang.hr/](http://www.hsp.hr/content/view/6/6/lang.hr/)).
- 5 The Croatian Bloc was founded in 2002 and was thought to be more a movement than a party. Since the party evolved as an HDZ faction, it was present in parliament from 2002 until the elections of 2003, even though it had never gained a single seat in an election. In two subsequent elections the party failed to enter parliament. The party defines itself as a patriotic, national, state-building, conservative party based on the ideological roots of the former Croatian president, Franjo Tuđman – *Tuđmanism*. Party ideology is based on the free development of individuals in society, protection of the Central European–Mediterranean identity of Croatia and protection of the Croatian language. The party supports the equal membership of Croatia in the EU (but not at all costs), and wants to keep an eye on, and hinder the sale of natural

resources to foreign firms. It wants to promote the strengthening of relations with Croats living abroad and one of the key components of the programme is the protection of the dignity of Patriotic War and the fight against *detudmanisation* (*100 Pitanja i odgovora. HB-pokret za modernu Hrvatsku* 2003). The party promotes active participation by Croatia in the Partnership for Peace (PfP), but it is against integrating the country into NATO, and states that if NATO integration should come, it should only be on the basis of a broad national consensus. The party is against global solutions which would threaten the Croatian national interest, sovereignty, or integrity and is against any regional Western Balkan association. It wishes to have strong relations with the USA and is open to cooperation with the ICTY and other UN agencies, on condition of depoliticisation. The party sees the main security problems in pressure to create a Western Balkan union, politicisation of ICTY cases, the economic situation, organised crime, the state of the judiciary, Croatian monetary policy, the state of the Croatian nation in BiH, unsolved border disputes, global terrorism, migration, refugee crises, ecological incidents of a transnational character, and an unstable and violent world (HB 2006).

- 6 The party was re-established in 1992 due to the personal rivalry in the original Croatian Party of the Right. It campaigns for 'the liberation of the entire Croatian ethnic space, for a completely independent and free Croatia in the entire territory' (*Temeljna načela HČSP* 2007, par. 8).
- 7 HP-HPP was founded in 2003 and 'the party does not renounce the Croatian historical lands where the genocide over Croatian citizens took place: BiH, Gulf of Croatian Saints (Zaljev Hrvatskih Svetaca), Srijem and Bačka' (*Temeljna načela HP-HPP*). The party uses clear signs of nationalism and xenophobia directed mainly against the Serbs in its documents.
- 8 The party was founded in 1995; it presupposes the creation of a (con)federation with BiH in order to tighten relations with the Croatian minority there (*Temeljna načela Hrvatske stranke prava-1861*, par. 6).
- 9 HIP was founded in 2001, and the son of the former president, Miroslav Tuđman, became its first leader. The party is against any de-tuđmanisation and the Hague prosecutions; and is for preserving the dignity of the Patriotic War, protecting Croatian generals, promoting special relations with BiH and protecting the Croatian nation there (HIP 2001).
- 10 The party was set up in 2004, and promotes the dignity and values of the Patriotic War, the merits of the first modern president Franjo Tuđman, the heroism of Croatian soldiers and HOS volunteers in the war (HPB 2004).
- 11 HSS is a traditional conservative party, recalling the pre-Second World War party leader, Stjepan Radić. The party is for integration into the EU, a referendum on NATO integration, protection of the national identity, a 12-year moratorium on the sale of land to foreigners after the EU accession, and protection of the Patriotic War and Croatian heroes (HSS 2007).
- 12 Therefore the workers and craftsmen supported the right in the first elections in 1990 (HDZ, HSP, HKDU), but changed their support in the elections in 2000. Young voters gave their support to the right-wing parties in 1992 and 1995, then switched to the left in 2000 and then again in 2003 voted for the right. The same goes for unemployed people. The police and army gave their votes in the first elections in 1990 to parties of the left and then, with the HDZ in power, they completely turned and since 1992 have supported right-wing parties (Šiber 2007: 152–76).
- 13 Rašković became discredited within Serbian society after some of his secret statements about Serbs ('Serbs are mad nation') and Milošević ('great Bolshevik, communist and despot') were made public (Barić 2005: 212). Some of his pronouncements were clearly pacific ('I do not want to lead you into war, I can lead you into peace and if you want war you shall be led by someone else'). However, e.g. a Serbian intellectual S. Livada stated that Rašković's declarations were a 'product of myth mania and

- even necrophilia', that Rašković is a 'bloodthirsty necrophyl' who 'wants to spill Croatian blood' (Livada cited in Barić 2005: 219).
- 14 The nickname of the party was 'Party of Tudjman's Serbs', because it was loyal to Croatia and did not really stand in opposition to the regime.
  - 15 For the current programme of SDSS see [www.sdss.hr/dokumenti/PROGRAM%20SDSS-a.doc](http://www.sdss.hr/dokumenti/PROGRAM%20SDSS-a.doc). The current critique of RSK government in exile Milorad Pupovac belongs to the SDSS leadership.
  - 16 For a summary of its programme see [www.hidra.hr/STRANKE/programi/028426.htm](http://www.hidra.hr/STRANKE/programi/028426.htm).
  - 17 SDA (nine mandates out of 42 in the House of Representatives on the federal level and 28 out of 98 on the FBiH level in 2006), SBiH (eight mandates out of 42 in the House of Representatives on the federal level and 24 out of 98 on the FBiH level in 2006) and BPS (one mandate out of 42 in the House of Representatives on the federal level and four out of 98 on the FBiH level in the 2006 elections).
  - 18 The electoral coalition HDZ-HNZ (three mandates out of 42 in the House of Representatives on the federal level and eight out of 98 on the FBiH level in 2006); HDZ-1990 and its allies (two mandates out of 42 in the House of Representatives on the federal level and seven out of 98 on the FBiH level in 2006).
  - 19 This would relate to the Croatian Party of the Right in Bosnia and Herzegovina (*Hrvatska stranka prava BiH Đapić-dr.Jurišić*, HSP) which strives for the regionalisation of BiH and 'protection of the vital interests of all nations, above all the Croatian nation, which is most endangered' though supporting integration into the EU and NATO. The New Croatian Initiative (*Nova Hrvatska inicijativa*, NHI) clearly displays nationalism as well: 'BiH and Croatia make one geopolitical unity so they are necessarily tied to each other' (Bilić 1998). The same would go for the Croatian Bloc in Bosnia and Herzegovina (*Hrvatski blok Bosne i Hercegovine*, HB BiH). As do other Croatian parties, HB BiH seeks nullification of the Dayton Peace Agreement and sees the Croats having a third entity within BiH with its own legal, executive and judicial powers.
  - 20 Probably the only party which does not demonstrate strong nationalist features is the Croatian National Community (*Hrvatska narodna zajednica*, HNZ) which wants to stop marginalisation of the Croatian nation and strives instead for a sovereign, independent, united and decentralised country with power on regional and local levels (HNZ HNŽ: BiH treba biti ... 2005).
  - 21 The SDS HDZ-HNZ (three mandates out of 42 in the House of Representatives on the federal level and eight out of 83 on the RS level in 2006); the SSND (seven mandates out of 42 in the House of Representatives on the federal level and 41 out of 83 on the RS level in 2006). The RS (two mandates out of 83 on RS level in 2006).
  - 22 The Serbian Radical Party of RS (*Srpska radikalna stranka Republike Srpske*, SRS RS), the Radical Party of RS (*Radikalna stranka republike Srpske*, RS RS), the Serbian National Union (*Srpski narodni savez*, SNS), the League of People's Rebirth (*Savez narodnog preporoda*, SNP), the Serbian Progressive Party of RS (*Srpska napredna stranka Republike Srpske*, SNS RS) fight for an independent, free and democratic Serbian state and the unity of the Serbian nation (SNS RS 1997).
  - 23 In the past, another party which presented strong nationalism was the Party of Serbian Unity (*Stranka Srpskog jedinstva*, SSJ). The SSJ was led (until his assassination) by Željko Ražnatović Arkan and later on by Borislav Pelević; its aim was the unity of the Serbian nation (Komšić 2006: 172–4). The SSJ merged late in 2007 into the Serbian Radical Party (for further information see e.g. Komšić 2006: 171–5).
  - 24 During the regime of Milošević, the Serbian Radical Party (*Srpska radikalna stranka*) was sometimes in opposition, sometimes in coalition with the SPS. Since 2000, the party has been very successful at attracting voters and in both the 2003 and 2007 elections, it gained more than 27 per cent of the votes. Vojislav Šešelj has been leading his party from its foundation to the present. Since Šešelj left for the Hague, the party

- has elected a second leader to substitute for him – Tomislav Nikolić. The Serbian Radical Party seeks the unification of all Serbian territories and protection of all Serbs; this entails the unification of Serbia, Republika Srpska, Republika Srpska Krajina, Montenegro (SRS does not talk about the Montenegrin nation), Kosovo of course and, if it wished, Macedonia as well. The main idea of the SRS's ongoing campaign is that 'those who are not with us are against us' or, better put, those who are not Serb are against us.
- 25 The Socialist Party of Serbia (*Socijalistička partija Srbije*) was the party in power till 2000. The party was led by Slobodan Milošević (1990–1997), Milan Milutinović (1997–2002) and, since 2002, Ivica Dačić. The nationalist course combined with socialism makes up the main part of the party programme.
  - 26 In the beginning of the 1990s the Serbian Renewal Movement (*Srpski pokret obnove*) strove for a Greater Serbia; since the fall of the Milošević regime and with the participation of the party in government, its nationalist and xenophobic features have disappeared.
  - 27 New Serbia (*Nova Srbija*) was formed in 1998 by a group splitting from the SPO. The party programme contains monarchist and nationalist features. It is expected that the party could form a coalition with SRS and DSS if they win in the May 2008 elections. The party is led by Velimir Ilić.
  - 28 Democratic Party of Serbia (*Demokratska stranka Srbije*, DSS) was founded in 1992, and the current leader is the charismatic Vojislav Koštunica. The DSS openly claimed the unification of Serbian territories in the beginning of the 1990s, thus demonstrating strong nationalistic features. At present, the party is against any cooperation with the EU or trading Kosovo for EU membership, and in certain circumstances could ally with the radical SRS.
  - 29 Democratic Party (*Demokratska stranka*, DS) is a successor to the Democratic Party which was founded in 1919 and re-launched in 1990. The party is led by the current president of Serbia, Boris Tadić, who shows more pro-European stances than his counterpart in the DSS, Vojislav Koštunica. The DSS sees a chance for Serbia in EU membership and supported the signing of the SAA agreements with the EU.
  - 30 Originally an NGO, the G17+ was set up as a party in 2002. It is led by Mladan Đinkić and the core of its programme is economic liberalism and fast accession of Serbia to the EU.
  - 31 The Liberal Democratic Party (*Liberalno-demokratska partija*) was founded in 2005 by Čedomir Jovanović and presents a classic example of a neo-liberal party supporting EU membership. In April 2007, the party merged with the Civil Union of Serbia (GSS, led by Vesna Pešić).
  - 32 The League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina (*Liga socijaldemokrata Vojvodine*) is a minor party on the right of the political spectrum; it is led by Nenad Čanak.
  - 33 Social Democratic Union (*Socijal-demokratska unija*).
  - 34 See chapter on political parties in Serbia's regions.
  - 35 See Chapter 10, The party system of Kosovo.
  - 36 The most famous is the Albanian National Army (*Armata Kombëtare Shqiptare*, AKSh or ANA), striving for the creation of a Greater Albania. It encompasses around 200 members and it does not really have support among the Kosovars. The Army for the independence of Kosovo (*Ushtria për Pavarësinë e Kosovës*, UPK) was classified as a criminal gang rather than paramilitary formation. (<http://sweb.cz/messin/upk.htm>; [www.serbianna.com/](http://www.serbianna.com/)). Even though the UÇK has been dissolved, the last incident it claimed responsibility for was a bomb attack on a government building in Prishtina on 19 February 2007 as revenge for the death of two Albanians who were killed during the previous demonstrations in the Kosovo capital ([www.tkb.org/Incident.jsp?incID=35446](http://www.tkb.org/Incident.jsp?incID=35446)).
  - 37 The Serbian People's Party (*Srpska narodna stranka*, SNS), founded in 1997, promotes the rights of Serbs in Montenegro with the motto 'Montenegro – land of Serbs'.



- The party advocates the ‘realization of our national goal of a unified state from Subotica to Bar’. The programme goes on to say that it wishes dual citizenship (with the right to vote) for the inhabitants of Montenegro and Serbia, a system of special relations with Serbia (economic and military union) and Republika Srpska, a constitutional definition of the Serbian language with the Cyrillic alphabet deemed to be official, along with the right to use the national symbols of Serbia. As for foreign relations, the party promotes EU membership unconditionally, and NATO membership subject to a referendum, with special relations with Serbia, Republika Srpska and the Russian Federation. The party promotes the preservation of ethnic values and national traditions. The party succeeded in securing nine seats (out of 81 MPs) in the 2006 parliamentary elections and represents one of the main opposition parties. The party was blocking the approval of the new Constitution and has certain blackmail potential.
- 38 The party strived for preservation of the union with Serbia. The current leadership as well as their programme is oriented on pro-European voters breaking with the past.
- 39 VMRO-DPMNE recalled the nationalist revolutionary organisation of the beginning of the twentieth century, which transformed itself into a terrorist organisation with elements of fascist ideology (Stojar 2006: 225).
- 40 The VMRO-People’s Party (*Vnatrešna Makedonska revolucionerna organizacija – Narodna partija*, VMRO-NP) was formed by a faction of VMRO-DPMNE in 2002, and in subsequent elections gained six per cent of the votes (six mandates). Vesna Janevska was elected its first president. The party defines itself as a right-wing conservative, patriotic party and seeks, among other issues, celebration of the Day of Patriotism in Macedonia. The programme is populist-oriented against the main parties in Macedonia; the party fights for a strong state. We can identify some kind of nationalism; however the party does not strive for an ethnically clean Macedonia or even a Greater Macedonia (VMRO-NP 2006). Many of the party’s interviews and texts include xenophobic statements against the Albanian minority.
- 41 One of the most radical relevant actors used to be labelled the Democratic Albanian Party (*Partija Demokratik Shqiptare*, PDSH) which was created in 1997 under the leadership of the influential Arben Xhaferri; the current chairman is Menduh Thaçi. The party stands strongly against its main rival, the Democratic Union for Integration (*Bashkimi Demokratik për Integrim*, BDI), which has continually boycotted parliament since the last elections because PDSH was chosen as coalition partner, even though it received fewer seats in parliament. Ironically, the party allies with the VMRO-DPMNE which is far more nationalist than the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia. The party wants to improve the rights of ethnic Albanians in the country and supports the proclamation on the independence of Kosovo. The party wants the Ohrid Peace Framework Agreement to be implemented and sees the future of Macedonia in stronger relations with the USA, EU and NATO (*Perspektiva e Maqedonisë varet nga të drejtat e Shqiptarëve* 2007).
- 42 The Army of the Republic of Ilirida was set up in 2002 in Macedonia. It fights for the incorporation of western Macedonia into a Greater Albania or Greater Kosovo. Over-rated sources indicate there are around 200 members. Some of these stated that the combatants took an oath to Albanian King Leka Zogu. However, Leka Zogu denies that. UÇK is led by Avdil Jakupi and he claims to control a paramilitary formation encompassing around 3,000 men.
- 43 Idajet Beqiri, the founder of the political party, writes in his article ‘Albanian nationalism is the national reunion’ that the party does not wish to change the borders aggressively, that its politics calls for peaceful solutions, and it opposes changing the borders with the law of the jungle. The main argument from the article is that if the Helsinki Declaration had already existed in 1912, Albania would have been complete and united (Beqiri 2002).
- 44 The pseudonyms of the leaders are Valdet Vardari, Alban Vjosa, Vigan Gradica, and Ramadan Verikolli. While Valdet Vardari is presumably a former collaborator of Ali

Ahmeti (real name Gafurr Adili) from Macedonia, who was arrested by the Albanian police while illegally passing through the borders from Macedonia and accused of creating terrorist organisations, Vigan Gradica is a former general of the Albanian army ([www.fbksh-aksh.org/](http://www.fbksh-aksh.org/); <http://akshalb.ifrance.com/statuti.htm>; Spiro 2004).

- 45 The National Front follows on its historical predecessor from the Second World War; the president of the party is Abas Ermenji. The current programme calls for the creation of an ethnic Albania, with the motto Albania for the Albanians (BK undated). The party states that Albanians are not chauvinist nationalists and the mentality of BK is oriented toward a Western political vision supporting American politics in the Balkans. The BK does not wish to fight for the creation of a Greater Albania, but asks for compliance with international charters and respect for the right of the Albanian nation to place its frontiers where its natural borders lie. The party seeks integration into Europe. The BK gained two seats in 1996, three seats in 1997, and in subsequent elections in 2001 it was part of the greater coalition of Union for Victory (PDSH, PRSh and others), which gained 46 mandates, though the mandates for BK remained on very much the same level as after previous elections. In 2005, the party did not succeed in gaining a single seat.