Europeanization beyond Europe

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Abstract

This article reviews the literature on Europeanization beyond the group of EU member and (potential) candidate countries. It uses the analysis of Europeanization in applicant states as a theoretical starting point to ask if, how and under which conditions we can expect domestic effects of European integration beyond Europe. Focusing on Europeanization effects in the areas of regionalism, democracy and human rights, and on the literature on the European Neighborhood Policy in particular, the article collects findings on the strategies and instruments as well as the impact and effectiveness of the EU. The general conclusion to be drawn from the theoretical and empirical literature reviewed is one of low consistency and impact.

Keywords: democratization, Europeanization, policy diffusion, security/external
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Contents

1 Introduction..........................................................................................................................................................5
2 Theoretical perspectives ......................................................................................................................................6
3 Goals and contents............................................................................................................................................. 10
4 Instruments and strategies ................................................................................................................................ 12
5 Impact and Effectiveness.................................................................................................................................13
  5.1 Regionalism.................................................................................................................................................. 13
  5.2 Human rights and democracy........................................................................................................................ 16
6 European Neighborhood Policy ..................................................................................................................18
  6.1 Democracy promotion in the ENP................................................................................................................ 19
  6.2 External governance and Europeanization in the European Neighborhood.............................................22
7 Conclusions.........................................................................................................................................................24
8 Acknowledgements.............................................................................................................................................26
References..............................................................................................................................................................27

List of Tables

1 Mechanisms of EU impact beyond the member-states......................................................................................8
1 Introduction

When I started writing for the Living Reviews in European Governance in the mid-2000s, "Europeanization beyond Europe" seemed an improbable topic for a literature review. The study of Europeanization was largely confined to the impact of European integration and governance on the member states of the European Union (EU) (see the Living Reviews by Goetz and Meyer-Sahling 2008; Ladrech 2009; Treib 2014). A few studies have expanded the scope of Europeanization analysis to the “quasi-member states,” specifically Norway and Switzerland (e.g. Fischer, Nicolet, and Sciarini 2002; Gava, Sciarini, and Varone 2014; Lagreid, Steinthorsson, and Thorhallsson 2004; Lavenex and Lehmkühl 2009; Mach, Häusermann, and Papadopoulos 2003; Sciarini, Fischer, and Nicolet 2004; Sverdrup and Kux 2000). Even more recently, the study of Europeanization has begun to include candidate states for EU membership (see the Living Review by Sedelmeier 2011). The editors of a 2007 compilation of Europeanization research admitted, while positing that the scope of Europeanization was not conceptually limited to the impact of the EU on its member states, that their own handbook was no exception from this focus (Vink and Graziano 2007: 9, 12). None of its 25 chapters dealt with Europeanization beyond accession countries. In addition, a title search in any major literature database combining the keyword “Europeanization” with the names of major countries or continents yielded few useful results, while those that were found were likely to be full of “noise” – articles and books that were actually about member and candidate states or those that used “Europeanization” in a very loose and metaphorical sense with few, if any, references to the Europeanization literature in political science studies of the EU. As this review documents, this situation has thoroughly been changing in the meantime. A large and growing literature on the processes and effects of Europeanization in the Eastern and Mediterranean neighbourhood of the EU has been emerging.

One might still ask, however, whether there really is any substantive "Europeanization" going on. It is certainly plausible to assume that EU organizations, policies and decisions have a relevant domestic impact on member states, states that participate in the internal market and the candidate states that must adopt the acquis communautaire to qualify for membership. But can the EU also have a systematic and distinctive influence of this kind beyond these groups of states?

This is a legitimate question that has triggered my interest for doing this review. What does the literature tell us about the EU’s goals and instruments in this area? What are the “mechanisms” of Europeanization beyond the group of actual and would-be members? To what extent and under which conditions has the EU been effective in Europeanizing countries beyond its membership region? A practical comparative starting point for answering these questions is found in the related field of Europeanization of candidate and accession countries (Sedelmeier 2011).

(1) In the case of quasi-members and candidate countries, it is clear that the transfer of the acquis communautaire is at the core of Europeanization. Participation in the highly regulated single market requires the adoption of its rules and EU enlargement has always been based on the principle that new members must transpose the entire acquis, albeit with varying transition periods. Beyond the EU, the European Economic Area (EEA), and candidate countries, the content appears less predetermined. So what is the substance of Europeanization beyond Europe? Which ideas, norms, rules, organizational structures and procedures, behavioral patterns, etc., spread intentionally or unintentionally beyond integrated Europe?

(2) Whereas the EU uses the incentive of membership as the main – and often effective – lever to make applicant countries adopt its rules, at least formally, this instrument is not applicable to countries currently ineligible for EU membership. Which other instruments and strategies does the EU then have at its disposal? And can these instruments and strategies be successful in the absence of the membership incentive and the accession conditionalities that often come with it?

(3) Finally, has the EU been able to transfer its rules and practices beyond the confines of its member and candidate countries? While there is no doubt that a massive transfer of EU rules and practices is taking place during
the accession phase in countries aspiring to become EU members, it is far from obvious that countries outside the group of potential member states should be subject to Europeanization in a similarly pervasive way. Börzel and Risse (2012a: 2) suggest the "further we move away from the EU and its immediate neighbors ... the less it makes sense to call the spread of EU policies and institutions 'Europeanisation'" because the EU becomes less powerful and competes with other sources of influence.

To be sure, the study of EU foreign policy and external relations has become a growth industry in EU research. But “Europeanization” is rarely mentioned in this literature, let alone featured in the titles of books and articles. Rather, this literature examines the EU as an international or global actor or as a civilian or normative power; covers the EU’s foreign or external policy or policies; or discusses the EU’s relations with various regions of the world. In addition, this literature focuses on what the EU is in the international system (“actor”, “presence”, or “system”; “civilian”, “trade” or “normative power”, to name several favored concepts) and what it does in its external relations (policy decisions, content, instruments and strategies) rather than if and how it affects third countries. Moreover, to the extent that the literature does study the impact of the EU, it concentrates primarily on the impact of the EU on the international system (e.g. its influence on the balance of power) or on specific international regimes such as international climate or trade policy. What remains is a very small selection of literature studying the domestic impact of the EU beyond Europe – which is the core of the Europeanization research agenda. This review will therefore be based on the EU external governance literature to a large extent, focusing on what we can learn from these works for the study of Europeanization.

The main body of the review includes five further sections: Section 2 introduces theoretical perspectives for studying Europeanization beyond Europe. Sections 3-5 follow the three issues arising from comparing Europeanization beyond Europe with Europeanization in the accession states: goals and contents (3); instruments and strategies (4); effectiveness and impact (5). Recently, the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) has attracted more scholarly analysis, which will be the focus of Section 6. The ENP is a framework for all neighbors of the EU that do not have an explicit membership perspective. It comprises Moldova and Ukraine (and potentially Belarus, but not Russia), the countries of the Southern Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) as well as the Northern African and Middle Eastern neighbors. The ENP can be seen as a most-likely case for Europeanization beyond Europe because it deals with close neighbors, covers a broad range of policies, and is based on the explicit commitment of the EU to extend its acquis beyond membership. The few findings that concern other world regions are dealt with in Section 3, 4, and 5. In the final section, Section 7, I draw a few general conclusions on the findings of the literature and the future research agenda.

2 Theoretical perspectives

In general, the study of Europeanization beyond Europe could benefit from the entire range of theoretical approaches that have been developed and put forward for analyzing Europeanization in the member states (for a brief overview, see Bulmer 2007). Here, however, I will limit myself to theoretical perspectives that have been used recently to analyze Europeanization beyond the borders of the EU. All of them specify mechanisms of EU impact, and the conditions under which they operate and are effective, as building blocks for a theory of Europeanization.

(1) In their analysis of Europeanization in the accession countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (2004; 2005a) distinguish mechanisms of Europeanization according to two dimensions. On one hand, Europeanization can be EU-driven or domestically driven. On the other, it can be driven by institutional logics: the “logic of consequences” or the “logic of appropriateness” (March and Olsen 1989: 160–162). Whereas the logic of consequences assumes actors choose the behavioral option that maximizes their utility under the circumstances, the logic of appropriateness stipulates that actors choose the behavior that is appropriate according to their social role and the social norms in a given situation. According to the logic of consequences, Europeanization can be driven by the EU through sanctions and rewards that alter the cost-benefit calculations of the target state (external incentives model). The impact of external incentives increases with the size of net benefits and
the clarity and credibility of EU conditionality. According to the logic of appropriateness, Europeanization may be induced by social learning. Target states are persuaded to adopt EU rules if they consider these rules legitimate and identify with the EU. These mechanisms can be implemented either through intergovernmental interactions (bargaining or persuasion) or through transnational processes via societal actors within the target state (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005a: 11–12, 18). Finally, according to the lesson-drawing model, states turn to the EU as a result of dissatisfaction with the domestic status quo and adopt EU rules if they perceive them as solutions to their problems, either based on instrumental calculations or the appropriateness of the EU solutions.

(2) In a study on the external dimension of Europeanization in the area of immigration policy, Sandra Lavenex and Emek Uçarer (2004) distinguish four modes of EU external governance differing in the extent to which intentional action of the EU or domestic interest of third countries triggers adaptation (Lavenex and Uçarer 2004: 420–421). “Unilateral policy emulation” occurs when third countries are convinced of the superiority of the EU’s rules and adopt them in order to more efficiently solve domestic problems. “Negative externalities” occurs if non-adaptation would create net costs. However, the presence of an EU requirement may produce policy transfer on the basis of opportune conditionality if the requirement meets the interests of the third country, or inopportune conditionality if adaptation is not in its interest but is compensated by other incentives.

(3) In their study of the impact of the EU on border conflicts, Thomas Diez, Stephan Stetter, and Mathias Albert (2006) construct a two-by-two table to conceptualize four “pathways of EU impact”. They distinguish pathways first according to “whether the impact is generated by concrete EU measures or an effect of integration processes that are not directly influenced by EU actors” (Diez, Stetter, and Albert 2006: 571). In addition, the impact can be on concrete policies or have wider social implications. The first pathway is “compulsory impact” – working with concrete measures, namely carrots and sticks, on concrete policies. The “connective impact” is established through concrete (mainly financial) measures establishing and supporting contact between conflicting parties. The other pathways function indirectly. According to the “enabling impact”, actors in conflict situations strengthen their influence by linking their political agendas and positions to the EU. Finally, the “constructive impact” results in a fundamental reconstruction of identities as a result of exposure to European integration (Diez, Stetter, and Albert 2006: 572–574).

(4) Michael Bauer, Christoph Knill, and Diana Pitschel (2007) use the trichotomy of EU governance modes in regulatory policy – compliance, competition and communication (Knill and Lenschow 2005) – to analyze domestic change in Central and Eastern Europe. Compliance is a coercive mechanism triggered by legally binding EU rules that national administrations must implement in order to avoid sanctions. Whereas compliance is linked to “positive integration”, i.e. the formal harmonization of national rules, competition is related to “negative integration”, i.e. the abolition of national barriers distorting the common market. In this mode of governance, the impact of the EU is less direct and works through market pressures rather than institutional sanctions. “Institutional change is thus stimulated by the need to improve the functional effectiveness of member states’ institutional arrangements in comparison to those of other participants within the common market” (Bauer, Knill, and Pitschel 2007: 411). Finally, communication is defined as a governance mode that brings about change as a result of voluntary information exchange and mutual learning between national policy-makers in EU-sponsored networks. Rather than direct sanctions from the EU or indirect sanctions from the market, it is the legitimacy of policy models that drives Europeanization.

(5) Börzel and Risse (2012a) use the basic distinctions of direct vs. indirect mechanisms and logics of action to propose a typology of "diffusion mechanisms". The mechanisms of direct influence are coercion (force or legal imposition), manipulation of cost-benefit calculations through conditionality and capacity-building (instrumental rationality), socialization (normative rationality), and persuasion (communicative rationality). They are contrasted with three mechanisms of indirect influence or emulation: competition and lesson-drawing (functional emulation) as well as mimicry (normative emulation).
(6) Lavenex (2014) distinguishes six "mechanisms of rule projection", which combine "structures of interaction", institutional logics, and "types of power". "Conditionality" and "legal authority" are both embedded in a hierarchical structure and generate "command" power but follow an instrumental and a normative logic respectively. The same distinction of logics applies to "learning" and "socialization", which both operate within a network structure and use "co-optive power". "Emulation" is a normative mechanism based on a "community" structure and "productive" power. Finally, "competition" is an instrumental, market-based mechanism producing "structural power" (Lavenex 2014: 889).

Obviously, there is considerable overlap between these conceptualizations - as well as some conceptual inflation. The classifications by Diez, Stetter, and Albert (2006) and Bauer, Knill, and Pitschel (2007) also implicitly distinguish between logics of action; Lavenex and Uçarer (2004), Lavenex (2014) as well as Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005a) distinguish between direct EU-driven and indirect pathways of Europeanization. Finally, all classifications emphasize the ability of Europeanization to function through intergovernmental as well as transnational channels. Table 1 presents an attempt to map this conceptual overlap (for a simpler version see Schimmelfennig 2010).

Table 1: Mechanisms of EU impact beyond the member-states

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Logic of consequences</th>
<th>Intergovernmental</th>
<th>Transnational</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Logic of appropriateness</td>
<td>Direct</td>
<td>Indirect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Conditionality</td>
<td>(2) Externalization</td>
<td>(3) Transnational incentives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intergovernmental incentives</td>
<td>Competition</td>
<td>Connective impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compulsory impact</td>
<td>Negative externality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compliance</td>
<td>Lesson drawing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Socialization</td>
<td>(6) Imitation</td>
<td>(7) Transnational socialization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intergovernmental social learning</td>
<td>Mimicry</td>
<td>Transnational social learning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constructive impact</td>
<td>Enabling impact</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Unilateral emulation</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Conditionality and socialization are the two fundamental mechanisms of EU impact that are compared and contrasted in most of the literature (see e.g. Coppieters et al. 2004; Kelley 2004; Kubicek 2003).

*Conditionality* (1) is based on the direct, sanctioning impact of the EU on the target government and subsumes the intergovernmental channel of external incentives, the compulsory impact and the compliance mode of governance. In the conditionality mode, the EU provides non-member governments with incentives such as financial aid, market access or institutional ties on the condition that they follow the EU’s demands. In addition, the EU provides states with additional resources to help them meet these conditions (capacity-building). The effectiveness of this mechanism depends on the size of the EU’s rewards and the credibility of its conditionality. Credibility results from superior bargaining power and a consistent application of conditionality, i.e. the EU needs to be less dependent on or interested in the agreement than its partner, and the partner needs to be certain that it will receive the rewards only when the conditions are met. In addition, target governments weigh external incentives against domestic costs. Domestic adaptation costs must not be higher than the international rewards because otherwise a rational target state of conditionality will not comply (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005a: 12-16).
By contrast, *socialization* (5) comprises all EU efforts to “teach” EU policies – as well as the ideas and norms behind them – to outsiders, to persuade outsiders that these policies are appropriate and, as a consequence, to motivate them to adopt EU policies. Socialization subsumes intergovernmental “social learning”, “constructive impact” and “communication”. Rather than directly manipulating or indirectly affecting the cost-benefit calculations of external actors, the EU teaches them the principles and rules of European governance. External actors adopt and comply with EU rules if they are convinced of their legitimacy and appropriateness and if they accept the authority of the EU. This is assumed to be more likely the case if the external actors are in a novel and uncertain environment and identify with and aspire to belong to “Europe”. A process characterized by deliberation and frequent as well as dense contacts between the EU and external actors is also thought to help. Finally, the high resonance of EU governance with domestic traditions, norms, and practices provides favorable conditions for effective socialization (Checkel 2001: 562-563; Risse 2000: 19).

All other mechanisms of EU impact are best seen as varieties of these two fundamental logics – varieties that work more indirectly and/or transnationally than conditionality and socialization. The EU’s conditionality and socialization can be directed at societal actors – parties, firms, interest groups, NGOs or even regional administrations – rather than central governments. In the “transnational incentive” or, according to Diez, Stetter, and Albert (2006), the “connective” mode of governance, the EU provides these non-state actors with incentives to follow EU rules themselves and/or to put pressure on their governments to adopt EU rules. Likewise, in the “transnational socialization” mode of governance, the EU may try to persuade these societal actors of its values, norms, or policy ideas. Societal actors will then work to disseminate these ideas further domestically.

*Externalization* (2 and 4): Conditionality, transnational incentives and transnational socialization are similar in one respect – the EU seeks to directly induce non-member actors to adopt and follow its rules. There are also, however, indirect modes of EU external governance. In this view the EU is a “presence” (Allen and Smith 1990) rather than an actor in its external relations. The EU’s impact on third countries is a result of its capacity as an important market and system of regional governance and has an indirect (sometimes even unintended or unanticipated) effect on internal regulations and policies (see also Damro 2012). According to the logic of consequences, internal EU governance may produce negative externalities towards third country governments and societal actors. External actors adopt and comply with EU rules because ignoring or violating them would generate net costs. This “governance by externalization” is most noticeably produced by the EU’s internal market and competition policies; firms interested in participating in the EU market must follow the EU’s rules. Countries whose economies are strongly interconnected with the EU make their internal rules compatible with those of the EU. This is similar to the competition mode of governance described by Bauer, Knill, and Pitschel (2007) and “negative externalities” (Lavenex and Uçar 2004). It is also in line with "lesson-drawing" (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005a), "learning" (Lavenex 2014), and "functional emulation" (Börzel and Risse 2012a). It may affect societal actors, such as firms and business associations, as well as governments that are induced to alter their own rules and policies in line with those of the EU. In general, the effects of externalization increase with the market size of the EU and the strength of its regulatory institutions (Bach and Newman 2007; Drezner 2005). The larger the EU’s share is in the foreign trade of a country, and the more binding and centralized the EU’s rules are, the more this country will be subject to Europeanization pressures. In addition, high exposure to the EU and its policies and the success of such policies is likely to promote learning and lesson-drawing.

*Imitation* (6 and 8): The EU’s processes and policies may provide a model for other regions, states and societal actors. Here, the logic of appropriateness is at work. Non-member actors imitate the EU because they recognize EU rules and policies as appropriate solutions to their own problems. This is in line with "mimicry" (Börzel and Risse 2012a) or “deliberate emulation” (Lavenex and Uçar 2004) by governments as well as non-state actors, and also resembles the “enabling impact” of the EU, which describes the use of EU policies and solutions by governmental and societal actors to add external legitimacy to their own political agenda (Diez, Stetter, and Albert 2006: 573). As in the case of socialization, novices in the international system and states in an uncertain environment are more likely to look for and emulate role models. They are more likely to select the EU as their model if they identify with the
EU, are in close contact with the EU, and find EU governance to resonate with their prior beliefs and practices.

These mechanisms can also be effectively used to theorize “Europeanization beyond the EU”. However, none of the earlier studies reviewed above generated high expectations of impact. According to the analyses in Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005b), the EU’s impact in candidate countries has resulted primarily from the external incentives of accession conditionality rather than social learning or lesson-drawing. Democratic conditionality ahead of accession negotiations has worked best when countries had a credible promise of eventual membership and when the domestic power costs of adopting democratic and human rights norms were low, i.e. did not threaten regime survival. Acquis conditionality regarding specific EU rules began to have a major effect only after accession negotiations commenced.

Diez, Stetter, and Albert (2006) find that the “transformative power of integration” in border conflicts is strongest when all parties to the conflict are EU members; much weaker when parties are only associated with the EU; and even negative when the external border of the EU coincides with the contested border. According to Diez, Stetter, and Albert, this is not only because of conditionality. Membership, and association to a lesser extent, also increases the legitimacy of EU positions (enabling impact), support for common activities (connective impact) and exposure to the constructive impact (Diez, Stetter, and Albert 2006: 573–574, 588).

Bauer, Knill, and Pitschel (2007) also generally expect the potential impact of the EU to be higher in states with strong prospects for membership than in “unlikely members”. Again, this not only applies to the governance mode of compliance (conditionality). Whereas the compliance mode is expected to have no effect in non-candidate countries, both competition and communication are hypothesized to have at least a limited effect in the long-term due to the fact that non-candidate countries are subject to market pressures generated by the EU and participate in EU-sponsored policy networks. Against this pessimistic backdrop, the more recent articles find rather more "Europeanization beyond Europe" than expected. Börzel and Risse (2012b: 194) report a surprising degree of institutional change along EU lines in the European neighbourhood and beyond, and Lavenex (2014: 895) finds regulatory alignment with EU rules thanks to international organizations and transgovernmental activities even where EU market power and centralization are weak.

3 Goals and contents

In general, the literature follows the thesis of “domestic analogy”. According to this thesis, polities prefer to have an international environment that is ordered according to their own principles and procedures. The substantive goals – as well as instruments – thus mirror the fundamental principles of the EU and European integration (Peters and Wagner 2005: 215–216); Europeanization in this case consists of “the external projection of internal solutions” (Lavenex 2004: 695).

This general characterization entails various, more specific claims regarding the goals the EU pursues globally. First, the EU is thought to promote its model of regionalism to other regions. Accordingly, it proposes regional economic and market integration and the establishment of supranational organizations as pathways to peace and welfare in other parts of the world (Bicchi 2006a; Farrell 2007). The regionalist model is also seen in the tendency of the EU to design its policies for, and conclude agreements with, regional groupings of countries rather than with individual states.

Second, and perhaps in a more critical perspective, the EU is often assumed to propagate a “neoliberal” economic model, which reflects the EU’s internal commitment to market-building and economic liberalization (see, e.g., Hurt 2003, 2004). Others point out, however, that the EU does not stand for free-market policies as such but for a multilaterally managed “regulatory framework for liberal markets” according to its own model (Damro 2012; Grugel 2004: 616; Woolcock 2005: 396).

Third, the EU promotes constitutional norms such as human rights, the rule of law and democracy in its external relations (e.g. Manners 2002: 240–241). Mirroring the debate surrounding the economic model advocated by the EU, Gordon Crawford (2005: 594, 596) asserts that, in this case, the EU promotes a rather limited democracy assistance
agenda “oriented at challenging state power and sustaining economic liberalisation rather than extending popular participation and control”, and thus “consistent with the maintenance of neo-liberal hegemony” (Crawford 2005: 594, 596). This includes the promotion of “good governance” (Carbone 2010).

Summarizing the results of a comparative analysis of the contents of EU democracy promotion, Wetzel and Orbie (2011) find that the EU generally follows the model of “embedded liberal democracy” with varying emphasis on its components across regions and countries. Moreover, they discern a focus on the external conditions of the model, such as socio-economic development, good governance, and civil society - rather than vertical or horizontal accountability more narrowly. In their view, this focus in external democracy promotion mirrors the EU’s internal focus.

In sum, according to the “domestic analogy”, for the EU as a regionally integrated system of liberal democracies and market economies, the principles of regionalism, regulated transnational markets and democratic constitutionalism define the essence of being “European”. “Europeanization” then includes promoting regionally integrated liberal democracies beyond its borders. From a rational perspective, an international environment that mirrors the EU is likely to be in the best interest of the EU and its member states. It is an environment they are familiar with and know to use to their benefit. This reduces adaptation and information costs and gives them an advantage over non-EU actors that are less familiar with such an environment (Peters and Wagner 2005: 216). Others, however, emphasize shared values and norms as well as established routines and templates of the EU as the source of these goals. Federica Bicchi, for instance, suggests that EU external policy can “be seen as unreflexive behaviour mirroring the deeply engrained belief that Europe’s history is a lesson for everybody. Put briefly, [it] is informed, at least partially, by the idea that ‘our size fits all’” (Bicchi 2006a: 287) or, at least, that “one model suits all” (Wetzel and Orbie 2011: 721). Regional economic integration and liberal democracy thus represent strong beliefs and universally valid ideas of an effective political order that are promoted regardless of calculations of benefit and feasibility.

The focus on more general principles of political order in “Europeanization beyond Europe” may be an artifact of the literature that has indicated a strong interest in the normative content of EU external policies and the EU as a value-driven actor and “normative power” (e.g. Manners 2002; Lucarelli and Manners 2006; Sjursen 2006a,b). It is, however, in line with the findings on Europeanization in candidate countries (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005b): Prior to the accession process proper, the focus on and impact of the EU’s specific acquis rules has been generally weak. Rather, the EU’s constitutive political norms are prominent.

Yet the focus on regional integration and liberal democracy also raises questions. First of all, what is understood as distinctly “European” in “Europeanization”? Whereas it may be granted that regionalism is a unique feature of EU external relations, democracy, human rights and market economy are Western principles propagated by non-EU Western countries (such as the United States) and other international organizations (e.g. the Council of Europe or the OECD) as well. Moreover, the EU itself may have been influenced by broader tendencies and patterns in the international system. Take, for instance, the “neoliberal” economic order or the “good governance” agenda the EU advocates in its external relations. In this case, the EU is not only part of a larger tendency represented by most other international economic organizations (Hurt 2004), its own internal economic governance has changed under the impact of “neoliberalism” as well. By the same token, researchers must be extremely careful in attributing liberal democratic domestic change in third countries to “Europeanization”. The general problem of Europeanization research – that EU influences must be analytically separated from international non-EU and domestic societal and political influences – is more difficult the less EU-specific the rules in question are and the less dense the institutional relationship between the EU and a third country are.

Second, the arguments concerning the “domestic analogy” (Peters and Wagner 2005) or the “ontological quality” of the EU as a “changer of norms” (Manners 2002: 252) clearly fail to sufficiently take into account the evolution and changes of the EU’s “Europeanization” goals and strategies over time. Both arguments suggest that, having been a regional organization of liberal democratic countries from its very beginnings, the EU should also have engaged in promoting its model from the start. Yet the promotion of regionalism, economic liberalism, human rights and
democracy has only become prominent since the early 1990s (see below). Instead, the global political changes of the time (the end of the Cold War, the wave of democratization) and the concomitant institutional enhancement of the EU as an international actor (the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) established in the Maastricht Treaty) seem to have spurred the explicit definition and promotion of the EU model beyond Europe (Farrell 2007: 304).

Third, the focus on “nice” and general goals that are officially propagated and intentionally pursued by the EU may come at the expense of studying more policy-specific, unintended or even “nasty” domestic consequences of the EU’s presence in the world. As an effect of the EU’s market power, for instance, producers and legislators in third countries will often be forced to unilaterally adopt EU product standards. Consequently, we can observe policy- or issue-specific Europeanization. Moreover, the effects of the protectionist Common Agricultural Policy on the welfare and societal and political development of less developed countries have arguably been extensive.

Finally, the focus in the literature on general political principles and constitutional goals should not obscure the fact that the EU is predominantly a system of issue-specific, technical international rules applied to a great variety of public policy areas that make up its _acquis communautaire_ (Magen 2007: 364-366; Lavenex 2014). Everyday EU external governance and its impact on third countries is arguably shaped much more by the issue-specific regimes of the EU. To a large extent, the EU propagates these rules directly in order to influence the agenda and decision-making of international organizations and the policy-making and legislative activities of third countries. In addition, however, the sheer weight of the EU market induces third countries to adapt to or adopt EU rules in order to be able to participate in it.

In the remainder of the review I will focus largely on the general political principles pro-actively advocated and pursued by the EU. Only Section 6.2 on the ENP will deal with sectoral _acquis_ rules. In the subsequent section the focus will be placed on how the principles have been pursued.

4 Instruments and strategies

The literature is in broad agreement that the 1990s witnessed a major change in EU external policies: the establishment of _conditionality_, in particular political conditionality, as a core instrument. Before the 1990s, EU external relations had been notable for their apolitical content and the principle of not interfering with the domestic systems of third countries. Since the beginning of the 1990s, however, democracy, human rights and the rule of law have become “essential elements” in almost all EU agreements with third countries as both an objective and a condition of the institutionalized relationship. In case of violation, the EU may suspend or terminate the agreement (Horng 2003). These goals were complemented later by “good governance”.

How did this policy change come about? It would be insufficient to simply attribute political conditionality via domestic analogy to the constitutional values and norms of the EU, which had existed before and did not change at the beginning of the 1990s. Outside the EU the changed external political environment following the wave of democratization in 1989/90 was the major influence. The wave of democratization not only strengthened the international legitimacy of liberal democracy but also increased the need to support new and fledgling democracies. This was complemented by the increasing acceptance in development policy circles that economic aid and conditionality were insufficient in the absence of political reform and good governance. Inside the EU, the European Parliament was the major driving force. It could use the assent procedure, which had been introduced by the Single European Act (SEA), for treaties with third countries to press for political conditionality (Holland 2002: 120; Smith 2001).

EU conditionality is generally described as “positive”. It uses “carrots” rather than “sticks” – rewards rather than punishment or assistance (Holland 2002: 132; Schimmelfennig 2005; Smith 2001; Youngs 2001a: 192). In spite of the “essential elements” clause, no agreements with third countries have been suspended or terminated. According to Youngs, “in practice European policy was in no significant way based on the use of coercive measures”; the EU has shown “no notable propensity to impose punitive action directly in relation to democratic shortfalls”. “European policy-makers saw a more positive, incentives-based form of conditionality as more legitimate and potentially more
“effective” than the use of sticks (Youngs 2001a: 192). Below the level of treaty relationships, however, the EU has, in fact, used the “stick”. In several cases financial aid was withheld, reduced or suspended, and negotiations were delayed (e.g. Nwobike 2005). These cases are, however, limited to the ACP countries. Moreover, “there is scant evidence of additional assistance to countries where things are improving” (Smith 2001: 190).

Conditionality is not the only mechanism of Europeanization observed – even in the field of democracy and human rights promotion. In his study of EU democracy promotion in the Mediterranean and East Asia, Richard Youngs finds evidence of two rather different strategies: civil society support and socialization. In addition, he observes that the “profile of EU democracy assistance funding in the two regions suggested a bottom-up approach, oriented overwhelmingly to civil society support, and in particular human rights NGOs” (Youngs 2001a: 192; Youngs 2001b: 362). This is also true for Latin America where the EU has little leverage for using political conditionality and has sought to develop direct links with civil society actors (Grugel 2004: 612).

On the other hand Youngs claims that “in light of the limits to positive and negative material measures, EU strategy was characterized by an aim to develop deeply institutionalized patterns of dialogue and co-operation as means of socializing political elites into a positive and consensual adherence to democratic norms” (Youngs 2001a: 193). The EU used “generally accepted cooperation over technical governance issues” in order to indirectly promote good governance and democracy (Youngs 2001a: 195; 2001b: 363). According to Youngs the socialization approach is designed to create opportunities for “imitation and demonstration effects” and starts with very modest expectations of introducing the vocabulary of democracy into domestic discourse and inducing elites to, at the very least, publicly support democracy (Youngs 2001b: 359). It is these strategies, rather than political conditionality, that bear evidence of a distinctive and innovative “European approach” to democracy promotion and have been “unduly overlooked” (Youngs 2001a: 192, 195). By contrast, the US approach to democracy promotion has been characterized by more “concrete intervention” and a “more top-down, politicized … assistance” focusing on the “formal procedural elements of democracy” (Youngs 2001b: 360, 363–364).

Carbone (2010: 21-22) tells a similar story about the promotion of good governance. At first, the European Community focused conditionality by including good governance as a “fundamental element” in the Cotonou Agreement with the ACP countries. Since 2003, however, it has broadened the scope of instruments in favor of dialogue, capacity-building, and positive incentives – not least in order to distinguish itself from the World Bank.

In sum, the Europeanization strategies identified by Youngs and Carbone in the areas of human rights, democracy, and good governance promotion match the most important mechanisms identified in the theoretical literature (see Section 2 above): conditionality, (intergovernmental) socialization, and direct EU-society links (via transnational socialization and domestic empowerment).

5 Impact and Effectiveness

What impact has EU external governance had beyond member and candidate states? How and to what extent has the EU been able to Europeanize non-European countries and regions? In reviewing the literature I will again focus on regionalism and democracy/human rights. The two criteria for evaluating EU policy most frequently found in the literature are consistency and effectiveness.

5.1 Regionalism

According to Federica Bicchi (2006a: 287-288), the EU has consistently promoted regionalism and followed a regional approach in its agreements and relations with non-European third countries around the world – with the exception of EU-US bilateral relations. This rather consistent approach across time and space and in spite of regional divergences strongly indicates that the EU follows an organizational norm rather than functional considerations. This is particularly evident with regard to regional policies addressing “regions” that have few objective regional characteristics (such as high density of transactions) and do not perceive themselves as regional communities – such
as the “Mediterranean” or the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries. Rather, they constitute “regions” mainly according to EU policy (Bicchi 2006a: 288).

As Jean Grugel (2004) argues in a comparative analysis of EU and US policy vis-à-vis Latin America, this regionalism is also distinctively European. First, relations are discursively constructed as “inter-regional partnerships”, “based around notions of equity and cooperation that ignores or transcends the underlying power inequalities” (Grugel 2004: 607–608). Second, the EU “has developed a conscious political leg to its new regionalism”, distinct from US-sponsored free-trade associations, built around “the promotion of its own model of democracy, social welfare, and regional integration”, understood as subregional integration within Latin America (Grugel 2004: 616).

If the EU’s promotion of regionalism has been consistent and distinctive, has it been isomorphic as well? That is, have regional arrangements created and supported by the EU been modeled on the EU example and have they been similar to each other? The great variety of interregional cooperation arrangements seems to contradict the expectation of isomorphism (for an overview, see Alecu de Flers and Regelsberger 2005). In addition, there appears to be disagreement as far as the assessment of specific arrangements is concerned. For instance, whereas Bicchi argues that the institutional settings and governance regimes of the EU and its Mediterranean policy (EMP) are highly similar to international governance with regard to its multilateral institutional framework, the emphasis on “economic matters but with a social flavour”, and the “eurocentric” transfer of the Justice and Home Affairs agenda to the EMP (Bicchi 2006a: 295–298; Joffé (2001); and Alecu de Flers and Regelsberger (2005: 323) point to the fact that the Barcelona process has been modeled on the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) rather than the EU.

In addition, the instruments and mechanisms of promoting regionalism vary across regions and time. The literature suggests that imitation and lesson-drawing were the dominant mechanisms world-wide before the 1990s and have continued to be relevant to this day in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. Since the 1990s, however, the EU has turned to more direct promotion of regionalism, that is, imitation is accompanied by socialization. In its immediate neighborhood and in relations with the ACP countries, it uses conditionality, too. The EU did not directly encourage or induce the establishment of major regional organizations such as the Andean Community and Mercosur in Latin America, ASEAN in Southeast Asia, or the African Union. Nor have these organizations and their reforms been a response to critical interdependence with the EU. But all of them have emulated EU institutions and policies. The uncertainty of the emulators and the legitimacy of the EU appear to be the main conditions for the imitation of EU institutions. Embracing the apparently successful EU model is perceived as a way to overcome crises of multilateral cooperation and integration in the regions. For instance, the Andean Pact was founded in 1969 as a response to the deficiencies of the Latin American Free Trade Association. To correct for its failures, the founders of the Pact leapfrogged towards the Community model of supranational integration including, among other features, majority voting, legal integration with a Court and the direct applicability and supremacy of supranational law, and – later on – a directly elected Andean Parliament (Malamud and De Sousa 2007: 93-94). Similarly, ASEAN reacted to its shortcomings in dealing with the financial crisis of 1997 and related problems by questioning its decidedly non-European “ASEAN way” of informal, consensual intergovernmental consultation and cooperation and of eschewing supranational economic integration. In the aftermath of this crisis, ASEAN policy-makers perceived the need for stronger formalization and institutionalization as well as more economic integration and started a process that eventually led to the adoption of a charter in 2005. In this process, the EU served as a source of inspiration for the constitutional structure as well as the project of a single market (Hwee 2008: 91-92; Börzel and Risse 2009: 13-15).

Jetschke and Murray (2012) characterize the mechanism as a mix of lesson-drawing and imitation. Whereas the crisis of regionalism motivated regional actors to look for solutions elsewhere, they turned to Europe because it was - at the time - regarded as the most successful project of regionalism worldwide. Yet ASEAN copied European institutions highly selectively with a focus on better intergovernmental coordination. Supranationalism was still eschewed. In her study of courts, Alter (2012) attributes the spread of ECJ-type courts to lesson-drawing as well.

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Common markets outside Europe have most often copied the ECJ "in order to promote compliance with the law and perhaps spur integration through law" (2012: 145). At the same time, they have sought to limit judicial activism.

In the meantime, the EU has established institutionalized relationships, funds cooperation programs, and maintains a political dialogue with these regional organizations so that an element of socialization is involved alongside imitation (Börzel and Risse 2009). In Latin America, for instance, the EU seeks to spread its ideas of regional integration and good governance through “research funding, seminar programmes, and the creation of a fund to provide for the regular exchange of ideas […] in imitation of its own policies.” (Grugel 2004: 612). Lenz (2012) therefore speaks of "spurred emulation".

As described by the notion of “decoupling” in the neo-institutionalist sociology of organizations (Meyer and Rowan 1977), the emulated formal structures as responses to crisis and uncertainty were, however, either never truly implemented or co-existed with practices reflecting "old habits”. The first option is most clearly seen in the Andean Community, whereas the second seems typical for the tendency of the member states of ASEAN to retain the practices of sovereignty, informality, and intergovernmentalism (Hwee 2008: 97-98). At any rate, mimicry in formal appearance and emulation of actual practice need to be distinguished. In particular, the EU remains unique with regard to supranational integration, i.e. the pooling and delegation of sovereignty. For this reason, many institutions that bear the same name in other regional organizations – Commission, Council, Court, Committee of Permanent Representatives, or Parliament – perform different functions. The most striking example of decoupling is the African Union. Whereas the former Organization of African Unity (OAU) not only adapted the EU’s name but also its supranational institutions and policy programs (such as monetary union), its practices could not be more different from the EU’s (Farrell 2007: 312).

Unintended effects of the EU’s presence – rather than effects of intentional promotion of regionalism – seem to have occurred in other regions and sub-regions as well. Christopher Hill and Michael Smith (2005: 396) point out that “the need to deal with a rich and powerful EU draws other states into cooperative ventures, especially in their international relations” (Hill and Smith 2005: 396, their italics) and list the South African Development Committee as well as the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) as examples. Although the EU might have unintentionally triggered regional cooperation in these cases, the cooperation schemes did not follow the EU model of regionalism.

Both Thomas Christiansen, Fabio Petto, and Ben Tonra (2000) and Anne Myrjord (2003) refer to the ambivalent effects of the EU on regional institutions and region-building in adjacent regions. In general, the differentiation among third countries according to how well they meet conditions, which is inherent in EU conditionality, undermines region-building and strengthens bilateralism in relations between the EU and its neighbors. In principle, the EU’s neighborhood policies have been designed to reduce the divisive effects of enlargement and “minimized the importance of the institutional boundary between the Union and its environment” (Myrjord 2003: 251). They represent “a turn towards an inclusive form of conducting EU external policy” and give non-member countries a say in EU policy-making (Myrjord 2003: 251; see also Christiansen, Petto, and Tonra 2000: 412). However, the often bilateral framework of negotiations between the EU and third states tends to undermine the model of multilateral regional integration that the EU seeks to promote, and external governance arrangements can only partially offset the disruptive effects of the EU’s differentiation between members, candidates and non-candidates in neighboring regions (Christiansen, Petto, and Tonra 2000: 407, 412; Bicchi 2010: 219). These findings are supported in the study by Diez, Stetter, and Albert (2006), which claims that EU borders that adjoin existing border conflicts exacerbate rather than mitigate these conflicts. In addition, “an emerging dependence on relatively strong EU financial instruments carries the potential of crowding out existing regional initiatives” (Myrjord 2003: 252). This effect will, of course, depend on the existence and strength of endogenous region-building developments. Whereas the EU may have had an overall disruptive effect in the Baltic and Nordic regions, where such region-building efforts seem to have been relatively well developed, “even the limited efforts of the EU to generate multilateralism constitute the main driving force in an externally directed region-building effort” (Christiansen, Petto, and Tonra 2000: 412) in the Mediterranean. However, as Simão argues in the case of the South Caucasus, even such efforts are likely to be ineffective in the face of protracted conflicts and volatile relations with other neighbors (Simão 2013).
With regard to Africa, Hurt is equally skeptical: “The history of regional integration projects within the ACP group, especially in Africa, is one of consistent failure to achieve meaningful integration and development.” Moreover, the six new regions defined in the Cotonou Agreement of 2002 are “externally imposed and do not in most cases correspond to existing regional organizations” (Hurt 2003: 173). Other authors conclude that the EU even “threatened existing regional integration processes” in the region (Slocum-Bradley and Bradley 2010: 40).

In sum, the promotion of regionalism has indeed been a consistent and distinctive feature of EU external relations. The presence of the EU, its success in regional integration and its importance as an economic actor have served as models and triggered regional cooperation schemes in other parts of the world. Both conditionality and lesson-drawing/imitation seem to have been at work in these processes. Yet the scope and design of these schemes are extremely diverse and bear, at best, superficial resemblance to the EU. In addition, the actual policy of the EU toward and in these regional arrangements seems at times to undermine rather than strengthen regionalism beyond the EU.

5.2 Human rights and democracy

Just as Bicchi (2006a) in the case of regionalism, Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse argue that “the instruments used by the EU to promote democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and ‘good governance’ look surprisingly similar across the globe”, indicating that “the EU follows quite clearly a specific cultural script” (Börzel and Risse 2004: 2). The use of political conditionality, political dialogue and capacity-building mechanisms in all world regions demonstrate movement “towards a coherent approach”, which did not follow a grand design but “incremental ‘learning by doing’” (Börzel and Risse 2004: 28–29). However, Börzel and Risse avowedly fail to analyze the implementation of the EU’s approach, as well as its effectiveness on the ground. The picture of consistency quickly becomes blurred when this is taken into account.

The consistency of EU political conditionality is a central issue addressed in the literature, and the general conclusion is that it is negative. Inconsistency starts with the fact that “essential-elements” clauses are not included in agreements with China and the ASEAN countries, nor with Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. While this may be attributed to the presence of a stable democracy in the latter cases, this justification clearly does not apply to the Asian countries.

Authors generally recognize that the EU treats countries differently regardless of similarities in human rights records. Despite the pervasive political and legal rhetoric of democracy and human rights promotion, actual policy seems to match rhetoric only when consistency is “cheap”; otherwise, it is driven by a host of other geopolitical, economic or security interests. According to Karen Smith, “poor, marginal states (often in Africa) of little importance to the EU or one of its member states tend to be subjected to negative conditionality; these are the cases where it is easiest to show that you are doing something about human rights” (Smith 2001: 193). In other cases member states block suspension or termination because this would harm commercial interests, because the country is strategically or politically too important or because they have doubts about the effectiveness of negative measures (Smith 2001: 196). Selective positive incentives to promote good governance have also been hampered by the tendency of member states to protect their close partners from differential treatment (Carbone 2010: 25)

Overriding interest in cooperation on energy issues and the war on terror is also cited as the main reason why democracy promotion was not prioritized in Central Asia, despite the dismal political record of the region (Warkotsch 2006). In a comparative analysis of EU responses to violations of democratic norms in the post-Soviet area, Alexander Warkotsch (2008) further shows that, while the existence of a democracy clause in EU-third country agreements significantly increases the likelihood of an EU response to anti-democratic policies, it is not significantly correlated with responses that go beyond verbal denunciation. By contrast, stronger sanctions are more likely to be used against geographically proximate states and less likely against resource-rich countries.

Martin Holland (2002: 133) reports that suspensions have mainly hit participants in the Lomé Convention and
countries that were economically relatively unimportant to the EU; on the other hand, the EU spared Asian and economically more relevant countries. In conclusion he argues that while the “link between development and democratic principles of good government has become the accepted and inevitable face of North-South relations; the degree to which this conditionality is supervised and sanctioned remains variable, almost idiosyncratic” (Holland 2002: 135).

Richard Youngs (2001b: 357) also generally finds that the “the overall distribution of EU trade and aid provisions did not to any significant extent correlate with democratic criteria” and punishment as well as rewards “were adopted on an ad hoc basis and not pursued with any coherence or vigour”. He also observes that the EU has reacted more to massive human rights abuses and “dramatic interruptions of the democratic process” than to persistently autocratic governments. “Democratic conditionality has not been systematic.” (Youngs 2001b: 356)

In a statistical analysis of the suspension of development cooperation in reaction to human rights violations, Hadewych Hazelzet (2005) comes to more nuanced results. She finds that “the level of respect for human rights or regime type was not significant for the granting of EU development cooperation” and that the EU was less likely “to impose sanctions on countries with which it has institutionalised cooperation”, which confirm the general picture of inconsistency (Hazelzet 2005: 9–10). But she also finds that former French and British colonies were sanctioned less severely than former colonies of other EU member states, indicating the protective influence of France and Britain (Hazelzet 2005: 10). On the whole, however, her multivariate regression analysis “indicates that, in the 1990s, overall the level of human rights violations was a more important determinant for EU sanctions than the level of economic or strategic importance of a country” (Hazelzet 2005: 11). In the end, Hazelzet’s findings refer only to ACP countries. As other authors have pointed out (see above), this group of countries was of relatively minor economic and strategic importance to the EU and was thus more likely to be treated consistently than Asian countries.

This inconsistency differs markedly from the fairly consistent and meritocratic use of political conditionality vis-à-vis the accession countries (see, e.g., Schimmelfennig 2003: 99–108; Vachudová 2005). The variation in institutional set-up may be one cause for this discrepancy. In the accession cases political assessments and decisions are prepared by the Commission in a centralized manner; beyond applicant countries, governments of member state and the various pillars of the EU are more strongly involved (Smith 2001; Youngs 2001a: 28–46). Alternatively, the difference can be explained by a “community effect: when constitutional questions such as membership are at stake, the pressure to act in line with the constitutive community rules increases. Rule adoption is expedient for outside cooperation partners but indispensable for future members. Whereas interest-based considerations are permitted to take the upper hand in relations with external states, the constitutive community rules will prevail in relations with future insiders” (Schimmelfennig, Engert, and Knobel 2006: 46).

Beyond Europe, the move toward intergovernmental political conditionality seems thus to have been a declaratory rather than practical policy. If the EU’s political conditionality approach has been inconsistent in countries and regions beyond Europe, what about its policies of domestic empowerment and socialization? According to Richard Youngs the EU did not pursue these strategies consistently either. As to civil society assistance, “the EU did not push hard to gain access for political aid work” and was “unwilling to risk tension with recipient governments”. In its dialogue and cooperation “the EU often deliberately sought ways of circumventing its own formal preconditions, offering concrete sectoral cooperation without the need for a formalization of new democracy-based discourse” (Youngs 2001a: 193; see also Youngs 2001b: 365). It seems thus to be a general feature of EU democracy promotion that it has been, as several authors have put it, “high on rhetoric and low on policy” (Crawford 2005 on Ghana; Warkotsch 2006 on Central Asia).
Elsewhere, Richard Youngs (2004) uses the case of EU human rights promotion in order to make a general point about the interaction of norms and strategic interests in EU external relations. He argues that “instrumental choices are made within a range of common normative understandings” and, in particular, that “security-driven choices [have] been selected within the overarching human rights framework” (Youngs 2004: 431). In his analysis EU human rights policy has been attuned to the general promotion of international stability and exhibited a “state-oriented capacity-building bias” (Youngs 2004: 424).

There is broad agreement in the literature not only on the overall inconsistency of EU strategy, but also on the overall low impact of the EU on democracy and human rights in non-candidate third countries. These findings hold regardless of the region under study and strategy used. The causes of ineffectiveness appear rather overdetermined for political conditionality. First, vis-à-vis non-candidate countries, the EU cannot use its most important incentive for compliance – the prospect of membership. Second, inconsistency hampers effectiveness: the “seemingly variable application of conditionality … detracts from the EU’s international credibility and influence” (Holl and 2002: 135). Third, for the predominantly authoritarian or autocratic governments in the EU’s neighboring regions, compliance with the EU’s democratic or human rights standards is politically costly. It involves the risks of losing political power that, in the perception of third-country governments, are not offset by the economic or diplomatic rewards the EU has on offer. The indirect strategies were confronted with the same obstacle when the ruling elites in target states “perceived that the good governance agenda was elaborated with increasingly political intent” (Youngs 2001a: 195; see also Tanner 2004: 140–141).

To conclude, EU democracy promotion and human rights policy beyond Europe has used the three mechanisms of conditionality, socialization and domestic empowerment. In all of these cases, however, EU policy in third countries and regions has been characterized by low consistency and effectiveness. In the next section I will review the more recent and specialized literature on the European Neighborhood Policy in order to find if the general findings hold true there as well.

6 European Neighborhood Policy

The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) was introduced by the EU during the time of its “big bang” enlargement of 2004 in order to expand and strengthen its relationship with neighboring countries that would not be considered as candidates for membership – at least for the foreseeable future. Originally conceived to encompass the enlarged EU’s Eastern European neighbors, it was later extended to the Middle Eastern and North African partner countries of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (“Barcelona Process”) and further to the Caucasus. It excludes Russia, however, which insisted on pursuing a separate track of cooperation with the EU (see e.g. Johansson-Nogués 2007 for an overview of the history of ENP).

The ENP can easily be seen as a framework of Europeanization. It was designed by Commission officials who had previously been in charge of enlargement and applied previously acquired tools to their new positions (Kelley 2006). It was originally planned to mirror the EEA by extending the EU market and acquis in the absence of formal membership in EU organizations. In addition, three principles of enlargement policy appeared in the ENP documents: First, the ENP is based on the EU’s commitment to promote core liberal values and norms beyond its borders and, second, it claims to use political conditionality as the main instrument of norm promotion. “Differentiation” is a fundamental principle of the ENP. In the absence of the membership incentive, the ENP strategy documents tie both participation in the ENP as such and the intensity and level of cooperation to the ENP partners’ adherence to liberal values and norms (Maier and Schimmelfennig 2007: 40–42). In the ENP review of 2011, the EU strengthened differentiation and conditionality by introducing the "more-for-more" principle, offering stronger partnerships and incentives to countries that make more progress towards democracy and good governance. Moreover, it declared it would put more emphasis on civil society and would deepen cooperation through Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements. Third, the EU uses planning, reporting and assistance procedures similar to that used for candidate countries (Baracani 2009: 136–137).
There are clear differences to enlargement, however, beyond the obvious fact that the ENP is not designed to guide third countries toward membership. For one, the major incentives designed to induce Europeanization in ENP countries – a liberalized access of goods and persons to the EU – is likely to be undermined by protectionist interest groups in the EU, the exclusion of sectors such as agriculture in which the ENP partners have a competitive edge and fears of crime and uncontrolled immigration in the EU (Occhipinti 2007; Sedelmeier 2007: 201-205; Vachudová 2007). Based on case studies dealing with different sub-regions of the ENP, the editors of a recent edited volume conclude that “the far reaching-benefits on offer have remained in the realm of possibilities” and too vague and weak to wield substantial leverage and encourage painful and costly reforms (Whitman and Wolff 2010: 12-13).

Second, rather than full transposition of the acquis, the EU’s “expectation is for partial and progressive alignment with EU legal norms in areas where it makes economic sense, suits the development level and serves the development goals of the neighbours” (Noutcheva and Emerson 2007: 91). Moreover, the EU “puts a much stronger emphasis on ‘soft’ and participatory mechanisms involving the ENP partners” (Sedelmeier 2007: 199). Rather than unilaterally imposed by the EU based on its acquis, the Action Plans at the core of ENP programming are negotiated and monitored between the EU and its partners bilaterally and based on “joint ownership”.

Joint ownership, a core principle of the socialization mechanism of Europeanization, is considered to undermine the effectiveness of conditionality. On one hand, “it reduces the likelihood that bilateral Action Plans reflect the EU’s objective precisely in relations with those countries which are furthest from conforming to the conditions preferred by the EU” (Sedelmeier 2007: 200). Governments that do not share the EU’s democracy and human rights agenda, for instance, can and do minimize the role of political conditionality in their Action Plans. On the other, it is “at odds with the tough monitoring and reporting by EU institutions that was a precondition for reform-oriented forces to mobilize pressure against reform-adverse governments in East Central European accession governments” (ibid.). To summarize, Ulrich Sedelmeier expects the coexistence of conditionality and socialization in the ENP to “undermine their respective potential” (Sedelmeier 2007: 201).

By contrast, Gwendolyn Sasse (2008, 2010) finds merit and opportunities in the ENP’s “conditionality-lite” (Sasse 2008, 2010). While she agrees that it is unlikely to produce short-term EU-driven change at the level of third country governments, ENP conditionality may serve as an external reference point for longer-term domestic political processes. In her view the vagueness of conditions and incentives “makes it easier for traditionally Euro-sceptic actors in ENP countries to approach the EU gradually and selectively” (Sasse 2008: 298). For those countries negotiating DCFTAs, EU conditionality has, however, hardened considerably. According to Delcour, DCFTAs are "standardized and non-negotiable" (2013: 349) and introduce a shadow of hierarchy going beyond the ENP Action plans, thus increasing the EU impact. Since they offer few short-term tangible benefits, however, the DCFTA effect depends on the domestic actor constellation and, one might add, on the government's strategic choice between Russia and the EU.

6.1 Democracy promotion in the ENP

The expectation of ineffectiveness is borne out by the evidence published so far (see also Börzel 2011). An analysis of ENP participants’ democracy and human rights records since they established contractual relations with the EU in the mid-1990s shows no overall liberalization or democratization (Maier and Schimmelfennig 2007: 45-48). The few leaps forward in democracy - such as the color revolutions in Eastern Europe or the "Arab Spring" - have not been effects of EU policy. Rather, they have taken the EU by surprise and often occurred in countries that had been particularly unresponsive to EU democracy promotion (such as Tunisia or Libya). This finding is not specific to the ENP: EU policy has never actually brought about democratic change, not even in Southern and Central Europe. The crucial difference is that EU enlargement policy has been able to lock in democratic change and support democratic consolidation, whereas there is no evidence for such effects in the ENP. At best, the EU may have averted even worse outcomes. In a comprehensive analysis of EU (and Russian) policies vis-à-vis Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine, Tolstrup finds an overall positive impact of the EU on these countries’ democratic
performance but mainly "as a restrainer of repressive policies and a vital counterbalance to Russian impingements on state leaders' effective power to rule" (Tolstrup 2014: 248). As much as the literature is characterized by a broad consensus on the ineffectiveness of EU democracy promotion, it attributes this ineffectiveness to a wide variety of reasons.

Inconsistency is the cause of ineffectiveness that is put forward most often in the literature (for a dissenting view praising non-uniformity, see Burlyuk 2014). It refers to conflicts between democracy promotion and other foreign policy goals, conflicting goals within democracy promotion, incoherence among member states and other EU actors, and inconsistency across ENP countries. The conditions and benchmarks for differentiation and conditionality are described as vague, arbitrary, inconsistent, and incomplete (Del Sarto and Schumacher 2011). Comparisons of ENP Action Plans demonstrate the absence of a coherent democracy promotion policy and the overriding importance of the EU’s geopolitical and partner countries’ political interests (Bosse 2007; Baracani 2009). In Eastern Europe, Tolstrup finds a predominantly stability-oriented policy in the 1990s, followed by a phase in which democratic conditionality was gradually introduced, and a more recent phase dominated by "pragmatic cooperation" and geostrategic competition with Russia (Tolstrup 2014: 249). In the Mediterranean, consistent democracy promotion was undermined by the EU’s efforts to build a multilateral partnership in the Southern Mediterranean and to promote peace in the Middle East – otherwise it would risk losing essential partners for these efforts. At the end of the day, the EU, and particularly its southern member states, have preferred stable, authoritarian and Western-oriented regimes to the instability and Islamist electoral victories that genuine democratization processes in this region are likely to produce (Gillespie and Whitehead 2002: 196; Gillespie and Youngs 2002: 12-13; Youngs 2002: 42; Jünemann 2003: 7; Hollis 2012). The EU reaction to the “Arab spring” appears to have confirmed this stability-oriented outlook (Dandashly 2015).

Moreover, Balfour (2012) argues that the “gap between rhetoric and practice” does not only follow from strategic interests but also from the member states' “competing cognitive and normative views of what EU foreign policy should be about, as well as the role that human rights and democracy should play in relations with third countries” (Balfour 2012: 14). Bicchi (2010) points out that implementation problems such as a long chain of command and ambiguous and contested policy objectives add to the ineffectiveness of EU democratic assistance. By contrast, Börzel and Van Hüllen argue that the “ENP suffers from substantive inconsistency rather than a lack of internal cohesiveness” (2014: 1034). Whereas the EU has generally been speaking with one voice, the conflicting pursuit of both democratic and effective governance at the same time has undermined its effectiveness. Analyzing the institutional response of the EU to the “Arabellaion”, Noutcheva (2015) concludes that although the EU embraced the democratic aspirations rhetorically, its practical democracy promotion policy was hampered by the disunity of the member states and the limited autonomy of EU institutions.

Weak resonance with promoted norms and weak identity with the democracy promoters are further sources of ineffectiveness. In Southern and Central Europe as well as in the Western Balkans, successful democracy promotion required target actors that identified both with the norms of democracy and with the EU and target states with a degree of liberalization and democratization, which provided openings for external democracy promoters. Both conditions also apply to the ENP (Jonasson 2013; Van Hüllen 2012) with the exception that democratic resonance, identity with the EU, and political liberalization are in much shorter supply in the European neighborhood. In a comparative analysis of post-Soviet countries, Sasse (2013) points out that, in the absence of domestic political competition, strong linkages with the West can be counterproductive for democratization. However, even in a comparatively benign case such as Ukraine, in which the EU made clear and determinate demands on one of the most liberalized and pluralistic ENP countries, Gawrich, Melnykovska, and Schweikert (2010) argue that the effectiveness of EU democracy promotion has been weak in the absence of a membership perspective. Timuş concurs that, despite the concerted efforts of the EU and other European organizations, “the electoral reforms are botched by short-term strategies of maximising electoral benefit”, because neighboring countries “are not as constrained as the EU candidates in adjusting to the European standards and […] party systems are weakly consolidated” (2013: 290).
Furthermore, the empowerment of civil society has been hampered either by the weakness of civil society in the ENP countries (Howard 2003; Blomberg and Szöcsik 2014) or by the EU’s choice of partners and civil society support. Studies of the MENA countries show that democracy assistance has been primarily directed towards secular civil society organizations engaged in non-political services that are approved by, and often connected to, partner governments (Gillespie and Whitehead 2002: 197; Haddadi 2002 and 2003; Jünemann 2002; Youngs 2002: 55-57). These assessments stem from the pre-ENP period but have been confirmed by more recent studies (Pace 2009; Pace, Seeberg, and Cavatorta 2009: 4-5; Youngs 2008). In a study of EU democracy assistance in Turkey and Jordan, Jonasson (2013) also finds that the lack of resonance and identity (or “orientation” as she calls it) is combined with a lack of local ownership and a lack of dialogue with a wide range of partners in the target countries.

With regard to Eastern Europe, Irene Hahn-Fuhr and Susann Worschech (2014) argue that Western support for small, weakly developed and hard-pressed civil society groups and organizations is likely to create divisions among civil society actors and their detachment from society at large. Donor conceptions and the practical exigencies of project management have contributed to the growth of professionalized NGOs that conform to the Western ideas of civil society and democracy, are capable of complying with the funding, project management, and reporting requirements of the donors (Shapovalova and Youngs 2014), and crowd out “amateur” civic groups following a local agenda. Civil society promotion thus “genetically engineers” a non-indigenous type of civil society organization (Ishkanian 2007). Western civil society promotion, public mistrust, and state harassment mutually reinforce or facilitate each other. Because of the public’s indifference or mistrust, many NGOs are dependent on external financial support, which in turn makes it easy for the state to denounce them as foreign agents, further contributing to public mistrust (Schimmelfennig 2014: 230).

Finally, democracy promotion in the European Neighbourhood faces resistance by non-democratic regional powers. Whereas the EU (together with the US) was unrivalled in Southern and Central Europe, it now confronts a Russia that has firmly embarked on an anti-Western course both domestically and in international relations. Even though Russia does not actively promote “autocracy” or any specific type of political regime, it regards democratic developments in its “near abroad” as a geopolitical threat strengthening Western influence and undermining its own—and uses economic sanctions as well as overt or covert military interventions to counteract such developments (Tolstrup 2014).

The failure of democracy promotion in the ENP is thus highly overdetermined according to the literature. Both conditionality and socialization are undermined by inconsistency. Conditionality is further weakened by limited incentives, weak credibility, international resistance, and high adaptation costs for the mostly autocratic regimes in the region. Socialization suffers from weak resonance and identity and a lack of local ownership and dialogue.

Given the limits and failures of top-down political conditionality and bottom-up socialization in the context of the ENP, Sandra Lavenex, Frank Schimmelfennig and their collaborators have begun to examine an alternative model of democracy promotion in the European Neighborhood (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2011). The “governance model” starts with the assumption that the intensifying web of association relations between the EU and associated third countries introduces a new form of democracy promotion through sectoral cooperation. Democratic governance goes beyond “good governance” in that it includes general attributes of democracy such as accountability, transparency and participation. It differs from the direct promotion of democracy in that it does not target the general institutions and processes of the polity, such as elections, parties, or parliaments, but operates at the level of sectoral policy-making. The EU seeks not only to externalize its material acquis rules for regulating public policy in each sector of political cooperation between the EU and its neighboring countries, but also procedural rules on how sectoral policies and actors are made transparent, accountable and participatory. Though democratic governance promotion initially remains at the sectoral level and – in the case of success – leads to the democratization of sectoral governance, it may spill over into the general polity by inculcating democratic values, norms and habits on societal and bureaucratic actors and creating a demand for far-reaching democratization of the entire political system (Freyburg, Skripka, and Wetzel 2007; 2009a).

In an empirical assessment comparing democratic governance promotion in three sectors (asylum, competition...
and environmental policy) and four countries (Jordan, Moldova, Morocco, and Ukraine), Freyburg et al. show that the EU is indeed capable of inducing neighbouring countries to incorporate policy-specific democratic governance provisions into domestic legislation in the absence of accession conditionality or even membership aspirations. This is especially the case when the corresponding EU rules are strongly codified and institutionalized, interdependence favors the EU, and domestic adaptation costs are low. The study also shows, however, that the application of these provisions in administrative practice has remained weak thus far (Freyburg et al. 2009b; 2011). In a different set of studies, Tina Freyburg shows that functional cooperation between the EU and ENP countries has the potential to transfer and strengthen positive attitudes of state officials towards democratic governance (Freyburg 2011a; 2011b; 2014).

6.2 External governance and Europeanization in the European Neighborhood

Initially, democracy promotion has been the most widely studied area of Europeanization in the European Neighborhood. Recently, however, single and comparative case studies focusing on other EU rules and policies have increased significantly. As in democracy promotion, the available evidence points to systematic weaknesses in EU impact. At a general level, Gergana Noutcheva and Michael Emerson show on the basis of World Bank governance scores that “most of them have regressed rather than progressed on both regulatory quality and rule of law” between 1996 and 2004 (Noutcheva and Emerson 2007: 90), i.e. during the time that the EU established institutionalized and – at least on paper – politically conditioned relations with the neighborhood countries. Policy-specific case studies have, however, added considerable nuance to this general finding. First, they reveal wide variation across policies regarding Europeanization effects. Second, they have begun to uncover the conditions of effectiveness. Policy-specific research has strongly focused on the Eastern neighborhood, however, and particularly on Ukraine.

Starting from the benchmark of accession countries and the assumption of Europeanization driven by conditionality, the baseline expectation is, indeed, no or weak Europeanization in the European Neighborhood. First, policy and institutional “misfit”, i.e. the discrepancy between EU rules and domestic rules in the ENP countries, is generally high in the case of ENP countries. Second, the ENP countries generally possess weak state and economic capacity. Both conditions together are likely to create very high costs of adaptation to EU rules. Third, these costs are unlikely to be balanced by incentives and support given that the EU does not propose membership and offers less financial support than for accession countries (e.g. Langbein and Börzel 2013). Some studies broadly support this general picture. In his book on EU external energy policy, Stephan Hofer compares EU rule export in Bulgaria, Serbia and Ukraine (Hofer 2008). For one, successful EU rule transfer requires that there be an economic necessity for reform in the country. In addition, however, the EU needs to apply proactive accession conditionality in order to overcome domestic interest group opposition. The absence of this second condition explains why EU influence in Ukraine has been weak in comparison to Bulgaria and Serbia (see also Gawrich, Melnykovska, and Schweikert 2010). In this sector, however, ineffectiveness may be the result of more than simple reluctance of the EU to provide a membership incentive and active monitoring. As Adam Stulberg and Sandra Lavenex point out, the policy field of energy “constitutes a rare set of issues of rough parity between Brussels and ENP partners” with mutual vulnerabilities and complementary interests (Stulberg and Lavenex 2007: 137) so that the EU would not have the bargaining power to impose its energy policy rules on ENP countries unilaterally.

Moreover, most studies show in comparative case studies that the expectation of weak Europeanization does not hold across the board. First, countries may embark on a strategy of anticipatory adaptation, which consists in adopting EU rules in the absence of a membership perspective but with the expectation that such voluntary adaptation might at some point persuade the EU to grant a membership perspective. European ENP countries such as Moldova or Ukraine, which are in principle eligible for EU membership according to the EU’s treaty rules, are therefore, on the whole, more willing to adopt EU rules than others (Barbé et al. 2009; Gawrich, Melnykovska, and Schweikert 2010; Sasse 2008; Verdun and Chira 2008; Wolczuk 2009). Langbein and Wolczuk (2012) caution, however, that this strategy mainly accounts for the openness of Ukraine towards accepting EU rules as the basis for
cooperation ("declarative Europeanization") but does not explain the highly uneven implementation of EU rules (see also Freyburg et al. 2009; 2011 on the results of EU democratic governance promotion; section 6.1). Second, ENP countries may still orient themselves to EU rules if (asymmetrical) interdependence with the EU, and the EU bargaining power resulting from such interdependence, are high. In this perspective, energy-rich countries (such as Azerbaijan or Algeria) and countries predominantly dependent on Russia for economic or security reasons (such as Armenia) are unlikely candidates for strong Europeanization effects. Again, however, there is selective and varying rule adoption in both more independent countries and more dependent countries (e.g. Börzel and Pamuk 2012) and even Russian influence cannot be treated as uniformly impeding or preventing Europeanization (Langbein 2013). Finally, it may be conjectured that more democratic regimes and countries are more likely to engage in Europeanization than more authoritarian ones. In their analysis of Ukraine, however, Langbein and Wolczuk demonstrate "the limited extent to which regime type … impacts convergence" (2012: 865).

The upshot of these findings is that explanations of ENP Europeanization do not work consistently at the country level but need to be located at the policy level and need to take into account the domestic and international policy context (Langbein and Börzel 2013: 574). This certainly is a sound and empirically substantiated lesson learned in a variety of comparative case studies of different countries and policies conducted by different research teams. A note of caution is in order, however. Country-level explanations based on membership aspirations, regime type, and interdependence are not to be taken as deterministic and might still produce valid probabilistic results in systematic large-n analyses of Europeanization comparing ENP countries across a variety of policy areas and in the longer term. Such studies do not exist, however.

Case studies on Europeanization in the Eastern neighborhood use factors related to the conditionality mechanism to explain the extent of compliance, convergence, or policy change but emphasize that they vary across policies. First, rather than general membership conditionality, policy-specific conditionality and capacity-building are at work. Whereas policy-specific incentives cannot produce rule adoption across the board of EU rules, they can trigger change in specific policy areas provided they are strong and credible and costs for domestic actors are not prohibitive (Ademmer and Börzel 2013: 584; Gawrich, Melnykosvska, and Schweikert; Langbein 2014: 159-160). Langbein further argues that policy conditionality is more effective the more it is not only based on EU-target country intergovernmental relationships but also on “multiple channels of interaction between external actors and domestic state and non-state actors” (2014: 165).

Second, effective policy conditionality depends on policy-specific interdependence. Barbé et al. (2009) argue that countries that do not harbor hopes of eventual accession will only orient themselves to EU rules if interdependence with the EU and EU bargaining power are high. In a comparison of trade, energy and foreign policy relations, Dimitrova and Dragneva (2009) show that the effectiveness of EU rule export increases with Ukrainian dependence on the EU instead of Russia. However, even strong dependence on Russia does not necessarily thwart Europeanization. Langbein (2013) argues that we need to disaggregate “Russia” and shows that Russian multinationals have had selective interest in, and the influence to bring about, the adoption of EU rules in Ukraine.

Third, the success of policy conditionality depends on policy-specific domestic adoption costs and veto players. Langbein and Wolczuk (2012: 865) argue that “persistent state capture by powerful business interests accounts for selective rule adoption and application” independent of membership aspirations and regime type. Accordingly, rule adoption and implementation depend on the constellation of policy-specific incentives, interdependence, and veto player costs as well as the extent to which costs are compensated by attractive rewards (such as market access) and capacity-building support (Buzogany 2013; Dimitrova and Dragneva 2013; Langbein 2014). Ademmer and Börzel emphasize that it is not so much the “objective” costs created by institutional misfit that matter but the “preferential fit”, i.e. policy-makers’ “intrinsic motivation to maintain or gain political power by improving their position vis-à-vis veto players or by advancing their own political agenda” (Ademmer and Börzel 2013: 584; see also Buzogany 2013). This explains, for instance, why even non-democratic regimes in the Southern Caucasus have sometimes adopted the EU’s anti-corruption policies if it served their political survival and power interests (Börzel and Pamuk 2012).

In sum, the recent case study literature draws a nuanced picture of Europeanization beyond Europe in the Eastern
neighborhood of the EU: whereas cooperation with the ENP countries often takes place on the basis of EU rules, in particular in the case of countries with membership aspirations, the actual adoption and implementation of EU policy rules depends on clear and credible policy-specific conditionality, the policy-specific dependence of countries on the EU (or other international and transnational actors with an interest in EU rules), and the fit of EU rules with the interests of governments and informal veto players. The policy-specific constellation of these factors explains the selective and partial transfer of EU rules in the neighborhood.

If the conditions of effective policy-specific conditionality are absent or only weakly present, policy transfer fails or remains declaratory and shallow. Generally, the position of the EU is weak if it is in a demandeur position (Lavenex 2014: 895). For instance, Wunderlich (2010) argues that convergence on migration policy between the EU and Morocco was limited because the EU depends on the partner countries for its implementation – thus limiting EU bargaining power. Policy convergence could only be achieved at the cost of considerable concessions by the EU, leading in effect to a softening of EU rules and à la carte cooperation by the partners. If policy conditionality is weak, Europeanization depends on socialization effects or the indirect mechanisms of externalization and imitation. For instance, Langbein and Wolczuk observe some lesson-drawing resulting from membership of local regulators in intergovernmental networks (2012: 875, 877). Lavenex makes a more general argument about the combination of “socio-economic interdependence within the individual sectors” and “the centred dynamics of regulatory, transgovernmental co-operation” (2014: 893) for EU policy export beyond Europe. However, there is little evidence from studies of the ENP that these alternative mechanisms can substitute for conditionality if the conditions of conditionality are weak or absent. In their study of EU external governance in the area of internal security, Lavenex and Wichmann (2009) start with the assumption that socialization through “network governance”, rather than hierarchical policy transfer through conditionality, is more likely to be used and effective in EU-neighborhood relations. Though they find abundant evidence of the existence of such transgovernmental networks, they also come to the conclusion that the operation and effectiveness of these networks is hampered by incompatible administrative structures, cultures, expertise and lack of trust.

The findings on the ENP apply a fortiori to the Russian district of Kaliningrad, which has also been analyzed from a Europeanization perspective (Gänzle, Müntel, and Vinokurov 2008). Although relations between the EU and Kaliningrad are not formally part of the ENP, as an exclave surrounded by EU territory, Kaliningrad was designed to be a “pilot region” for enhanced EU-Russian relations. In spite of this particular geographic situation and the interdependence that comes with it, Europeanization has remained very weak and selective (Gänzle and Münter 2008). Generally, the low level of regional autonomy and Russia’s insistence on safeguarding sovereignty and being treated as a special partner (Meloni 2008) limit the impact of EU rules. However, “weak institutional capabilities and lack of interest” prevent Europeanization even in policy areas with comparatively high regional autonomy (Gänzle and Münter 2008: 251).

7 Conclusions

In the introductory sections of the review, I proposed using the literature on Europeanization in candidate states for membership as a benchmark for the analysis of “Europeanization beyond Europe”. In general, the findings reported here suggest that the dividing line between candidate states and other third countries constitutes a categorical difference for the analysis of the effects of Europeanization.

First, though the *acquis communautaire* is at the core of Europeanization in the case of “quasi-members” and candidate countries, the goals and contents of Europeanization beyond Europe – at least those analyzed in the majority of the literature – are of a more general character. While “regionalism” may still count as an EU-specific goal, which, if effectively pursued, would result in a distinctive “Europeanization” beyond Europe, other core goals such as stability and security or democracy and human rights are clearly less related to the EU’s *acquis* and less specific to the EU’s external relations. However, there is a clear tendency in the more recent literature on the ENP to redress the balance in favor of the whole range of EU policies.
Second, even though positive political conditionality became a general feature of EU relations with third countries in the 1990s, it has been used less consistently than in EU relations with potential member states. Moreover, other instruments for promoting EU core values and norms – such as domestic empowerment of civil society or socialization through transgovernmental cooperation – do not appear to have been consistent and effective substitutes for accession conditionality.

Third, the Europeanizing impact of these strategies has been patchy and often weak beyond the group of credible candidates for EU membership. The causes are manifold: low incentives and low consistency of policy on the part of the EU and serious domestic obstacles to Europeanization on the part of third countries. In sum, membership, or the prospect thereof, appears to be a crucial condition of effective Europeanization across the board of policies. With regard to its specific normative and regulatory content and its instruments and impact, Europeanization beyond Europe is substantially weaker than Europeanization in Europe. There is, however, a clear distinction in the findings of the literature regarding the promotion of democracy and human rights, on the one hand, and rule transfer in other policy areas, on the other.

The literature on EU democracy promotion in the neighborhood suggests overdetermined failure. There is a general consensus that democracy and human rights promotion have been inconsistent and ineffective. Studies in this area suggest a high number of explanatory factors contributing to this outcome but do not seem to possess an analytical handle to distinguish these factors according to causal relevance.

Much progress has been made in studying policy-specific Europeanization, especially in the EU’s Eastern neighborhood. The picture is not one of overall failure but of patchy and often weak or shallow rule transfer. General explanations appear to be hard to achieve; the literature is so far dominated by the analysis of case- and policy-specific constellations of factors (Langbein and Börzel 2013: 574) which are, however, mostly related to the conditions of the conditionality mechanism.

Finally, the growing body of empirical research on EU external governance and Europeanization calls for systematic comparison and theoretical synthesis. Sandra Lavenex (2011) proposes a typology of EU external governance arrangements with non-member states based on the scope, legal quality, and monitoring of EU rules and the organizational form of EU-third country relations. In line with the metaphor of “concentric circles”, she shows that the intensity of regulatory and organizational inclusion roughly increases with geographic proximity but also that the sectoral logic (differentiation of external governance by policy areas) trumps the geographic logic beyond the EU’s immediate neighborhood. This sectoral logic gives rise to "functionalist extension" driven by socio-economic interconnections and interdependence, on the one hand, and socialization and lesson-drawing with the help of transgovernmental networks, on the other (Lavenex 2014). In my own recent attempts at synthesis (Schimmelfennig 2010; 2012), I have looked at how the mechanisms, conditions, and effects of Europeanization vary across these “concentric circles” and argue that supranational regulation and relevant market size and dependence are generally the most important conditions of Europeanization beyond the EU. Relevant market interactions and the material, economic incentives that come with them generate the need for external actors to adapt to the rules of European governance. Only to the extent that there is a clearly defined European rule – and one that is centrally decided and hierarchically enforced – can the EU speak with the necessary unity and authority to the outside world. The strong impact that the EU has in the “quasi-member” and candidate countries is predicated upon the high and asymmetric interdependence with these countries, the substantial incentives of membership or full market access, and the hierarchical organization of the accession process as well as the EEA. Relationships with the neighborhood and the rest of the OECD world (e.g. the USA) are characterized by weaker and more symmetrical interdependence, weaker incentives, and a non-hierarchical institutional setting. Whereas the EU cannot impose its entire model in these relationships, it can still have a Europeanizing impact with regard to specific governance rules where the conditions of critical market dependence and supranational regulation are present. Where these are absent, however, the EU’s institutions can merely serve as a model for imitation and lesson-drawing or as a socialization agency.

Endnotes
1 The Cotonou Agreement replaced the Lomé Convention as the general treaty framework between the EU and the group of African, Caribbean, and Pacific states. Its focus is on development policy.

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